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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
handed down in 2001 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court
of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska. The summaries focus on
the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common
law principles interpreted and the essence of the primary holdings.
Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained
in this review without further reference to the cases cited. Full
summaries of the cases in the Appendix are available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/19ALRYearinReview.
The opinions are grouped by general subject matter rather
than the nature of the underlying claims. The summaries are presented alphabetically in the following eleven areas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, torts and trusts and estates.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Akootchook v. United States,1 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a suit
brought by five Alaska Natives challenging denial of their applications for land allotments under the Alaska Native Allotment Act
2
(“ANAA”). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal of
the decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), reasoning that the claims were barred by the res judicata effect of earlier class action suits challenging the IBLA’s denial of applications
based on ancestral use of land rather than personal use. The court
of appeals found the application of res judicata improper because
the ancestral claims common to the classes were not identical to

1. 271 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 1162.
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these plaintiffs’ personal claims.3 However, the court affirmed the
district court’s ruling by deferring to the IBLA’s interpretation of
the ANAA and the IBLA’s requirement that use of the land applied for must be accomplished by an independent individual acting
4
in his own right and not by a minor. The court acknowledged the
plaintiffs’ interpretation that the ANAA focuses on communal
rather than personal use as reasonable, but held that “it is not the
only reasonable interpretation and does not compel us to strike
5
down the IBLA’s interpretation.”
6
In Alaska v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that it had jurisdiction to review three EPA orders which in7
validated air quality construction permits. The orders determined
that a new power generator at Conmico’s Red Dog Mine facility
did not comply with the Clean Air Act and prevented Conmico
from beginning any construction or modification activities associated with the generator. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and Conmico petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review of the orders. The EPA argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction because the orders did not constitute the “final action
8
of the Administrator.” The Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction
was proper because the orders (1) represented a final position asserted by the EPA on the factual circumstances upon which the orders were predicated; (2) determined the “rights or obligations” of
the parties by preventing further construction or modification at
the facility; and (3) indicated that “legal consequences will flow” in
9
the form of penalties if Conmico chose to disregard the orders.
However, the court declined to consider the merits of the case until
the EPA submitted a complete administrative record, withdrew the
orders in question or filed an enforcement action in the appropri10
ate district court.
In Bullock v. State, Dep’t of Community and Regional Affairs,11
the supreme court held that when the value of all taxable property
of a municipality exceeds the 225% valuation cap on the total
property value that municipalities may tax under Alaska Statutes
(“A.S.”) 29.45.080, the municipality may reduce the value of all
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1166-67.
Id. at 1167.
244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id. (applying Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).
Id. at 751.
19 P.3d 1209 (Alaska 2001).
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taxable property on a pro-rata basis.12 The court also held that under A.S. 29.45.100, the 225% limitation does not apply to the impo13
sition of taxes for debt service. Bullock asserted that section
29.45.080 requires the municipality to reduce the value of oil and
gas property taxes so that when added to the full value of all other
taxable property, the total amount does not exceed the cap. The
State advocated the pro-rata reduction of the assessed value of all
the property in the municipality to arrive at the maximum value
under the cap, the method practiced since the introduction of the
statute. Finding ambiguity in the statutory language and history,
the supreme court deferred to the State’s long-standing interpreta14
tion of the statute and upheld the pro-rata reduction. Bullock
also argued that municipalities must apply the valuation cap to
taxes for repaying bonded indebtedness, but the court held that the
valuation cap limitations do not apply to taxes levied to pay the
15
principal and interest on bonds.
16
In In re Friedman, the supreme court reduced a sanction entered by the Alaska Bar Association’s disciplinary board against an
attorney who drew on a settlement trust account to advance funds
to his client and to pay himself attorney’s fees that were not yet due
17
him. Friedman, the attorney for a plaintiff in a complex tort suit,
deposited an $81,000 settlement contribution in his client trust account. Friedman drew on that account almost immediately, without informing the other plaintiffs’ attorneys. The supreme court
agreed with the disciplinary board’s finding that Friedman violated
disciplinary rules against conduct involving dishonesty, mishandling
18
of client funds and illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
However, the court disagreed with the finding that Friedman engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and
19
reduced Friedman’s suspension to three years. Friedman’s initial
denial of any wrong-doing was an aggravating factor, but his lack of
a prior disciplinary record, the absence of loss or injury to his clients, his commitment to pro bono and public service and the measures he took to remedy the problems caused by his misconduct
20
convinced the court that a three-year suspension was appropriate.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1218.
23 P.3d 620 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 627-30.
Id. at 628-29, 634.
Id. at 634.
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In Interior Alaska Airboat Assoc., Inc. v. State,21 the supreme
court held that the Board of Game’s regulations establishing two
controlled use areas (“CUAs”) are constitutional, are within the
22
Board’s authority and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The
Noatak and Nenana CUAs restrict hunter access by aircraft in certain areas to help reduce moose harvests, to prevent habitat alteration and to resolve conflicts between hunters using planes and airboats for access and hunters using other transportation. The
Interior Alaska Airboat Association challenged the regulations,
but the supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for
23
the Board. The court rejected the Association’s constitutional arguments that the regulations deny equal access, finding that the
CUAs are open to any resident who wants to use them and that the
24
equipment limitations apply equally to all users. The court found
that the regulations are within the statutory authority of the Board
and are consistent with its conservation and development goals,
and that the record showed that the Board’s decisionmaking proc25
ess was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Repasky,26 the supreme court
reversed the superior court and held that the mayoral invocation of
the item veto power to reduce the annual budgets of a school district and the local source appropriations for those budgets was a
27
In 1995 and 1997,
valid exercise of the mayor’s veto power.
Mayor Mystrom reduced the budget and local source appropriation
as approved by the Anchorage Municipal Assembly. Citizens
challenged his authority to veto the district’s budgets, claiming that
the mayor did not have line item veto authority over the school
budget and that state law impliedly prohibited his veto power. The
supreme court interpreted subsection 5.02(c) of the Home Rule
Charter for the Municipality of Anchorage as granting the mayor
both general and line item veto power over the school district
28
budget and local appropriation ordinances. The court held that
Alaska law did not expressly prohibit the grant of veto power to
the mayor and that A.S. 14.14.060(c) did not impliedly prohibit the
municipality’s veto power, even though it is silent about the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

18 P.3d 686 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 690-91, 694.
34 P.3d 302 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 304, 315.
Id. at 307-10.
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power.29 Citing the express prohibition of a mayoral veto of “appropriation items in a school budget ordinance” in all locations
other than home rule municipalities, the court held that the silence
reflected the legislature’s intent to grant each home rule municipality the freedom to decide whether to give its mayor the power to
30
veto a school district budget.
In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt,31 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enjoined the National Park Service (“NPS”) from implementing its plan to increase the number of
cruise ships entering Glacier Bay because the NPS had not com32
plied with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
NEPA requires a federal agency undertaking any major action to
take a “hard look” at the effects of its decision on the environ33
ment. The agency must first prepare an Environmental Assessment (“EA”), followed by an Environmental Impact Statement
34
(“EIS”) if the EA reveals an adverse environmental impact. The
NPS did not complete an EIS even though the EA showed that
there were many unknown effects on whales, Steller sea lions, bald
eagles and waterfowl, and that increased disturbance levels could
compromise the survival and reproduction of marine mammals.
The court determined that “unknown” effects of the increase in
cruise ships constituted grounds for the preparation of an EIS because uncertainty is the reason for the preparation of an EIS, not
35
an excuse to avoid its completion.
In Newmont Alaska Ltd. v. McDowell,36 the supreme court
held that an original claimant had not abandoned mining claims
because a deficient yet timely payment of second year’s rent enti37
tled him to an opportunity to cure the deficiency. Miners who
stake claims to state lands must pay the first year’s rent within
ninety days and the second year’s rent within a set three-month pe38
riod or the claims will be considered abandoned. Clay, the predecessor in interest to Newmont, was the original locator of most of
the 224 mining claims at issue. The Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) applied Clay’s payment to his second year rent,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 310-12.
241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 730.
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2001)).
Id. at 729.
22 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 885.
Id. at 882.
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determining that he had failed to pay year one and thus had abandoned his claim. The DNR division director rejected this determination, finding Clay’s payment to be a deficient but timely partial
payment that is curable under A.S. 38.05.265. The supreme court
agreed, finding that Clay had actually paid more than one year’s
39
rent because he paid $400 over his year one obligation. Therefore, his year two payment was deficient, but timely and abandon40
ment did not result.
In Snyder v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,41 the supreme court
affirmed the revocation of Snyder’s driver’s license based on his re42
fusal to take a breath test. After his arrest for driving while intoxicated, Snyder made two requests for a blood alcohol content
test, which were refused. Snyder attempted to take a breath test
several times, but never provided an adequate sample and was
charged with refusal to submit to a test. Snyder’s driver’s license
was revoked, but he claimed that a chest injury had prevented him
from blowing sufficiently into the machine. The hearing officer
found that Snyder was unwilling to perform the tests, not merely
physically incapable. In affirming, the supreme court reasoned that
the revocation was based solely on Snyder’s refusal to take the
43
breath test, irrespective of what a blood test might have revealed.
44
In Tlingit-Haida Regional Electric Authority v. State, the supreme court upheld the Alaska Public Utility Commission’s
(“Commission”) decision to eliminate overlap between two utili45
ties. Twenty-five years ago, the Commission created overlapping
service territory between the Tlingit-Haida Regional Electric
Authority (“THREA”) and the Alaska Power Company. In 1993,
the Commission awarded the Klawock territory to Alaska Power,
eliminating the overlap. THREA appealed the award to the superior court, which remanded the case to the Commission for further
factual determinations. On remand, the Commission found, as before, that the public interest required that Alaska Power serve
Klawock exclusively and that this would not hinder the purposes of
the Rural Electrification Act. THREA appealed, and the superior
court affirmed but found THREA’s loss of its Klawock facility to
be a compensable taking. The supreme court affirmed, finding that
the Commission did not err when it chose to favor one expert’s tes39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 883-84.
Id.
31 P.3d 770 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 776.
15 P.3d 754 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 770.
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timony over that of another, that THREA was entitled to compensation for the physical assets stranded by the Commission’s decision and that the Rural Electrification Act did not preempt the
46
Commission’s restriction of THREA’s territory.
In Whitesides v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,47 the supreme
court held that the Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) violated
Whitesides’ due process rights when it denied him an in-person li48
cense revocation hearing. Whitesides was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and had his driver’s license revoked for refusing
to take a breath test. Whitesides claimed he had agreed to take the
test and sought review of the revocation. The DMV scheduled a
telephone hearing over Whitesides’ objections, and the hearing officer found that Whitesides had refused the breath test and revoked his license for one year. The supreme court found that a
driver’s license is an important property interest, that in-person testimony is a valuable tool for evaluating the credibility of witnesses
and that the government’s interest in cost savings would not be
greatly prejudiced by granting in-person hearings where credibility
49
is at issue. The court held that there were material issues about
Whitesides’ credibility that needed to be resolved and, therefore,
50
an in-person revocation hearing should have been held.
51
In In re Wiederholt, the supreme court held that a disbarred
attorney petitioning for reinstatement must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has acknowledged wrongdoing, re52
habilitated past conduct and is fit to practice law. Wiederholt was
disbarred in 1994 for knowingly filing a false pleading and affidavit
and for forging his client’s signature to endorse a check. Wiederholt petitioned for reinstatement after five years, but the Bar Association Disciplinary Board denied his request. In a matter of first
impression, the supreme court held that under the Alaska Bar
Rules, a presumption against reinstatement exists to protect the
public and the petitioning attorney must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has met the competency and
53
knowledge requirements under Alaska Bar Rule 29. The court
affirmed, holding that the Board appropriately considered Wieder-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 764-67.
20 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1132-38 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id. at 1139.
24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1225-26.
Id. at 1223, 1226.
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holt’s past conduct, remorse and acknowledgment of wrongdoing
and the length of his disbarment when considering reinstatement.54
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Alderman v. Iditarod Properties, Inc.,55 the supreme court
held that where a trade name has acquired secondary meaning
prior to use by another business, it is infringed when confusion re56
The court also held that A.S.
sults from another’s use of it.
10.35.040 requires prior use of a business name for its valid regis57
tration. Iditarod Properties, Inc. (“Iditarod”) restored the historic
Fourth Avenue Theatre and ran several businesses from the premises. The Aldermans ran a trolley from the theater. After a disagreement resulted in severance of the oral agreement between
Iditarod and the Aldermans, the Aldermans registered the business
name “Fourth Avenue Theater Trolley Tours.” Iditarod later ran a
trolley tour business under the same name, and filed suit for trade
name infringement against the Aldermans. Because the evidence
supported the jury’s finding that the trade name “Fourth Avenue
Theater” had acquired secondary meaning, the supreme court
58
found that the Aldermans’ use was infringing. The court also affirmed the interpretation of section 10.35.040 to require prior use
59
for registration of a trade name.
60
In Hartung v. State, Dep’t of Labor, the supreme court held
that when bankruptcy intervenes, a corporate officer is not liable
for tax payments that become due during the post-petition period
during which bankruptcy prevents the officer from making pay61
ments. Hartung was the chief financial officer of MarkAir, which
filed for bankruptcy in April 1995. The Department of Labor determined that Hartung was responsible for paying $135,026 in unemployment taxes owed by MarkAir for the first quarter of 1995.
The superior court affirmed the Department’s decision on appeal.
However, the supreme court reversed, finding that Hartung was
not a party against whom tax liability for unemployment contributions could be assessed because the bankruptcy order prevented
him from compelling payment and because he was not in a position
to ensure that MarkAir paid employer contributions due in the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1227-28.
32 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 392-94.
Id. at 387-89.
Id. at 392-94.
22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 4.
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post-petition period.62 The court noted that Hartung might be held
liable for the employee contribution portion of the taxes but that
63
the issue was not adequately addressed by the parties.
In Hoffman Construction Co. of Alaska v. U.S. Fabrication &
64
Erection, Inc., the supreme court held that the duty to defend in
an indemnity clause is triggered by claims of injury falling within
the scope of the clause, while the duty to indemnify is not triggered
65
until the indemnitee is liable for damages. Four U.S. Fabrication
& Erection, Inc. (“USF&E”) employees brought suit alleging that
they had been exposed to asbestos while working at a construction
project at Providence Hospital in Anchorage. Hoffman settled the
suit and sought indemnity from subcontractor USF&E under a
contractual indemnity provision. USF&E simultaneously sought
indemnity and defense from Hoffman under an implied contractual
theory, and Providence sought indemnity and defense costs from
Hoffman under a contractual indemnity provision. Because the
workers’ claims were within the scope of the Providence/Hoffman
contract, the supreme court held that Hoffman owed Providence
the duty to defend, but not to indemnify, since Hoffman had settled
66
with the workers. The court reversed the ruling that USF&E did
not owe Hoffman a duty to defend because the employees’ claims
were within the scope of the Hoffman/USF&E indemnity clause
and because A.S. 45.45.900, the public duty exception, the policy of
nondelegable duties and the doctrine of unclean hands did not pre67
vent enforcement of the indemnity clause. Lastly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for USF&E on the issue of
implied contractual indemnity because the indemnitor, Hoffman,
was receiving rather than performing the contractual service and,
68
as a result, the Kandik Construction model for implied contractual
69
indemnity did not apply.
In Long v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc.,70 the supreme
court reversed a grant of summary judgment because it found a
71
limitations clause in Holland America’s contract unenforceable.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 5.
64. 32 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2001).
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 355-56.
67. Id. at 360.
68. Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik Const., Inc., 823 P.2d 632
(Alaska 1991).
69. Hoffman, 32 P.3d at 361-62.
70. 26 P.3d 430 (Alaska 2001).
71. Id. at 437.
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Long sustained injuries during a Holland America tour of Alaska.
The tour contract contained a choice of law provision stating that
Washington state law would control and that notice of personal
injury claims must be provided within six months of the alleged injury and suit filed within one year. Long’s attorney gave Holland
America notice of Long’s claim after ten and one-half months and
filed suit after sixteen months. The supreme court found that the
limitations provision in the contract was enforceable because
Alaska law was applicable under the Restatement (Second) of
72
Conflict of Laws, because applying Washington state law would
73
violate a fundamental policy of the State of Alaska, and because a
74
contractual limitations period is unenforceable in Alaska.
In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,75 the supreme court held that a waiver agreement with the IRS stays the
statute of limitations for Alaska state income taxes to the extent
76
that the tax issue is covered by the federal waiver. LouisianaPacific received a refund of taxes paid to the State, but a subsequent audit revealed that the corporation did not request the refund within the three-year period required. Louisiana-Pacific
maintained that waiver agreements with the IRS stayed the statute
of limitations and refused to return the refund. The supreme court
held that a waiver agreement between the IRS and a taxpayer stays
77
the statute of limitations for Alaska state taxes. The court reasoned that the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code by reference
under A.S. 43.20.021 includes the portion concerning extensions of
78
The court remanded to determine
the statute of limitations.
whether the issues in the waiver agreements were related to Lou79
isiana-Pacific’s state tax liability and refund.
80
In McCormick v. City of Dillingham, the supreme court held
that Dillingham’s business license fee and sales tax are valid, and
that McCormick was personally liable for his corporation’s failure
81
to pay them. Dillingham sued to collect its business license fee
and sales taxes from McCormick, who alleged that those ordi-

72. Id. at 432-33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
187(2)(b) (1971)).
73. Id. at 432-34.
74. Id. at 435-37.
75. 26 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2001).
76. Id. at 429.
77. Id. at 427 (citing Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 238 (Alaska 1966)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 430.
80. 16 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2001).
81. Id. at 745.
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nances had never been legally enacted. The superior court granted
summary judgment for Dillingham, finding the ordinances valid
and McCormick personally liable for his corporation’s debts. On
appeal, the supreme court found that McCormick had failed to
overcome the presumption that “proceedings of the governing
body of a municipality have been conducted in accordance with the
82
law.” Although Dillingham’s sales tax ordinance included a reference to a lost exhibit and was mislabeled, the court held that
these “anomalies . . . [do] not [establish] that the city failed to com83
ply with the law.” The court also found that the business license
fee ordinance had been properly enacted and was not preempted
84
by the state business license law. Finally, the supreme court determined that the trial court had not acted improperly in piercing
the corporate veil because the company was under McCormick’s
control and was incorporated by him, was inadequately capitalized
85
and used McCormick’s personal property without payment.
86
In Magden v. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union, the supreme
court upheld the delayed execution of judgment against a creditor
because the credit union had no evidence that the creditor had any
assets upon which it could execute and it had been barred from
87
collecting against the creditor’s income. The Alaska USA Federal
Credit Union (“AUSA”) sought to execute a deficiency judgment
against Magden. However, Magden successfully moved to exempt
her income and entered into a settlement in which AUSA agreed
not to execute against her permanent fund dividends. After Magden failed to adhere to the settlement, AUSA moved for execution. Magden opposed the motion, arguing that execution was
barred by A.S. 09.35.020, which provides that no execution may be
entered when five years have elapsed after entry of judgment unless the creditor provides “just and sufficient reasons” for delay.
The court found that AUSA had “just and sufficient reasons” because it was barred from executing against Magden’s permanent
fund dividend and could not execute against her regular income
88
because she had successfully sought exemption.
In Old Harbor Native Corp. v. Afognak Joint Venture,89 the supreme court reversed a grant of summary judgment because the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 742-45.
36 P.3d 659 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 662.
Id.
30 P.3d 101 (Alaska 2001).

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

2002]

06/04/02 2:07 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

213

Afognak Joint Venture had a fiduciary duty to disclose the status
of a contemporaneous lawsuit after the Old Harbor Native Corpo90
ration withdrew from the venture. In 1982, Old Harbor Native
Corporation (“Old Harbor”) and Akhiok-Kaguyak, Inc. (“Akhiok”) entered into a joint venture agreement with other corporations to receive land from the federal government. In 1989, Old
Harbor and Akhiok relinquished membership in the Joint Venture
after the Exxon Valdez spilled oil on the Joint Venture’s land. In
July 1991, Old Harbor, Akhiok and the Joint Venture reached a
partition agreement and executed a release of claims. Subsequently, the Joint Venture received $22 million in a settlement with
Exxon. The supreme court held that the release of claims in 1991
did not bar the corporations’ claims to their part of the settlement
91
agreement. The court held that because members of a dissolving
joint venture continue to owe each other a fiduciary duty of disclosure from the time of dissolution until the venture winds up its affairs, the Joint Venture owed a duty to disclose the status of the
Exxon claim during the period following the corporations’ with92
drawal and prior to the completion of the partitioning process.
93
In Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., the supreme court held that the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) authorizes Native corporations to issue shares to certain groups of Native elders
94
without consideration. The court was equally divided on whether
Goldbelt satisfied its disclosure duty in its proxy statement regard95
ing the elder benefit program. In 1997, a majority of Goldbelt
shareholders authorized issuance of one hundred shares to original
Goldbelt shareholders who reached the age of 65. Sierra filed suit,
arguing that Goldbelt could not limit issuance of these new shares
to elders who were original shareholders or to elders who are no
longer shareholders. Sierra appealed the grant of summary judgment for Goldbelt. The supreme court held that the ANCSA
clearly allows Native corporations to discriminate in favor of original shareholders and does not limit the corporations’ ability to issue elder stock only to those elders who still own the original
96
shares. The court also held that because the ANCSA expressly
preempts Alaska corporate law, Goldbelt was authorized to issue

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 109.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106-07.
25 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id. at 701-02.
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new stock to non-shareholders without consideration.97 The court
split on the question of the adequacy of Goldbelt’s proxy solicitation, thereby affirming the lower court’s summary judgment on the
98
issue “without substantive discussion.”
In Sprucewood Investment Corp. v. Alaska Housing Finance
99
Corp., the supreme court affirmed the ruling that Sprucewood’s
100
Alaska
appeal of a temporary restraining order was moot.
Housing Finance Corporation (“AHFC”) awarded a contract to
Northern Construction and Equipment for the demolition of various buildings. After the contract was awarded, Northern Construction learned that other bidders had intended to move the buildings
off site and salvage them. Consequently, Northern Construction
abandoned its plans to raze the buildings and instead sold them to
Sprucewood. Upon learning that the buildings had been sold,
AHFC obtained a temporary restraining order against Sprucewood
and was granted summary judgment on its breach of contract
claims against Northern Construction. AHFC then sold the buildings to another investment company rather than demolish them.
On appeal, the supreme court held that Sprucewood’s appeal of the
restraining order was moot because a reversal of the order would
not enable Sprucewood to do anything with the buildings now
101
The court also found
owned by another investment company.
that the superior court correctly granted summary judgment to
AHFC on its breach of contract claims because, since both parties
understood that the contract required demolition of the buildings,
102
The court
it was enforceable in accordance with that meaning.
upheld dismissal of Sprucewood’s counterclaim for negligence in
103
Finally,
drafting, finding that the contract was not ambiguous.
the court upheld dismissal of Sprucewood’s counterclaim for economic waste because the waste claim was rendered moot when the
104
buildings were sold rather than demolished.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
33 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
105
In Falconer v. Adams, the supreme court held that a codefendant, Adams, was not entitled to draw his award of attorney’s
106
fees over a lien filed by Falconer’s attorney. In an auto collision
case, the jury found that defendant Taylor-Welch was negligent
and that co-defendant Adams was not negligent. The attorney for
plaintiff Falconer filed a lien for $18,583, and the trial court
awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Adams against Falconer for
$10,623.25. A judgment of $13,873 was entered against TaylorWelch in favor of Falconer. Falconer argued that the attorney lien
had priority over Adams’ claim under A.S. 34.35.430(b). The court
recognized that the language in that section seemed to refer to all
parties in a proceeding, but noted that the section has been interpreted narrowly to apply only to the rights of the party paying the
107
proceeds against which the lien is asserted. The court concluded
that section 34.35.430(b) refers only to each plaintiff’s rights vis-àvis each defendant’s rights and therefore held that the attorney’s
108
lien has priority.
109
In Hodge v. Sorba, the supreme court affirmed the award of
110
attorney’s fees to Sorba. Sorba was granted attorney’s fees after
the superior court entered a divorce decree and adjudicated child
custody, support and property division. Because she had no income, Sorba’s attorneys agreed to represent her in exchange for
the attorney’s fees, if any, awarded by the superior court. Hodge
argued that Sorba’s fee arrangement was a contingent fee arrangement, which denied the court the authority to award attorney’s fees under Alaska Bar Rule 35(d). The supreme court held
that the superior court had the authority to award attorney’s fees
111
under A.S. 25.24.140. The underlying fee arrangement was not
“contingent” because the arrangement turned on the financial resources of the parties rather than on successful prosecution of the
112
issues. The court also held that its decision in Coleman v. Cole113
man suggested that an attorney’s fee award in a domestic pro105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

20 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585-86.
Id.
31 P.3d 1273 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1273.
Hodge, 31 P.3d at 1275.
Id.
968 P.2d 570, 573-74 (Alaska 1998).
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ceeding will not turn on whether the proceeding is one for a divorce and, therefore, there was no prohibition against contingent
114
attorney fee agreements in domestic matters.
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Rewire The Board,115 the supreme court held that Rewire prevailed in the superior court as a
public interest litigant and upheld the attorney’s fee award and two
counts of contempt against the Matanuska Electric Association
116
(“MEA”). A group of MEA members called Rewire the Board
(“Rewire”) proposed a bylaw amendment and sued to recall all of
MEA’s directors. Because Rewire’s allegations warranted a recall
election, the superior court held it to be a prevailing party. The supreme court upheld Rewire’s status as the prevailing party and as a
public-interest litigant because “most of its members did not have a
117
substantial economic interest in the litigation.” The court found
that it was not “an abuse of discretion to award Rewire attorney’s
fees incurred in responding to MEA’s petitions for review” because
Rewire successfully opposed many of MEA’s arguments on two
118
appeals. The court also overturned findings of contempt against
MEA, for comments made in an unsolicited interview and for photographing picketers supporting Rewire, but affirmed contempt
findings for MEA’s publication of unofficial election results and a
119
letter critical of Rewire as willful violations of the court’s order.
120
In Shearer v. Mundt, the supreme court held that lay pro se
121
litigants are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. Layperson Shearer successfully defended title to his land pro se and requested attorney’s fees. The superior court rejected his claim,
122
holding that “attorney’s fees may not be awarded to lay litigants.”
The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that “the purpose of Rule
82 attorney’s fees is to compensate litigants for fees they incur
through legal representation, not to compensate litigants for the
123
The court also rejected
economic detriment of litigating.”
Shearer’s claim that denying attorney’s fees to lay pro se litigants
violated his right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution

114. Hodge, 31 P.3d at 1275-76.
115. 36 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2001).
116. Id. at 687.
117. Id. at 695-97.
118. Id. at 699.
119. Id. at 701-03.
120. 36 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2001).
121. Id. at 1199.
122. Id. at 1197 (citing Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bernhardt, 794 P.2d
579, 581-82 (Alaska 1990)).
123. Id. at 1198.
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because it treats attorneys and non-attorneys differently.124 The
court reasoned that attorneys and non-attorneys are not similarly
125
situated and, therefore, are not subject to equal protection.
126
In United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Pruitt, the supreme
court held that separate awards of attorney’s fees in a bifurcated
case were appropriate but that the amounts awarded were not justified because the court did not explain why it deviated from
127
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(b)(1). During arbitration of
an insurance case, the case was split into the issues of coverage and
damages. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees for each part of
the bifurcated case. United Services Automobile Association
(“USAA”) argued that the fees should have been awarded only
with respect to coverage, in accordance with the memorializing order. The supreme court disagreed and reasoned that the trial court
did not err because the USAA’s attorney stated in oral argument
128
that “the idea was. . .to award attorney’s fees separately.” However, the supreme court held that the lower court erred in its deviation from the Rule 82(b)(1) fee schedule because it did not calculate the fees according to the schedule and did not adequately
129
describe its reasons for deviating as required by Rule 82(b)(3).
B. Miscellaneous
130
In Baker v. Exxon Corp., a case arising out of the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court’s order, finding that Exxon had standing
to appeal the decision of the district court, that the district court
erred in ruling that Exxon should not be allowed to share in the
punitive damages and that there is no material difference between
131
In July 1999, the
an assignment and a “cede back” agreement.
district court granted final approval to the allocation plan for seafood processors included in the plaintiffs’ class. The plan excluded
some processors because they had settled with Exxon before certification of the mandatory punitive damages class by assigning part
of their punitive damages claims to Exxon in exchange for money.
Exxon filed suit to recover a portion of the punitive damages pursuant to its assignments. The district court held that Exxon should
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1199.
Id.
38 P.3d 528 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533 (citing State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 440, 446 (Alaska 1998)).
239 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 987.

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

218

06/04/02 2:07 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:1

be prevented from sharing in the punitive damages. The Ninth
Circuit found that Exxon had standing to appeal without intervening because Exxon was already a party to the suit, thereby falling
132
within the rule that only parties can appeal adverse judgments.
The court found that public policy supports settlement of disputes
and favors settlements where the plaintiffs assign their punitive
133
damages awards to the defendant. The court found that assignments are not materially different from “cede backs,” which were
134
permitted in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Baker, and that the settle135
ments should stand.
In Botelho v. Griffin,136 the supreme court held that Attorney
General Botelho could pursue a claim on behalf of, and without
consent from, various charitable organizations against the Griffins
137
for violating state gaming laws. Botelho alleged that the Griffins
failed to turn over the statutory minimum percentage of gaming
proceeds to the charities and charged some charities excessive fees.
The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment for
the Griffins, reasoning that statutory and common law give the attorney general standing to bring suit to uphold state gaming laws,
and that intervention by the attorney general is appropriate if the
charities’ trustees dismiss or compromise the charities’ claims for
138
less than the charities are due.
139
In Bradley v. State, the court of appeals held that a former
law clerk may serve as an attorney in a case which was pending
during his clerkship if he did not personally or substantially partici140
pate in the case or if all parties consent. Plaintiff Bradley’s appeal was pending during Maarten Vermaat’s clerkship in the 19992000 term. Bradley did not object to Vermaat serving as the State’s
lawyer in his case and Vermaat submitted an affidavit stating that
he had no contact with Bradley’s case during his clerkship. The
court decided that under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 104,
Vermaat should not serve as attorney for Alaska, but noted that
the more recently adopted Rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional
141
Conduct is much narrower in its disqualification of law clerks.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 988.
229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
Baker, 239 F.3d at 988.
25 P.3d 689 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 691, 696.
Id. at 692-93.
16 P.3d 187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 188-89.
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The court adopted the language of Rule 1.12 as it applies to law
clerks and established the procedure for former clerks to serve as
attorneys in such cases, which involves submitting a motion and af142
fidavit disclosing “all pertinent facts.”
143
In Brown v. Lange, the supreme court held that pro se defendant Brown was not entitled to notice of default judgment
against him and that Lange’s attorney owed no independent pro144
fessional duty to give such notice. Lange, a passenger in a boat
driven by Willis, sued Brown and Willis after their boats collided.
After receiving the complaint, Brown called Lange’s attorney and
left a recorded message asking for the court date. The attorney’s
receptionist returned the call, informing Brown’s mother that no
court date had been set and that Brown needed to answer the
complaint. Brown did not answer and default judgment was entered against him. Brown argued that the default judgment should
be set aside because he “appeared” and was therefore entitled to
service of the application for entry of default under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 55. The supreme court declined to find Brown’s
145
act of leaving the message as an “appearance” under the Rule.
Without this appearance, the clerk of court was permitted to enter
a default judgment without requiring service of the application for
146
default on the defendant. The court also held that an attorney’s
professional obligation to contact known opposing counsel who
had requested an extension and to inquire of his or her intentions
before seeking default did not extend to a pro se defendant who
147
merely made a single telephone call inquiring about a court date.
148
In Hallam v. Holland America Line, Inc., the supreme court
held that the superior court did not err in denying class certification
to pro se litigant Hallam, but remanded the case for consideration
149
of Hallam’s conditional class certification motion. Hallam filed a
pro se complaint in superior court against Holland America for
claims involving his employment contract and the Alaska Wage
and Hour Act. Hallam’s motion for class certification was denied
because Hallam lacked counsel. Hallam’s subsequent motion
seeking certification of the class conditioned on Hallam’s hiring an
attorney was never decided. The district court granted summary
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 190.
21 P.3d 822 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 826, 828.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 828.
27 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 754.
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judgment to Holland America. The supreme court found that
while the denial of class certification with Hallam as a pro se litigant was not erroneous, the issue of conditional class certification
must be considered on remand because the district court did not
150
give the motion due consideration.
151
In Leisnoi v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction over an
152
action under the Quiet Title Act, because the United States
claimed an interest in the property at issue in the form of reserve
easements and because title between Leisnoi and the U.S. was dis153
When a third party filed a lis pendens on behalf of the
puted.
U.S. against Leisnoi Inc., an Alaska Native Village Corporation
wishing to sell land, Leisnoi filed an action in district court to quiet
title. The court of appeals found that the district court retained jurisdiction because the U.S. claimed reserved easements in Leisnoi’s
property and because the U.S.’s interests in title were asserted by a
third party, clouding Leisnoi’s title and resulting in a continuing
154
dispute between the interests of Leisnoi and the U.S.
155
In Smith v. Cleary, the supreme court held that the superior
court did not exceed its approval authority by requiring an Arizona
private correctional facility to meet the standards outlined in a settlement agreement between the State and a class of prisoners,
156
which addressed overcrowding in Alaska prisons. The State and
the prisoners’ class entered into a settlement, which enumerated
the rights of inmates, outlined population guidelines, detailed
prison standards, established mechanisms for compliance and designated a judge to enforce the agreement. In response to superior
court sanctions for overcrowding, the State contracted with a private detention facility in Arizona to house 206 Alaska inmates.
The superior court conditioned its approval of the contract on the
Arizona facility’s compliance with the settlement agreement. The
supreme court first found that the settlement agreement did not directly apply to the Arizona facility because neither party intended
157
However, because the
the provisions to cover such a facility.
agreement required the State to submit mitigation plans for court
approval if the State sought to limit overcrowding and because the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 754.
267 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (1994).
Leisnoi, 267 F.3d at 1023.
Id.
24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1249.
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Arizona detention facility plan was intended to limit overcrowding,
the court held that the superior court had discretion to require the
158
Arizona facility to comply with the settlement agreement.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles,159 the supreme court
held that the Governor’s item veto power only permits the deletion
or reduction of money appropriated and does not permit the Gov160
ernor to increase or divert funds or strike descriptive language.
Governor Knowles invoked the Governor’s item veto power and
struck various parts of the 1997 appropriation bills passed by the
Alaska legislature. The Alaska Legislative Council challenged five
of these vetoes, arguing that they were invalid because they did not
eliminate “items” and that Knowles had failed to adequately explain the vetoes. Knowles countered that the vetoed provisions
were invalid because they violated the Alaska Constitution’s confinement clause requiring that appropriation bills be confined to
161
For purposes of the item veto power, the suappropriations.
preme court defined “item” as “a sum of money dedicated to a par162
The court held that although Knowles suffiticular purpose.”
ciently explained each veto, all five were invalid because the vetoed
provisions were not “items” subject to the Governor’s item veto
163
power. In holding that three of the vetoed provisions violated the
164
confinement clause, the court approved a five-part non-exclusive
test requiring that an appropriation not administer a program of
expenditures, enact or amend law, or extend beyond the life of the
appropriation and that the language be germane to the bill and be
165
the minimum necessary to explain the legislature’s intent.
In Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of
166
Anchorage, the court held that Anchorage’s random drug testing
program for police and fire department employees in safety167
sensitive situations violated the Alaska Constitution. Anchorage
adopted a policy which provided for urinalysis of employees in the
following circumstances: job application, after a traffic accident,
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1250-51.
21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 369; see ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 374-76.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 377.
24 P.3d. 547 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 549.
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promotion, transfer, demotion and at random. Only employees in
positions of “public safety” are subject to random testing and to
promotion, demotion and transfer testing. The police and firefighters filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that suspicionless testing violated their constitutional rights. The superior
court held that the policy was valid. On appeal, the supreme court
168
concluded that urinalysis constitutes a search, and that Anchorage’s interest in ensuring public safety is sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the intrusions on privacy when firefighters and police
employees are subjected to suspicionless urine testing upon application for employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, or after a
169
traffic accident. However, the court held that the State’s interest
in public safety did not outweigh privacy interests in the case of indefinite random testing because random testing: (1) places increased demands on employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy; (2) is more intrusive; and (3) has no logical nexus to any job170
related occurrence. In holding that the random testing program
violated the Alaska Constitution, the court noted that there was no
documented history of substance abuse problems by firefighters
171
and police employees.
172
In Doe v. Otte, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution bars application of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(“ASORA”) to people who committed sex crimes before the Act
173
was enacted. The plaintiffs in Doe were convicted sex offenders
who had completed their sentences. The ASORA “requires sex offender registration, with criminal penalties for failure to register,
and it authorizes full disclosure of information about all offenders
174
to the public.” In evaluating the plaintiffs’ claim, the court noted
that the ex post facto clause prohibits enactment of a law that inflicts a greater punishment than was available when the crime was
175
committed. The court examined first whether the legislature intended the statute to be punitive, and second, whether the statute is
176
so punitive in effect that it should be considered punishment.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 551.
Id. at 556-57 (applying Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980)).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 982.
Id. at 984.
Id. at 984-85 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798)).
Id. at 985 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
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The court found that the intent of the legislature was not punitive
by applying seven factors:
1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; 3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it; and 7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
177
alternative purpose assigned.

The court held that because four of the factors were met, the statute must be considered punitive for ex post facto purposes, and
178
remanded for further proceedings.
179
In Jacobus v. State, the district court of Alaska held that the
State may constitutionally limit individual and corporate contributions to political parties for electing or nominating a candidate, but
it may not restrict donations to political parties for other purposes
180
The court
or limit the volunteering of professional services.
found that while it is constitutional under A.S. 15.13.070(b)(2) for
the State to restrict the amount an individual can contribute to a
political party for the purpose of nominating or electing a candidate, the restriction of donations made for other purposes under
sections 15.13.070(b)(2) and 15.30.400(3) is unconstitutional because it interferes with “the protected rights of speech and associa181
tion.” The court found that restricting or limiting volunteer professional
services
under
section
15.13.400(3)(B)(i)
is
unconstitutional because it is vague and overbearing, it impacts an
individual’s freedom of speech and association, and the State has
182
The court also found that
not provided a compelling interest.
section 15.13.074(f), limiting corporate contributions to political
183
parties for nominating or electing a candidate, is constitutional.
184
In Rollins v. Ulmer, the supreme court held that the registration requirements under Alaska’s medical marijuana law do not
185
violate an individual’s constitutional right to privacy. The medical marijuana law requires authorized users to register with the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 986-87 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)).
Id. at 993-94.
182 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Alaska 2001).
Id. at 893.
Id. at 888-90, 893.
Id. at 890-92.
Id. at 893.
15 P.3d 749 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 754.
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Department of Health and Social Services, which maintains a registry of such users. Rollins claimed that the registration requirements infringe upon the constitutional right to privacy, arguing that
there is no guarantee that the government will comply with the
law’s confidentiality requirements and that the mere existence of
the registry is burdensome because of the fear of stigmatization it
causes. The supreme court found the law constitutional because
the confidentiality provisions barring public access to the registry
and limiting its use to authorized and narrowly specified purposes
186
The court
sufficiently protect the privacy of the information.
held Rollins’ fear of mishandling of the registry to be unsubstantiated and his fear of stigmatization to be too incidental in its deter187
rent effect to establish a constitutional violation.
188
In Sampson v. State, two patients sought a declaratory judgment that Alaska’s ban on assisted suicide violated their constitu189
tional rights to privacy, liberty and equal protection, but the supreme court upheld the statute. The court looked at the history of
assisted suicide and determined that it was not a fundamental lib190
Therefore, the State had to establish
erty or privacy interest.
merely a “legitimate interest and a close and substantial relationship between its interest and the chosen means of advancing that
191
interest.” The court determined that legitimate state interests are
involved, such as protecting vulnerable Alaskans from undue influ192
ence. Furthermore, the court rejected the equal protection claim
using a sliding scale test based on the relative importance of the
state and individual interests and the degree of closeness of the
193
regulation to the interest. The court held that the distinction between the withdrawal of life sustaining care and the active partici194
pation in suicide does not result in over- or under-inclusiveness.
The court also rejected the argument that the law violates equal
protection because those patients capable of committing suicide
195
unassisted are not subject to its chilling effect.

186. Id. at 752-53 (citing Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 570 P.2d 469,
479 (Alaska 1977)).
187. Id. at 753.
188. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
189. Id. at 90.
190. Id. at 91-94.
191. Id. at 91.
192. Id. at 95-96.
193. Id. at 98.
194. Id. at 98-99.
195. Id. at 99.
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In Sands v. Living Word Fellowship,196 the supreme court held
that tort claims based on religious “shunning” are barred by the
197
free exercise clauses of the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions. Sands
and his father, the pastor of Wasilla Ministries, assisted Jodi Hejl, a
member of Living Word Fellowship, in running away from home.
In response, Hejl’s parents alleged that Wasilla Ministries was a
cult, accused Sands of being a cult recruiter and obtained an injunction prohibiting Sands and Wasilla Ministries from having any further contact with the Hejl family. Living Word then sought to warn
the Christian community about the dangerous practices of Wasilla
Ministries and encouraged the community to “shun” its members.
Following his suicide attempt, Sands sued Living Word and the
Hejls for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process. The superior
court dismissed the entire case for failure to state a claim. The supreme court affirmed dismissal of Sands’ abuse of process claims
198
for failure to state the requisite “willful acts” and held that Sands’
tort claims were barred by the free exercise clauses of the U.S. and
Alaska Constitutions because Living Word’s conduct involved religion, was sincere and did not pose a threat to public safety, peace
199
However, the supreme court held that the superior
or order.
court erred in dismissing Sands’ tort claims against the Hejls because Sands alleged that their conduct was not motivated by religion but by a desire to suppress Jodi Hejl’s allegations of sexual
200
abuse by her stepfather.
In State v. Planned Parenthood,201 the supreme court reversed
the summary judgment decision of the superior court holding A.S.
202
Absent judicial waiver, section
18.16.020 unconstitutional.
18.16.020 requires parental consent for an abortion for any une203
The
mancipated, unmarried minor under the age of seventeen.
court first determined that Planned Parenthood and two doctors
who provide abortion services had standing to challenge the stat204
ute’s constitutionality. The court also held that the privacy clause
of the Alaska Constitution creates a self-executing right to reproductive privacy and that minors have the same right of privacy as
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

34 P.3d 955 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 959.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 958-60.
Id. at 962.
35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 32.
Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020 (Michie 2000).
Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d at 34.
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any other citizen; therefore “the state can constrain a minor’s privacy only when necessary to further a compelling state interest and
205
Finally, the court held
only if no less restrictive means exist.”
that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for
Planned Parenthood without hearing evidence of the State’s as206
serted compelling interest. The court therefore remanded for an
207
evidentiary hearing.
In State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services v. Planned Par208
enthood, the supreme court held that a Department of Health
and Social Services (“DHSS”) regulation that denied Medicaid assistance for medically necessary abortions except where there is a
risk of dying or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest violated
209
equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. The court recognized the right to reproductive freedom as a constitutional right
210
and subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the court ruled that once the State establishes a health care
program for the poor, it may not selectively deny medical treatment to a poor woman merely because her health risk arises from
211
The court held that the regulation did not advance
pregnancy.
the State’s purported interest in either the medical and public welfare interests in funding childbirth or the State’s interest in mini212
mizing health risks to the mother and child.
In State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Andrade,213 the supreme court
held that A.S. 42.23.005(a), which restricts alien eligibility for a
permanent fund dividend (“PFD”) to those aliens who are lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States, is constitu214
After being denied dividends, the Andrade family
tional.
brought suit, claiming that the denials violated both the U.S. and
Alaska Constitutions. However, the supreme court held that under
state law, the relevant language of the statute means that “an alien
must be legally present in Alaska and be able to form the requisite
215
intent to remain in Alaska.” Therefore, the statute does not discriminate between similarly situated aliens, but rather differenti-

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 39-41.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 46.
28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 912-13.
23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 61, 80.
Id. at 80-81.
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ates between restricted aliens who cannot form the necessary intent
to remain in Alaska, and nonrestricted aliens who can form the
216
necessary intent. The court also found that the statute does not
violate the supremacy clause because it is not a regulation of immigration, Congress has not preempted state power to regulate PFD
eligibility, and the statute “does not stand as an obstacle . . . of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress in regulating immigra217
tion.” Finally, the court held that the statute does not constitute
national origin discrimination because eligibility stems from a person’s status as a nonrestricted alien and is not based on “cultural
218
characteristics, ancestry, or country of origin.”
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure. In Albers v. State,219 the court of appeals held that “during an investigative stop. . . the police may order or force the detained person to open his hand only if the police
have an articulable reason to suspect that the detained person is
220
holding something that could endanger the police.” A police officer suspected that Albers and another individual were engaged in
illegal drug activity and ordered both men to stand and put their
hands against the wall. Albers did so, but kept his left hand closed.
The officer ordered Albers to unclench his hand and, when he
complied, a rock of crack cocaine dropped to the ground. Albers
was indicted for possession of cocaine and asked the superior court
to suppress the evidence of the cocaine, arguing that the police had
conducted an illegal search. The motion was denied and Albers
was convicted. On appeal, the court analogized the search to a
“pat-down” search and held that it is “justified whenever the circumstances would warrant a reasonably prudent person in suspecting the detainee was armed or otherwise posed a threat to the
221
officer.” Because the superior court did not expressly address the
question of whether the officer had such a belief, the case was re222
manded for reconsideration of the motion to suppress.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 74.
38 P.3d 540 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543.
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In Cowles v. State,223 the supreme court held that a videotape
showing Cowles, the University of Alaska box office manager,
stealing cash from the ticket office was not obtained in violation of
224
After reher constitutional rights and was admissible at trial.
ceiving a tip from one of Cowles’s co-workers, University police installed a hidden video camera above her desk without obtaining a
warrant. Cowles’ desk was in an area of high public traffic. The
camera showed Cowles taking money from the University cash bag
and transferring it to her purse. Cowles was convicted of seconddegree theft and, on appeal, argued that the surveillance was a
violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches guaranteed by the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions. To determine
whether the monitoring was a search, the court employed the expectation of privacy test, which asks: (1) did the person harbor a
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) is that expectation one
225
The court found that
that society recognizes as reasonable?
Cowles’ expectation of privacy was not reasonable considering the
public nature of Cowles’ office and that activities open to public
226
The court rejected
observation are not generally protected.
Cowles’ argument that the location of the camera above her desk
rather than at eye-level placed it in an area where she would not
expect surveillance, stating that simply positioning the camera for
optimum surveillance did not create an expectation of privacy
227
where one did not previously exist. The court also reasoned that
the high-security nature of Cowles’ job made her expectation of
228
privacy less reasonable. The court therefore held that Cowles did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her office and af229
firmed the decision of the court of appeals.
In Haskins v. Municipality of Anchorage,230 the court of appeals held that the entry of police officers into the basement of the
Haskins’ home without consent or justification for a protective
search violated Haskins’ rights under the search and seizure clauses

223. 23 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2001).
224. Id. at 1169.
225. Id. at 1170. The expectation of privacy test under the Alaska Constitution
is substantially the same as under the U.S. Constitution. See California v. Ciraola,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129
(Alaska 1984).
226. Cowles, 23 P.3d at 1171.
227. Id. at 1172.
228. Id. at 1173.
229. Id. at 1175.
230. 22 P.3d 31 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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of the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.231 Police officers knocked on
the door of the Haskins residence because Haskins’ vehicle was
suspected in a hit-and-run accident that had just occurred. Mrs.
Haskins invited the officers inside but told them to go upstairs
while she went downstairs to get her husband. The officers followed her downstairs, arrested Haskins and, based on their observations of him and his vehicle, charged him with driving while intoxicated. Haskins moved to suppress all evidence from the
officers’ entry into his home, claiming it exceeded the scope of consent. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of
Haskins’ motion, finding that the officers’ entry into the basement
232
Alof the home could not be justified as a consensual search.
though warrantless protective searches may sometimes be justified
in the most serious situations, the court found that the facts of this
233
case did not rise to such a level.
234
In State v. Joubert, the supreme court held that a police
235
search of Joubert’s pocket was a valid search incident to arrest.
After detaining Joubert on suspicion of auto theft, the police conducted a pat-down search. The officer felt something small and
hard in Joubert’s pocket, removed the item and found a rock of
crack cocaine. Joubert was arrested for possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver. At trial, Joubert moved to suppress the evidence
of the cocaine, arguing that it was the result of an illegal search.
The trial court allowed the evidence after determining that the officer could have reasonably believed that the unknown object was a
weapon, but the court of appeals reversed. The supreme court reinstated Joubert’s conviction, finding the search valid as a search
incident to arrest in which the crime “fell into the category of
236
crimes evidence of which can be concealed on the person.” Such
searches are valid when the arrest is supported by probable cause,
is not a pretext for the search, is for an offense for which evidence
could be concealed on the suspect and when the search is “roughly
237
contemporaneous” with the arrest.
238
In United States v. Sparks, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling that a search of Sparks’ bag was
not rendered unreasonable merely because the search was per231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
20 P.3d 1115 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1120-21
Id.
Id. at 1118.
265 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001).
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formed by the civilian owner of the loaded guns stolen by Sparks.239
The victim, Fox, suspected Sparks of stealing two of his handguns
after he saw him hitch a ride from the spot where footprints from
Fox’s broken window ended. Fox and a police officer approached
Sparks at a gas station. While searching Sparks, the officer told
Fox to see if his guns were inside the car Sparks was riding in. Fox
found his guns inside Sparks’ bag. On these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest
240
Sparks and conduct a search. Further, the court concluded that
Fox’s role in the search did not render the search unreasonable
since Fox’s role was strictly aiding the officer’s efforts, the officer
was in need of assistance in finding the guns quickly and Fox was
241
limited to doing only what the police had authority to do.
242

2. Miscellaneous. In Bourdon v. State, the court of appeals
held that A.S. 12.30.040(b) violated the equal protection clause of
243
Section 12.30.040(b) denies postthe Alaska Constitution.
conviction bail to defendants convicted of class B or C felonies if
they had prior convictions for first-degree stalking, sexual assault
244
or sexual abuse of a minor. The court of appeals held that section
12.30.040(b)(2) violates the equal protection clause because it does
245
not deny bail in an “even-handed manner.” The statute treated
those with prior felony convictions for sexual assault differently
246
Thus, a defendant with a
from those with current convictions.
prior conviction for a class B or C felony who was convicted of sexual assault would not be denied post-conviction bail, while a defendant with a prior conviction for sexual assault convicted of class B
247
or C felony would be denied bail.
248
In Hertz v. State, the court of appeals held the transfer of an
inmate to an out-of-state private correctional facility to be constitutional and within the authority of the Alaska Department of Cor249
rections (“DOC”). Hertz petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
while serving a term for murder at the privately-owned Central
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
1982)).
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 832.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831-832.
28 P.3d 319 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 320-32; ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.040(b)(2) (Michie 2000).
Id. at 323 (citing Griffith v. State, 641 P.2d 228, 234 (Alaska Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 897.
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Arizona Detention Center (“CADC”). Hertz based his petition on
a number of grounds, including the DOC’s unconstitutional delegation of its incarceration power and the agency’s waiver of jurisdiction over Hertz by sending him to Arizona. The court of appeals
held that Alaska’s delegation of the power of incarceration to a
private facility is constitutional because Alaska law permits transfer of prisoners only when necessary to address prisoner health, security considerations or prison overcrowding, and the CADC must
follow comprehensive Alaska prison management laws and DOC
250
regulations. The court also found that Alaska retained jurisdiction over Hertz because both the legislature and the DOC, in its
contract with the CADC, clearly intended to retain jurisdiction
251
over Alaska inmates serving sentences in out-of-state facilities.
252
In Ragsdale v. State, the court of appeals affirmed Ragsdale’s
conviction of second-degree assault for engaging in sexual penetration of a woman so intoxicated that she was either incapacitated or
253
unaware of the penetration. The court held that the definition of
“incapacitated” under A.S. 11.41.420(a)(3) does not violate the
Alaska Constitution’s single subject clause because the statute
deals with domestic violence, bail and access to records of the
Violent Crimes Compensation Board, which have a common
254
thread. The court also held that the statutory definition of “incapacitated” meets the constitutional standard for definiteness and
255
The court
therefore rejected Ragsdale’s vagueness challenge.
held that the jury did not have to agree on one or both of the alter256
native statutory definitions of “intoxicated.” Because a jury does
not ordinarily have to agree on a single interpretation of the facts
of a particular criminal episode, the trial court properly refused to
instruct the jury that they must reach a unanimous conclusion
about whether Ragsdale knew the woman was incapacitated or
257
whether he knew she was unaware penetration was occurring.
258
In Sanford v. State, the court of appeals held that Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(n)(1) is constitutional and that a
majority of the grand jurors originally sworn in and charged with

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 903-04.
Id. at 900-01.
23 P.3d 653 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 655; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2000).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 658.
24 P.3d 1263 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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instructions is required for indictment.259 Sanford was indicted by a
grand jury for robbery, coercion and assault. The next day, with
only twelve of the original fifteen grand jurors present, the grand
jury voted to indict Sanford for attempted kidnapping. Sanford
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Rule 6(n)(1) required a majority of the initially sworn grand jurors. The State argued that Rule 6(n)(1) violated article I, § 8 of the Alaska Constitution, which provides that the “grand jury shall consist of at least
twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return an in260
The court of appeals held that the constitution was
dictment.”
ambiguous on how many grand jurors must vote for indictment and
that the supreme court had the authority to promulgate Rule
261
6(n)(1) to resolve the issue. Therefore, the method specified in
Rule 6(n)(1) for determining the number of votes necessary was
262
constitutional, and the indictment against Sanford was dismissed.
263
In Wolfe v. State, the court of appeals held that Alaska’s dis264
265
orderly conduct statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Wolfe, a high school teacher, was convicted of disorderly conduct
for shaking a student and pushing him against a desk. Wolfe
claimed that the statute was overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional because it allowed the State to prosecute and punish teachers for using “appropriate force to maintain discipline and protect
266
students and staff.” The court held that the statute is not overbroad because it provides a defense of legal justification or excuse,
which allows teachers, pursuant to school regulations, to use rea267
sonable and appropriate non-deadly force to maintain order.
B. General Criminal Law
268

1. Criminal Procedure. In Evans v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial judge improperly failed to redact the presentence report under Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Alaska Rules of
269
Criminal Procedure. At Evans’ sentencing hearing, he denied the
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 1264.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8; Id. 24 P.3d at 1265.
Sanford, 24 P.3d at 1266.
Id.
24 P.3d 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a)(6) (Michie 2000).
Wolfe, 24 P.3d at 1257-58.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
23 P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 653.
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accounts of his sexual abuse of a child and requested that the alleged offenses be struck from the report. The trial court judge refused, but noted Evans’ denials on the report. The court of appeals
held that the failure to remove the allegations in the pre-sentence
270
Upon Evans’ denial, Rule
report violated Rule 32.2(a)(3).
32.2(a)(3) required the judge to either resolve the truth of the allegations to preserve the pre-sentence report or to conclude that the
allegations made no difference to the sentencing decision and
strike them from the report. Because the trial judge only annotated the report after Evans denied the allegations, the court of appeals remanded the case for the court to comply with the require271
ments of Rule 32.2(a)(3).
272
In Fitts v. State, the court of appeals upheld Fitts’ conviction
273
for first-degree robbery. Fitts and Gonzalez were convicted for
robbing a cab driver at gunpoint. On appeal, Fitts asserted that the
police had conducted an illegal search of his room at Gonzalez’s
house because Gonzalez’s mother did not have the authority to
consent to a search of a room for which he paid a monthly rent.
The court rejected this argument because Gonzalez’s mother did
not have to have actual authority to consent to the search as long as
274
the police reasonably believed she had the authority.
275
In Galimba v. Municipality of Anchorage, the court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that field sobriety tests were a
276
form of Terry search that require reasonable suspicion and that
the police had reasonable suspicion to administer such tests to
277
The police stopped Galimba after witnessing him
Galimba.
making an illegal turn and driving erratically and arrested him for
driving while intoxicated. Galimba moved to suppress the results
of field sobriety tests, arguing that the tests were intrusive enough
to constitute a search and were per se unreasonable when performed without a warrant. The court noted that breath tests are
generally considered searches for constitutional purposes, but field
sobriety tests are not, and that most courts that do consider field
sobriety tests as searches treat them as a form of Terry stop re278
quiring only reasonable suspicion. Without deciding the constitu270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
25 P.3d 1130 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1132-33.
19 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Galimba, 19 P.3d at 612.
Id. at 611-12.
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tional issue, the court of appeals held that the record supported a
finding of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion because
Galimba committed a moving violation, drove erratically and ad279
mitted to consuming several drinks.
280
In Griffin v. State, the court of appeals upheld state criminal
procedures allowing a court-appointed attorney to withdraw from
281
frivolous post-conviction relief applications, but required that a
“no-merit certificate” include “a detailed explanation of why the
attorney has concluded that the petitioner has no colorable
282
Griffin, an indigent, apgrounds for post-conviction relief.”
pealed dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief after
his attorney filed a no-merit certificate. The court rejected Grif283
fin’s argument that it should adopt the rule in Hertz v. State,
which prohibited counsel for an indigent petitioner from withdrawing the petition for post-conviction relief even if the attorney
284
has concluded it was frivolous. The legislature had lawfully enacted the procedures, and the court argued it was “not at liberty to
substitute another procedure simply because we believe it might be
285
better.” However, the court remanded Griffin’s case because the
286
certification did not fully explain why the claims were frivolous.
287
In John v. State, the court of appeals overturned its prior de288
cision in Wilson v. State and held that when an Alaskan villager is
charged with a felony, Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 requires that the presumptive trial site be in the city or town identified by the supreme court venue map as the felony trial site for that
289
district. John was charged with committing felonies in the village
of Tetlin and his trial was scheduled in Fairbanks. Criminal Rule
18 requires establishment of venue districts and a venue map that
identify a presumptive trial site where the jury pool represents a
fair cross-section of the defendant’s community. The interpretation of Rule 18 in Wilson directed the superior court to set a felony
case for trial at the closest existing court with a resident superior

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
1989).
289.

Id. at 612.
18 P.3d 71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(e)-(f).
Griffin, 18 P.3d at 72.
755 P.2d 406 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Griffin, 18 P.3d at 75.
Id.
Id. at 77.
35 P.3d 53 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 1893 (Alaska App., October 11,
John, 35 P.3d at 59.
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judge, either Fairbanks or Bethel. Finding the Wilson interpretation of Rule 18 inconsistent with public policy, the court of appeals
290
overturned Wilson. Instead, the court held that when a felony is
committed within one of the twenty-five venue districts drawn by
the supreme court, the trial site is presumed to be in the city or
291
town identified as the felony trial site for that district.
292
In Pitka v. State, the court of appeals held that under Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(c)(1) (the section of Alaska’s
speedy trial rule governing additional charges filed after the initial
complaint or indictment), separate offenses are considered part of
the “same criminal episode” only if there is some nexus between
293
the crimes more than their temporal proximity. A state trooper
responding to a domestic disturbance arrested Pitka and discovered cocaine on his person. Pitka was charged with criminal trespass and criminal mischief the day after the arrest but was not indicted for possession of cocaine until six months later. Pitka
argued that all three offenses arose out of the “same criminal episode,” and, therefore, the speedy trial “clock” ran from the time of
the initial indictments, preventing the State from adding other
charges at a later time. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that
cocaine possession was not an element of and had “virtually no
bearing” on the trespass and criminal mischief charges and, therefore, the charges could not be part of the “same criminal episode”
294
even though they occurred simultaneously.
295
In Ritter v. State, the court of appeals found a Cooksey296 plea
invalid when the sole issue preserved for appeal was the sufficiency
of the evidence at grand jury, even if the prosecution stipulated
297
that it had no further evidence to present at trial. The court also
held that A.S. 11.41.420(a)(4), which prohibits a health care worker
from engaging in sexual contact with a person unaware that a sexual act is being committed, applies when the patient fails to recognize that the contact is sexual in nature rather than part of legiti298
Ritter was charged with six counts of sexual
mate treatment.

290. Id. at 57-59.
291. Id. at 59.
292. 19 P.3d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
293. Id. at 607.
294. Id.
295. 16 P.3d 191 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
296. See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974) (holding that a
defendant need not go to trial to preserve an appellate issue that is dispositive of
the defendant’s case).
297. Ritter, 16 P.3d at 196.
298. Id. at 198.
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assault arising from sexual contact during massages given to female
clients. Shortly before trial, Ritter entered a Cooksey plea,
whereby he pled no contest to one count, the remaining five were
dropped and the State agreed that Ritter could appeal. After sentencing and while his appeal was pending, Ritter filed a motion to
withdraw his plea, arguing that even if both of the State’s theories
of prosecution were dismissed, the State would still be able to return to the grand jury with additional evidence and seek new indictments. Despite the State’s assertions that it had no better evidence, the court agreed with Ritter and stated that an issue is
dispositive for Cooksey pleas only if resolution of the issue in the
defendant’s favor would either legally preclude prosecution or
leave the government with insufficient evidence to survive a mo299
tion for acquittal. The plea was found invalid and Ritter was al300
lowed to go to trial on the original indictments.
301
In State v. Euteneier, the court of appeals held that warrants
may be issued for a search for evidence of the “violation” of con302
Juneau police responded to a
sumption of alcohol by a minor.
complaint of a loud party but were denied entry to the house. The
police returned with a search warrant to look for evidence of consumption of alcohol by minors. Euteneier was charged with consuming alcohol as a minor, designated by the legislature as a “viola303
Euteneier asserted that the evidence seized should be
tion.”
quashed because search warrants can only be issued to investigate
crimes, not violations. The court disagreed, finding that violations,
like traffic infractions, were intended by the legislature to fall
within a class of “quasi-criminal offenses” enforced by traditional
304
criminal procedures, including search warrants.
305
In Tyler v. State, the court of appeals dismissed Tyler’s appeal from his felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) convic306
307
Tyler asserted that his two prior
tion for lack of jurisdiction.
DWI convictions were invalid and, therefore, the charge in question should have been a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Tyler

299. Id. at 195.
300. Id. at 196.
301. 31 P.3d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
302. Id. at 112.
303. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (Michie 2000).
304. Euteneier, 31 P.3d at 113.
305. 24 P.3d 1260 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
306. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 2000) (defining a felony driving
while intoxicated (“DWI”) as being convicted of DWI after having been twice
convicted of DWI and/or refusing a breath test within the preceding five years).
307. Tyler, 24 P.3d at 1263.
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entered a Cooksey plea, which he hoped would allow him to plead
no contest to the DWI charge while still preserving the issue of his
prior convictions on appeal. The court of appeals pointed out two
potential defects in Tyler’s Cooksey plea. First, valid Cooksey
308
pleas need the assent of the prosecution, lacking in this case.
Second, the issue Tyler was attempting to preserve on appeal was
309
Even if Tyler
not dispositive of the felony charge against him.
were successful in his challenge of his prior DWI convictions, the
State would be entitled to re-prosecute Tyler for those crimes. If
he were again convicted of the earlier DWIs, the felony conviction
would still stand. As a result, Tyler’s Cooksey plea was invalid and
310
the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Evidence. In David v. State,311 the court of appeals found
an impermissible inference under Alaska Rule of Evidence 512(a)
in the trial judge’s assertion that a defense expert’s answer was “inconsistent” with his earlier assertion of a privilege to refuse to an312
swer the question. David was charged with sexually abusing his
stepdaughter and called a psychologist in support of his defense
that the police had encouraged his stepdaughter to invent false accusations. During voir dire examination the psychologist was
asked about allegations of sexual abuse in his son’s sealed psychiatric records. He asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege and
refused to answer. In the presence of the jury, he denied knowledge of any such records. The trial judge ordered the psychologist’s answers during voir dire to be played for the jury as a prior
inconsistent statement. The court of appeals held that the trial
judge could have found the psychologist’s answer inconsistent with
his earlier assertion of privilege only if the judge assumed that the
assertion of privilege essentially conceded that the answer to the
313
Alaska Rule of Eviquestion was unfavorable to the witness.
dence 512(a) provides that no such inference can be drawn from an
314
assertion of privilege.
315
In Hess v. State, the supreme court held that when the prosecution introduces evidence of a prior sexual assault, the defendant
may introduce evidence of acquittal to show reasonable doubt as to
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id.
28 P.3d 309 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 313-14.
20 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2001).
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his “propensity to disregard the new complainant’s lack of consent.”316 Hess was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and kidnapping of H.W. At trial, Hess claimed consent, and the State offered evidence that Hess had previously sexually assaulted A.R.
The trial court denied a limiting instruction to inform the jury that
317
Alaska Rule of
Hess had been acquitted in the previous case.
Evidence 404(b)(3) allows the prosecution to admit evidence of
previous sexual assaults when a defendant raises the defense of
consent. The supreme court found that evidence of the acquittal
was relevant to whether Hess recklessly disregarded a companion’s
318
lack of consent. The court found that this exclusion of probative
319
evidence constituted prejudicial error and ordered a new trial.
320
In State v. Ward, the court of appeals held that when the
State destroys or loses evidence in good faith, the sanction imposed
321
depends on the degree of prejudice to the defendant. Ward was
charged with felony driving while intoxicated and taken in for a
breath test. Ward chose to have his blood drawn for an independent test, and when he later sought the analysis, he was informed
that the sample had been destroyed. The trial court found that this
destruction interfered with Ward’s rights and granted his motion to
suppress his breath test results. The court of appeals vacated this
ruling and remanded the case, holding that the court must “carefully examine the circumstances surrounding the state’s violation of
its duty of preservation,” and that where the evidence has been destroyed in good faith, the appropriate sanction will depend on the
322
degree of prejudice suffered. Further, the court stated that the
presumptive sanction is an “instruction telling the jury to assume
323
that the missing evidence would have been favorable to Ward.”
324

3. Sentencing. In Baker v. State, the court of appeals vacated Baker’s sentence after determining that Alaska’s breath test
325
refusal statute gave the trial judge discretion to impose a portion
of Baker’s sentence concurrently with a sentence for driving while
326
Baker was convicted of felony refusal to
intoxicated (“DWI”).
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1128-30.
17 P.3d 87 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 90.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
30 P.3d 118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (Michie 2000).
Baker, 30 P.3d at 120.
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submit to a breath test and felony DWI. The trial judge sentenced
Baker to the three-year presumptive term for each offense. The
breath test refusal statute states that “the sentence imposed . . . under this subsection shall run consecutively with any other sentence
327
of imprisonment imposed.” The trial judge interpreted this provision to mean that Baker’s sentence for breath test refusal had to
328
run consecutively with his sentence for DWI. The appeals court
examined the legislative history and held that the phrase “this subsection” referred to the various mandatory minimum sentences set
out in a subsection, rather than to any sentence imposed on a de329
fendant convicted of felony breath test refusal. Accordingly, the
court of appeals concluded that after the 120-day mandatory minimum imposed by A.S. 28.35.032(p)(5), the trial court had discretion to impose all or a portion of Baker’s remaining sentence con330
currently with the DWI sentence.
331
In Buckwalter v. State, the court of appeals held that under
332
Alaska’s aggregation statute, the State must prove a single course
of conduct linking criminal acts in order to aggregate them to de333
termine the degree of the offense. Buckwalter was convicted of
first-degree theft and scheme to defraud for stealing $26,000 of
goods in the course of a year. The court of appeals held that in order to aggregate the thefts to meet the $25,000 threshold for firstdegree theft, the jury must find a single course of conduct linking
the distinct offenses, essentially that the defendant had engaged in
334
a calculated series of thefts. However, the court found that the
failure to instruct the jury as such was harmless error because
Buckwalter’s conviction for engaging in a scheme to defraud necessarily included a finding that the thefts were part of a single source
335
of conduct. The court did find error in the use of the fact that
Buckwalter knew his offense involved multiple victims to aggravate
his presumptive sentence because under A.S. 12.55.155(e), a factor
that is a necessary element of the present offense may not be used
336
in aggravation.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(p)(5).
Baker, 30 P.3d at 118.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
23 P.3d 81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.980(c) (Michie 2000).
Buckwalter, 23 P.3d at 85-86.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 88.
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In Hill v. State,337 the court of appeals held that a decision to
grant a limited driver’s license for work purposes under A.S.
28.15.201(a) does not constitute modification of a defendant’s sentence within the meaning of Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
338
Hill was convicted of manslaughter and had his driver’s
35(b).
license revoked for life. Following his release, a three-judge panel
denied his request for a limited license, finding it an untimely motion for sentence modification. The court of appeals vacated the
ruling and remanded the case, holding that the power to grant a
limited license was inherent in the original judgment revoking the
defendant’s license and that granting such a license would not con339
stitute a sentence modification under Rule 35(b).
340
In Hill v. State, the court of appeals held that mandatory parole was lawful, that the Parole Board has the authority to govern
the conduct of prisoners released on mandatory parole, and that a
parolee who violates conditions set by the Board can be required to
341
serve the time excused for good time credit. After being released
on mandatory parole, Hill’s parole was revoked and he was sent
back to prison to serve the days for which he had previously received good time credit. On appeal, Hill first argued that A.S.
33.20.040(a), allowing for mandatory parole for prisoners whose
composite sentence exceeded two years, contradicted sections
33.20.010 and 33.20.030. The court of appeals disagreed because,
for prisoners whose composite sentence exceeded two years, good
time credit, while not leading to an unconditional discharge, still
hastened a prisoner’s release from prison by converting days in jail
342
to days on parole. Second, Hill argued that the Parole Board had
no authority to revoke a parolee’s good time credit because A.S.
33.20.050 only authorized forfeiture of a prisoner’s good time for an
offense committed in prison. The court of appeals distinguished
section 33.20.050 as dealing only with the Department of Corrections’ authority to take away good time credit before release and
found the Parole Board’s authority to revoke parole in section
343
Third, Hill argued that revocation of a parolee’s
33.16.220(i).
good time credit was an illegal increase in sentence because it subjected the parolee to state supervision for a longer period than contemplated by the sentencing court. The court held that although
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

32 P.3d 10 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 12.
Id.
22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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Hill may spend more total time under state supervision after having his parole revoked, the possibility was inherent in any criminal
sentence exceeding two years by virtue of the statutes that created
344
mandatory parole and authorized the Parole Board to revoke it.
345
In Jackson v. State, the court of appeals held that an inmate
serving more than one sentence, one of which is partially consecutive, is entitled to good time credit and mandatory parole only after
346
After Jackson’s
serving two-thirds of the aggregate sentence.
probation was revoked, he was ordered to serve his suspended time
both concurrently and consecutively with his sentence for other offenses. After being released on parole, Jackson claimed that his
sentence had been miscalculated and as a result, he served more
time in prison than required. Jackson argued that the general rule
that mandatory parole release dates are based on the total length
of imprisonment rather than each sentence did not apply in his case
347
The court
because his sentences were not entirely consecutive.
disagreed, finding no precedent or policy that would preclude application of the rule to partially consecutive sentences like Jack348
Jackson also argued that A.S. 33.20.010 should allow for
son’s.
good time credit for concurrent sentences. Because the statute
provides that good time is calculated based on “term of imprisonment” rather than on the term of sentence and because concurrent
sentences do not increase the length of imprisonment, the court
held that concurrent sentences should not be included when com349
puting good time credit.
350
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals held that a first-time
offender convicted of first-degree weapons misconduct is subject to
351
Smith pled no contest to disa five-year presumptive term.
charging a firearm from a vehicle while the vehicle is in motion.
The superior court concluded that the statutory seven-year presumptive term applied and sentenced Smith to a ten-year term with
three years suspended. The court of appeals held that, despite the
statutory language, sentencing a defendant convicted of firstdegree weapons misconduct to seven years “would lead to unin352
The court found that the overlap between the
tended results.”
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 29.
31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 324-25.
Id at 325.
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first-degree weapons misconduct and manslaughter, which carries
only a five-year presumptive term, would result in lesser sentences
353
for defendants whose actions result in death. The court vacated
Smith’s sentence on the grounds that the legislature could not have
intended to create a system that imposes lesser sentences on indi354
viduals whose drive-by shootings result in death.
4. Miscellaneous. In Daniels v. State,355 the court of appeals
held that the trial judge abused his discretion in disqualifying Daniels’ attorney, Dieni, for a conflict of interest under Alaska Rule
356
of Professional Conduct 1.9. In Daniels’ trial for murder, Dieni
announced that in Daniels’ defense he would suggest that someone
else (Saganna) committed the murder. Ten years earlier, Dieni
had represented Saganna in an assault charge. Although Dieni
stated that he had no memory of the case, the State filed a motion
to have him disqualified for a conflict of interest. Daniels waived
whatever conflict of interest Dieni might have with Saganna, and
Saganna stated upon consultation with independent counsel that
she did not see a conflict of interest. The superior court disqualified Dieni, but the court of appeals reversed, finding no conflict of
interest because the present and prior cases were not substantially
related and because Dieni, Saganna and Saganna’s attorney could
not see any relevant information about Saganna that could be used
357
by Dieni in violation of Rule 1.9.
358
In Greinier v. State, the court of appeals held that a defendant can be lawfully convicted of first-degree hindering prosecution even when the person who committed the underlying felony is
not prosecuted, convicted of the felony, or convicted of a lesser of359
fense. Harris was living with Greinier despite court-imposed bail
conditions forbidding contact with her. Harris committed felony
assault on Greinier’s daughter, and Greinier later lied to medical
personnel and police regarding how the injury occurred. Greinier
appealed her conviction for hindering prosecution, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict and that her due
process rights were violated. The court of appeals affirmed Greinier’s conviction, holding that even though Harris was convicted of
only misdemeanor assault, Greinier could still be convicted of fel353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
Id. at 326.
17 P.3d 75 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 85-87.
23 P.3d 1192 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1195.
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ony-level hindering prosecution as long as Harris committed a
“crime punishable as a felony.”360 The court of appeals also held
that prosecuting Greinier did not violate her due process rights, despite the fact that if she had told the truth, she would have divulged
information that could have led to her prosecution as an accom361
plice to Harris’s crime of violation of his bail conditions.
362
In Hernandez v. State, the court of appeals remanded the
case to the superior court to determine whether Hernandez’s inter363
pretation of the arresting officer’s conduct was reasonable. Hernandez was arrested for driving while intoxicated in the middle of
the night and chose to exercise his right to an independent blood
test. The arresting officer, Terland, informed him that only a hospital was open to perform the test and took Hernandez there.
However, the receptionist incorrectly told Hernandez that the test
would not be admissible in court and incorrectly explained why.
Hernandez turned to Terland who shrugged his shoulders in response. Hernandez then decided to go to the police station for the
breath test. If the State interferes with an arestee’s constitutional
right to obtain an independent blood test, the results of the breath
test will be suppressed. The court of appeals held that although
Terland was not directly responsible for the misinformation regarding the blood test, if Hernandez acted reasonably in interpreting Terland’s conduct as confirmation of the receptionist’s statements, then Hernandez’s right to due process was violated, and the
364
breath test should be suppressed. The court of appeals remanded
to determine whether Hernandez’s interpretation of Terland’s
365
conduct was reasonable.
366
In Hurd v. State, the court of appeals held that a defendant
may be convicted of kidnapping if “the defendant actually restrained the victim either temporally or spatially beyond what was
367
Hurd held Schlotfeldt
necessary to commit the target assault.”
captive at his house for thirty to forty-five minutes and refused to
let him leave until he signed documents absolving Hurd of his debt
and conveying money and property to Hurd. Hurd was convicted
of coercion, third-degree assault and kidnapping. Hurd appealed
the kidnapping conviction, basing his argument on the court’s
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id. at 1196.
28 P.3d 315 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
22 P.3d 12 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 15.
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holding in Alam v. State368 that “when a defendant restrains a victim
to facilitate the commission of another offense, [the] restraint will
not constitute a kidnapping if it is merely ‘incidental’ to the com369
mission of the other offense.” Hurd contended that he held
Schlotfeldt only long enough to commit the target crime of coercion. The court of appeals agreed with Hurd that the jury was not
properly instructed on the elements of the kidnapping charge and
370
reversed his conviction. However, the court concluded that the
State’s evidence, if believed, would support Hurd’s conviction for
371
kidnapping and upheld the kidnapping count of the indictment.
The court noted that coercion is not a crime “that inevitably involves restraint of the victim,” and a jury must decide if the re372
straint was more than “incidental,” thus constituting kidnapping.
373
In Hutchison v. State, the court of appeals held that extreme
intoxication is a defense to a charge of “wilfully [sic] failing to ap374
pear” under the pre-September 2000 version of A.S. 12.30.060.
Hutchison missed his scheduled court hearing because he drank so
much alcohol the night before that he passed out and did not wake
up until the next afternoon. Although the pre-September 2000 version of section 12.30.060 required willfulness in order for a defendant to be convicted for failure to appear, the Alaska legislature
had not defined “willful.” The court of appeals found that “willful”
conduct occurs when, “in the absence of some legally recognized
justification or excuse, the defendant makes a deliberate decision
375
to disobey a known obligation to appear in court.” In addition,
the court of appeals held that “intoxication that incapacitates a defendant or that blots out a defendant’s memory of the required
court appearance” can be a defense to willfully failing to appear
376
under the pre-September 2000 version of section 12.30.060. Because the lower court found that Hutchison did not have the conscious goal to not appear in court, the court held that Hutchison
377
did not act willfully and reversed his conviction.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

776 P.2d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Hurd, 22 P.3d at 14.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 15, 18.
27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 782.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 782.
Id.
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In MacLeod v. State,378 the court of appeals reversed Mac379
Leod’s conviction for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). After
arresting MacLeod for DWI, the state trooper gave him the “offrecord” advice that if a blood test and a breath test are administered contemporaneously, the blood test intoxication reading will
be higher. The court of appeals held that a government officer
having custody of a motorist arrested for DWI should not attempt
to dissuade the motorist from invoking his or her right to an inde380
pendent blood test. As a result, MacLeod’s breath test result was
381
suppressed and his conviction reversed.
382
In Nunley v. State, the court of appeals held that the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”) requires all sex offenders physically present in the state, even those who had been
released from probation before the effective date of the ASORA,
to register, and any person who fails to comply with this require383
ment is subject to criminal penalty under A.S. 11.56.840. Former
section 12.63.010 set out three deadlines for registration based on
the sex offender’s date of release from prison, date of conviction if
384
not sentenced to prison or date of arrival within the state. The
defendants argued that because they were already present in the
state and had been convicted and released from probation before
the ASORA became effective in 1994, they did not fit into any of
the groups of offenders set out in former section 12.63.010 and that
even if the ASORA did apply to them, they were not provided with
adequate notice that they had a duty to register. The court of appeals found that the legislature intended to exempt only one group
of offenders from registration, those with only one sex offense conviction and who had been unconditionally discharged before July 1,
385
1984. The court of appeals held that because the defendants did
not fall into that group, they were criminally liable for their failure
to register as sex offenders and that the ASORA provided sex of386
fenders with sufficient notice of their duty to register.

378. 28 P.3d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
379. Id. at 945.
380. Id. at 944-45 (reiterating the holding from Lau v. State, 896 P.2d 825
(Alaska Ct. App. 1995)).
381. Id. at 945.
382. 26 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
383. Id. at 1115.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1114-15.
386. Id.
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In Pease v. State,387 the court of appeals reversed Pease’s conviction for possessing twenty-five or more marijuana plants in vio388
Police found nineteen marilation of A.S. 11.71.040(a)(3)(G).
juana plants growing in Pease’s home along with the remnants of
thirty-three dead marijuana plants. At trial, the jury was instructed
that the thirty-three remnants constituted marijuana plants for the
purposes of assessing Pease’s guilt. The court of appeals looked at
the legislative history of the statute and found that the State must
prove that a defendant simultaneously possessed twenty-five or
389
more living marijuana plants to be in violation of the statute.
While the existence of marijuana remnants may provide circumstantial evidence that a defendant possessed twenty-five or more
plants at some point in time, that issue was never presented for the
390
jury to decide. Because the jury was incorrectly instructed on an
391
essential element of the crime, the court reversed the conviction.
392
In State v. Bonham, the court of appeals held that neither
A.S. 12.20.10 nor the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution precluded Bonham’s state prosecution for perjury and submitting misleading security filings, even after she pled guilty to federal charges of mail fraud and money laundering based upon the
393
Bonham pled guilty to the federal
same criminal episode.
charges after using the mail to further a pyramid scheme. Following this plea, an Alaska grand jury indicted her on the state
charges. The court concluded the term “act” in section 12.20.10
394
The
meant something narrower than transaction or episode.
court held that although the acts charged in the state indictment
were part of the criminal scheme, submitting a false affidavit and
misleading security filings were separate acts from those for which
395
Finally, the court conshe was prosecuted on federal charges.
cluded that because the offenses of mail fraud, perjury and submitting misleading filings involve “significantly different societal interests,” the state prosecution was not barred by the double jeopardy
396
clause of the Alaska Constitution.

387. 27 P.3d 788 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
388. Id. at 788. This section makes it a felony to possess “25 or more plants of
the genus cannibus.” ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040 (a)(3)(G) (Michie 2000).
389. Id. at 791.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. 28 P.3d 303 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
393. Id. at 308-10.
394. Id. at 307.
395. Id. at 307-08.
396. Id. at 308-09.
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In State v. Martin,397 the court of appeals reversed the dismissal
of Martin’s charge for failing to register according to the provisions
398
of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”). Martin pleaded no contest to incest in 1982. His conviction was set
aside in 1988, after he had served five years of probation. The
ASORA, enacted in 1994, requires sex offenders residing in
Alaska, including those who were convicted in the ten years prior
to 1994, to register with their local police agency. The court of appeals held that the Department of Public Safety acted within its
lawful authority when it included persons whose convictions were
399
The court
subsequently set aside as those who had to register.
rejected Martin’s arguments that the enforcement of the ASORA
in his case would violate the terms of his plea agreement because
400
plea agreements may be modified without violating due process.
The court also rejected Martin’s argument that the Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it required only those sex offenders who had been convicted in the ten years prior to 1994 to regis401
ter and not all sex offenders convicted prior to 1994.
402
In State v. Saathoff, the supreme court held that the crime
“theft by receiving” was not a continuing offense and that the fiveyear statute of limitations for such a crime prevented Saathoff from
403
being convicted. Saathoff purchased a rifle, apparently suspecting it was stolen property, in the summer of 1988. Nine years after
the purchase, police discovered the stolen rifle at Saathoff’s residence. A.S. 12.10.010 provides a five-year statute of limitations for
404
However, the statute of limitations would
theft by receiving.
405
have tolled if theft by receiving was a continuing offense. Under
A.S. 12.10.030, theft by receiving would be continuing only if a legislative purpose to make it so “plainly appears” in the language,
structure or legislative history of sections 11.46.100 and
406
11.46.190(a). The supreme court held that those factors indicated
that theft by receiving is not a continuing offense, and therefore,
407
the statute of limitations prevented Saathoff’s conviction.

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

17 P.3d 72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 73 (citing State v. Otness, 986 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999)).
Id. at 74.
Id.
29 P.3d 236 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 238; ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.010(2) (Michie 2000).
Saathoff, 29 P.3d at 238.
Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.030 (Michie 2000).
Saathoff, 29 P.3d at 242.
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In Strane v. State,408 the supreme court held that the mental
state required for conviction for violating a domestic violence protective order under A.S. 11.56.740(a) is “knowingly.” As a result,
the lower court erred in holding that Strane’s good faith belief that
his conduct did not violate the protective order was irrelevant to
409
his guilt or innocence. The State argued that violation of a restraining order could not be excused because of the defendant’s ignorance of its terms or his misunderstanding of their meaning.
However, the court held the statute to be ambiguous and applied a
410
more narrow “knowingly” culpable mental state. Therefore, the
State needed to show that the defendant knew his conduct violated
the protection order or that the defendant was aware of a substan411
tial probability that his conduct violated the order. Additionally,
because the culpable mental state was “knowingly,” any honest
412
mistake would have been a good defense to the charge. The supreme court remanded the case and held that Strane could potentially defend against the charge that he violated the terms of a protective order based on his good faith mistake about the terms, even
413
if that mistake was objectively unreasonable.
414
In Tenison v. State, the court of appeals affirmed Tenison’s
conviction for driving with an expired license and held that the Department of Motor Vehicles’ (“DMV”) wrongful refusal to renew
415
her license did not constitute a defense. Tenison’s license expired
in October 1998. She applied for renewal and was asked to provide
her social security number in accordance with Alaska Statute section 28.15.061(b). For religious reasons, she refused, and her license was not renewed. She was later convicted for driving with an
expired license and appealed, arguing that it was unconstitutional
to require driver’s license applicants to divulge their social security
number, particularly when a person has religious reasons for refusing to do so. The supreme court held that as a general rule,
people are not free to break the law by engaging in licensed activity
without a license and then later defending that the government
416
wrongfully refused to grant their earlier request for a license.
Tenison was obliged to challenge the DMV’s refusal to renew her
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

16 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 750-51.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 752.
38 P.3d 535 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 538.
Id.
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license by pursuing an administrative appeal or a civil lawsuit.417
The court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, reasoning that Alaska’s requirement of social se418
curity numbers was based on several valid state interests.
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Discrimination
419
In Grant v. Anchorage Police Department, the supreme court
held that although the superior court correctly found that Grant
could not proceed on his contract-based claims because he had not
exhausted his administrative remedies, it was error to apply collateral estoppel to preclude him from pursuing a disability discrimina420
Grant was terminated from the Anchorage Police
tion claim.
Department because a gunshot wound prevented him from doing
certain duties. Because Grant was a union member, his employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
After Grant was terminated, he did not file a grievance under his
CBA, but later filed suit against the police department alleging
breach of contract, wrongful termination and unlawful discrimination under A.S. 18.80.220(a)(1). The supreme court found against
Grant on his contractually-based claims because the terms of the
CBA required employees to exhaust their administrative remedies
421
The court disand file grievances before suing their employer.
agreed that Grant was excused from filing a grievance because his
interpretation of the contract would render one clause completely
null, contravening the rule that all provisions of a contract should
422
be found meaningful if possible. Additionally, Grant had previously obtained disability benefits after showing that his injury prevented him from performing his duties, and the superior court concluded that this showing precluded his argument that he was
423
The supreme
discriminated against under A.S. 18.80.220(a)(1).
court disagreed, holding that whether Grant could perform his duties with reasonable accommodation by the police department had
424
not yet been determined.

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id. at 540.
Id. at 539.
20 P.3d 553 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 558.
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B. Labor Law
425
In Carlson v. United Academics, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that United Academics did not
discriminate between individuals who merely objected to union
dues and those who objected and wished to challenge the fee cal426
culation. In addition, the court held that United Academics did
not violate the principles set forth in Chicago Teacher’s Union v.
427
Hudson by permitting an impartial decision maker to raise the
428
fee amount. Carlson was a non-union professor at the University
of Alaska represented by United Academics per the collective bargaining agreement with the University. Carlson brought suit following demands for dues, alleging that the demands violated Hudson’s notice and procedural safeguards. The court ruled that the
distinction between “objectors” and “challengers,” which provided
immediate reimbursement to non-members who merely objected
to paying dues but placed the dues collected from those who objected and challenged the fee calculation into an escrow account,
429
met the Hudson standards. The court also validated the United
Academics procedure by which an independent arbitrator is given
the ability to increase or decrease the union fee, finding it safely
430
within the bounds of Hudson.
431
In Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska, the supreme court
held that Whitesides could not be classified as an administrative
employee exempt from overtime pay under the Alaska Wage and
432
Hour Act. U-Haul assigned Whitesides to work under the direction of another employee with a set schedule of hours and restricted business travel rights. The next day, when Whitesides reported to work fifteen minutes late, U-Haul suspended him for
three days without pay. Whitesides was fired in July 1996 and sued
U-Haul for unpaid overtime wages. U-Haul then decided to pay
Whitesides for the three suspended days, stating that the pay “was
433
Due to his suspension without pay,
inadvertently reduced.”
Whitesides argued at summary judgment that he did not meet the
“paid on a salary or fee basis” requirement of the definition of an
administrative employee under Alaska Administrative Code sec425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

265 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 783.
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
Carlson, 265 F.3d at 785.
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 785.
16 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 731.
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tion 15.910(a)(1) and, therefore, was not exempt from the requirement of overtime pay. The supreme court held that U-Haul could
not retroactively take advantage of a statutory “window of correction” by correcting the withheld pay to meet the statutory definition of an administrative employee after the commencement of a
434
Additionally, the supreme court held that Whitesides
lawsuit.
was subject to direct supervision and, therefore, did not meet the
“performs work only under general supervision” requirement of an
435
The supreme court vacated the judgadministrative employee.
ment for U-Haul and remanded the case for further proceedings.
C. Workers’ Compensation
436
In Nickles v. Napolilli, the supreme court held that where
breach of contract claims rely on duties created by the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Act, the Act provides an adequate remedy for the breach of contract and does not permit a separate
437
Nickles performed farm chores for the Napolillis in exsuit.
change for living in a cabin on their property. During the course of
her chores, Nickles injured her arm, which later had to be amputated. Before trial, Nickles changed her claims of negligence to
breach of contract, and the superior court granted the Napolillis’
motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to refer the case to the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board. The supreme court held that this
was not error because provisions of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act “support the interpretation that a common law action
under A.S. 23.30.055 is limited to tort claims for the underlying in438
jury.” Therefore, “when an employer breaches its duty to provide workers’ compensation benefits, the workers’ compensation
law only authorizes the employee to recover for personal injuries
439
through a tort action.” Since Nickles abandoned her tort claims,
the superior court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss.
However, the supreme court affirmed the finding that Nickles was
an employee of the Napolillis, and remanded the case to allow
440
Nickles to pursue her claims before the Board.
441
In Parris-Eastlake v. State, the supreme court held that under
A.S. 23.30.235(2), an employee is not barred from claiming benefits
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 735 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 15.910(a)(1) (2000)).
29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 254.
26 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2001).
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if the claimed injury is addiction to drugs or alcohol.442 ParrisEastlake developed recurring headaches and neck and back pain
while working as an assistant district attorney and was prescribed
narcotic painkillers. At trial, she testified that eventually she began
lying to her doctors to receive more drugs. She began having difficulty at work, resigned from her job and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied
her claim, and the superior court affirmed. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that section 23.30.235(2) barred recovery for injuries that were proximately caused by drug use, but
443
The court reanot if the injury claimed is the addiction itself.
soned that legislative history indicated that the phrase “under the
influence” was akin to “intoxicated” and, therefore, ParrisEastlake’s claim was not barred because her actions were impaired
not by being under the influence of drugs but rather because of her
444
desire to use them. The court remanded to determine whether
445
her injuries were work-related.
In State, Dep’t of Fish and Game v. Kacyon,446 the supreme
court held that simply because a settlement allocation was courtapproved did not mean it was not a “compromise with a third per447
son” as defined in A.S. 23.30.015(h). The court also held that section 23.30.015 applies to the total proceeds of global settlements
reached by the deceased party’s beneficiaries, making any subsequent allocations between those beneficiaries irrelevant to the calculation of the employer’s continued workers’ compensation liabil448
Kacyon, the widow of a state-employed wildlife biologist
ity.
killed in a plane crash during a moose survey, reached a wrongfuldeath settlement with the operator of the plane for the benefit of
herself and the minor son of the deceased. The State argued that
the settlement was a compromise with a third person made without
the employer’s written approval and attempted to invoke the forfeiture provision of section 23.30.015, which protects the employer
against unreasonably low settlements that result in continued liability. The supreme court agreed and remanded the case to the
Workers’ Compensation Board with instructions to vacate its ruling that the State must continue to pay benefits to the son after the

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1105.
31 P.3d 1276 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.
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sum allocated to him from the global settlement is exhausted.449
The court also held that for purposes of any calculations made under section 23.30.015 with regard to the son, the total amount of the
global settlement, not merely the five percent allocated directly to
450
the son, should be used.
In Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge,451 the supreme court held
that a restaurant was not liable for workers’ compensation for an
assault on a waiter because the restaurant’s failure to protect him
452
did not constitute facilitation. While waiting tables at the Denali
Princess Lodge, Temple was punched in the jaw by his girlfriend’s
former boyfriend, Callahan. Callahan entered the Lodge, waited in
a restricted area, confirmed Temple’s identity with a Lodge employee and injured Temple. Temple claimed he was entitled to
workers’ compensation because the employer facilitated the attack.
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied compensation,
and the superior court affirmed. The supreme court held that
Temple did not prove his claim of a preliminary link between the
453
injury and his employment by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court held that injuries resulting from an assault motivated by
personal reasons, where the sole role of the employment is providing a location for the assailant to find the victim, are not com454
pensable injuries arising out of employment.
D. Miscellaneous
455
In Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme court
ruled that threats of retaliatory discharge may excuse the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial remedies,
456
even where required by statute. Bruns and Saathoff made several claims against the Municipality for back overtime pay under
Anchorage Municipal Code section 3.30.129. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Municipality, ruling that
the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies as
required by section 3.30.129. The supreme court had previously
held that a plaintiff who fails to exhaust administrative remedies
457
The court
may still seek judicial relief if the failure is excused.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id.
Id.
21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 818.
32 P.3d 362 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 370.
Id. (citing Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 181 (Alaska 1982)).
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ruled that threats of retaliatory discharge can excuse an employee’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and held that Bruns’ and
Saathoff’s contention that threats of discharge prevented their
utilization of available administrative remedies raised a question of
458
material fact such that summary judgment was inappropriate.
459
In Petranovich v. Matanuska Electric Ass’n, the supreme
court held that an employer was not liable for injuries incurred by
an independent contractor as a result of routine risks on which the
460
contract was silent. Petranovich, an electrician, was seriously injured while working as an independent contractor for Matanuska
Electric Association (“MEA”). The contract between the parties
was silent with respect to the manner of performance of the procedure in the course of which the injury occurred. The superior court
granted summary judgment for MEA because Petranovich was allowed to choose his own methods and MEA did not retain enough
right of supervision over Petranovich; therefore, MEA was not re461
In a per curiam
sponsible for Petranovich’s acts or injuries.
opinion, the supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judg462
ment for MEA.
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
463
In Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, the supreme court held that Michael Beaudoin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim
464
After
that Georgia Beaudoin was voluntarily underemployed.
their divorce, the Beaudoins originally agreed on a child custody
agreement that gave Georgia sole custody of their children. Georgia did not look for employment outside the home during this time.
Four years later, the parties made Michael the primary custodian,
taking sole custody of one child and sharing custody of the other
two on an alternating-week schedule. Michael sought an order to
re-establish Georgia’s child support obligation based on her earning capacity rather than her previous earnings history, claiming that
since Georgia’s obligations for child care had decreased, she should
either obtain employment or be treated by the court as voluntarily

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Id at 370-71.
22 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 451.
24 P.3d 523 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 524.
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underemployed. On appeal, the supreme court held that Michael
had raised a material dispute regarding the issue of Georgia’s voluntary underemployment sufficient to require an evidentiary
465
hearing. The court held that neither Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3 nor prior case law supported the superior court’s finding
that a “track record of employment and earnings” is a “critical
element” in the absence of which there is “no baseline from which
to measure the extent” to which Georgia was voluntarily underem466
ployed. The court vacated the superior court’s 1998 child support
order and remanded for entry of a modified order after an eviden467
tiary hearing on Michael’s case.
468
In Murphy v. Newlynn, the supreme court held that the preclusion provision contained in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure
90.3(h)(3) can apply where the obligor parent has custody of one,
469
but not all, of the children subject to a support order. Murphy,
obligated to pay child support for his two daughters, took custody
of one of his daughters during her final high school academic year
per an agreement with Newlynn, who did not seek child support
during this period. When Newlynn again sought child support, the
Child Support Enforcement Division calculated Murphy’s arrears
assuming a full obligation for the academic year that he had custody of one of his daughters. Murphy sought an exemption under
Rule 90.3(h)(3), which provides that an obligor parent does not accrue child support obligations, when by agreement or acquiescence,
the obligor exercises primary physical custody of the children for a
period of nine months or more. Newlynn argued that the text and
official commentary of the Rule both indicated the exemption only
applies when the obligor has custody of all children under the support order. The supreme court held that Rule 90.03(h)(3) may apply in the situation where an obligor parent has custody of one, but
470
Therefore,
not all, of the children subject to a support order.
Murphy was still liable for child support arrears related to his noncustodial daughter, but requiring him to pay support for the custodial daughter would provide her no benefit and would provide an
471
undeserved windfall for Newlynn.

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 530-31.
34 P.3d 331 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 335.
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In Spott v. Spott,472 the supreme court held that a parent may
be assessed retroactive child support for children not previously included in support calculations and that such retroactive obligations
should be based on actual rather than previously determined pre473
dicted income. After Marvin and Cheryle Spott divorced in September 1995, their minor children, Ethan and Seth, resided with
Cheryle. Marvin was ordered to pay child support but the master
in charge of the case erroneously concluded that only Ethan resided with Cheryle and did not factor Seth into Marvin’s support
obligation. Because Marvin was unemployed at the time, the master based Marvin’s adjusted income on his 1995 earnings of
$39,252.33, which the master felt Marvin should be able to earn
again. Marvin’s actual adjusted income was $20,115.48. Cheryle
was later awarded an additional amount per month for Seth for the
time between December 1, 1995, and July 1, 1997. Marvin appealed, arguing that the supplemental award was a retroactive
modification of child support in violation of Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 90.3(h)(2). The supreme court ruled that the prohibition against retroactive modifications does not apply to cases where
474
there is a child such as Seth for whom no support was awarded.
Marvin then argued that even if the award was valid, his support
obligation should be based on actual income rather than the prospective income as determined by the master in 1995. The supreme
court agreed and directed that child support for Seth be deter475
mined based on Marvin’s actual income for the relevant period.
B. Child Custody
476
In B.B. v. D.D., the supreme court held that the superior
court had subject matter jurisdiction and did not abuse its discre477
tion in modifying a custody order issued in Oregon. An Oregon
court granted B.B. custody in 1990. After relocating to the North
Pole, B.B. and the children abruptly left in 1996, depriving D.D. of
his visitation rights. D.D. found the children and B.B. in poor living conditions in Kasilof, and the superior court granted legal and
primary custody of the children to D.D. On appeal, B.B. argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify an Oregon court order
and that the court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous
findings of fact. The supreme court held that the superior court
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

17 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
18 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1212, 1214.
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had subject matter jurisdiction under both the state Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the federal Parental Kidnapping Pre478
vention Act. Although federal law generally forbids state courts
479
from modifying other state court’s custody orders, the court concluded the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction under the
state custody law and that Oregon had lost jurisdiction because nei480
ther B.B. nor the children had lived in Oregon since 1991.
481
In In re C.R.H., the supreme court held that section 1911(b)
482
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) authorizes transfer of
jurisdiction to federally recognized tribes in Alaska tribal court re483
gardless of Public Law 280. The Department of Health and Social Services assumed emergency custody of an Indian child. The
question in subsequent litigation was whether the Nikolai tribe
could assume jurisdiction over the proceedings in light of the cases
concerning Public Law 280. The supreme court held that tribal jurisdiction exists independently of Public Law 280 because section
1911(b) of the ICWA expressly approves the transfer of child cus484
tody proceedings to tribal courts, unless the parents object, the
tribe declines jurisdiction or good cause exists for denial of trans485
fer. Because the lower court did not inquire into good cause for
denial, the court remanded for “transfer to the Nikolai tribal court
486
unless the superior court finds good cause to deny transfer.”
487
In John v. Baker, the supreme court reversed the determination that Baker was denied due process and remanded the case to
488
the Northway Tribal Court for further child custody proceedings.
489
In a previous appeal, the supreme court found that the Northway
Tribal Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody dispute.
The case was remanded to the superior court to determine whether
the tribal court’s decision should be recognized under the comity
doctrine. The record of the tribal court was lost, and the superior
478. Id. at 1212-13; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.300-.390
(Michie 2000).
479. B.B., 18 P.3d at 1212; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(1)-(2) (1994).
480. B.B., 18 P.3d at 1212.
481. 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
482. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
483. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 854; Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
255, 589 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360).
484. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 852.
485. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000).
486. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 854.
487. 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 2001).
488. Id. at 78-79.
489. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
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court held that Baker was denied due process and denied comity to
the tribal court’s order. The supreme court found that loss of the
490
record was not itself a due process violation. However, Baker’s
claim that the mother’s family exercised undue influence over the
tribal court proceedings, if successful, would have been a violation,
and the absence of a record made it impossible for the supreme
491
court to judge the merits of that claim. Because Baker did not
allege or prove that the tribal court was incapable of fairly deciding
future issues in the case, the supreme court ordered the case re492
ferred to the tribal court to decide upon custody arrangements.
493
In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, the supreme court held
that when determining custody, trial courts do not have the
494
authority to impose restrictions on the relocation of a parent. In
their divorce, Moeller-Prokosch and Prokosch both sought custody
of their son. During the custody trial, Moeller-Prokosch requested
legal and physical custody of her son and permission to relocate to
Florida. The superior court determined that relocating to Florida
would not be in the child’s best interests and conditioned MoellerProkosch’s primary physical custody of her son upon her maintaining a residence within sixty-five miles of Prokosch’s residence
in Alaska. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the
trial court does not have the power to prevent a parent from moving or to restrict the region within which Moeller-Prokosch could
495
When making a custody determination after
live with her son.
one parent expresses an intent to relocate, the court must presume
that the move will take place and then determine what custody arrangement is in the child’s best interests under the criteria established by A.S. 25.24.150(c), which includes an inquiry into whether
496
there are “legitimate reasons for the move.”
497
In Ogden v. Ogden, the supreme court held that a courtappointed child custody investigator is ordinarily subject to dis498
qualification upon a showing of either actual or apparent bias.
Julie Ogden filed for divorce after Douglas Ogden absconded with
one of the couple’s two children. Julie obtained an interim order
giving her custody of both children and appointing an attorney,
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

John, 30 P.3d at 74.
Id.
Id. at 78-79.
27 P.3d 314 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 316.
39 P.3d 513 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 517, 519.
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Bressers, to conduct a child custody investigation. Douglas challenged Bressers’ ability to serve as custody investigator based on
specific allegations of bias and Bressers’ practice of advertising her
services as a “Voice for Women and Children.” The superior court
found no evidence of actual bias warranting disqualification and
granted Julie sole custody of both children. On appeal, the supreme court held that the Code of Judicial Conduct required that
officers of the court, such as custody investigators, “avoid impro499
priety and the appearance of impropriety.” Because her advertisements cast serious doubt on her impartiality, the court held that
500
Howthe superior court erred in failing to disqualify Bressers.
ever, because the court found no reasonable possibility that a report by a different custody investigator would have changed the
superior court’s custody decision, the superior court’s failure to
501
disqualify Bressers was deemed harmless error.
502
In West v. West, the supreme court held that a custody award
cannot be based on the assumption that a divorced parent who remarries can provide a better home than an otherwise equally com503
petent parent who remains single. In deciding custody of Brian
and Marlene West’s son, Cody, the superior court found that both
parents would “provide positive environments and living arrangements,” that neither one was necessarily better than the other and
that only physical distance and Cody’s need to attend one school
precluded shared physical custody. The superior court then
awarded physical custody of Cody to Brian based on the high likelihood that he would remarry soon, providing the positive advantages of a two-parent household. Marlene appealed, arguing that it
was improper for the court to award Brian custody based on his anticipated remarriage and that the court had failed to consider various factors operating in her favor. The supreme court agreed and
held that “a presumptive preference for the two-parent setting is
504
Without case-specific evidence indicating that
unwarranted.”
Cody’s anticipated step-mother’s in-home care would be superior
to the care that Cody would receive from his extended family if
living with Marlene, custody should not have been determined by
an expressed preference for the advantages of a “two-parent

499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

Id. at 516 (citing Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A)).
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
21 P.3d 838 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 839.
Id. at 843.
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household.”505 The supreme court vacated the order and remanded
for a redetermination of custody based on Cody’s best interests.
C. Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights
506
In B.F. v. D.M., the supreme court held that a father need
not be convicted of sexual assault to lose his right to consent to
507
adoption of a child conceived as a result of sexual assault. B.F.
appealed after the superior court granted adoption of his daughter
without his consent. The court held that sufficient evidence
508
showed that the child was conceived as a result of sexual assault.
The court then concluded that neither the plain language nor the
legislative history of A.S. 25.23.180(c)(3) requires a parent to be
convicted of sexual assault to lose his or her right to consent to
adoption of a child, but only requires that the parent committed an
509
act that fits the definition of sexual assault. The court also held
that section 25.23.180(c)(3) is constitutional because adoption proceedings are brought by private parties, not the state, the act of
waiving parental rights is not a criminal penalty and the secrecy of
adoption proceedings precludes the possibility of a father facing a
510
criminal finding of the same charge.
511
In C.L. v. P.C.S., the supreme court upheld the adoption of
512
two children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) de513
spite the objections of the children’s grandparents. After L.G.’s
parental rights to her daughters, J.G. and S.G., were terminated,
the superior court awarded adoption of J.G. to one individual and
adoption of S.G. to her second cousins. The maternal grandparents
of the children had sought to adopt the girls and appealed the superior court’s decision. The supreme court held that when determining whether good cause exists to deviate from the ICWA
514
placement preferences, the three Bureau of Indian Affairs factors
are not exclusively controlling and a court may consider a broad
505. Id.
506. 15 P.3d 258 (Alaska 2001).
507. Id. at 264.
508. Id. at 260-61.
509. Id. at 264-65. In this case, the definition of sexual assault was supplied by
Washington law because the alleged conduct occurred in Washington. See
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(3) (Michie 2000).
510. B.F., 15 P.3d at 266.
511. 17 P.3d 769 (Alaska 2001).
512. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
513. C.L., 17 P.3d at 779.
514. Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts, Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 § F.3 (1979).

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

2002]

06/04/02 2:07 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

261

range of factors as long as the focus is on the child’s best interests.515
Regarding the adoption of S.G., the supreme court held that the
ICWA does not set forth any order of preference among “extended
516
family members” seeking to become prospective adoptive parents; therefore, the court did not err by choosing the child’s second
517
cousins over her grandparents. The supreme court also held that
the decision not to grant the grandparents formal visitation rights
to J.G. was not an abuse of discretion because her adoptive parent
had demonstrated a willingness to maintain the relationship between J.G. and her grandparents and should have the discretion to
518
determine the circumstances and frequency of such contacts. The
supreme court also held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by not consolidating the adoption proceedings and that
519
both adoptions were proper.
520
In C.W. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services, the supreme court held that the statutory duty of the Department of
Health and Social Services (“DHSS”) to make “reasonable efforts
to provide family support services” was not available as a defense
for a parent whose parental rights were terminated on grounds of
521
C.W.’s parental rights were terminated after he
abandonment.
had abandoned his son for three years and lost contact with all individuals involved in his son’s Children in Need of Aid (“CINA”)
proceeding. C.W. argued that the State violated the CINA statute
by failing to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his son
and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by
failing to provide alcohol treatment services that reasonably accommodated his allegedly substantial learning disability. Assuming that DHSS is required to make reasonable efforts to reunite a
biological family when the parent has abandoned the child, the supreme court reasoned that DHSS had met that duty by communicating with the child’s mother and checking criminal records in an
attempt to locate C.W. during the three-year period of abandon522
The supreme court also rejected C.W.’s ADA claim bement.
cause the superior court terminated his parental rights based upon

515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

C.L., 17 P.3d at 775-76.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2000).
C.L., 17 P.3d at 777.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 772-77.
23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 55 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(a) (Michie 2000)).
Id.
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an independent finding of abandonment and not on the ground
that his drinking made him an unfit parent.523
In E.H. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,524
the supreme court upheld the denial of E.H.’s motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the termination of E.H.’s parental
525
rights. While the Department of Health and Social Services investigated reports of harm to E.H.’s two sons, E.H. took her sons
to Edmonton, Alberta. The boys were returned to Alaska through
the efforts of a Canadian child protective worker and an Alaskan
social worker and placed in foster care. At a Child in Need of Aid
(“CINA”) hearing, the superior court found both boys in need of
aid and sent them to live with their father. The superior court denied E.H.’s motions for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and terminated E.H.’s parental rights. On appeal, the supreme court held
that both former and current A.S. 47.10.010 establish that CINA
statutes govern proceedings concerning Alaska residents who are
minors regardless of whether the minor child is physically present
526
in Alaska. Under A.S. 01.10.055, the court determined that the
boys retained their Alaska residency as required by the CINA statutes while they were in Canada because Alaska was their home
state, there was no evidence that another state had jurisdiction over
them and substantial evidence remained in Alaska as to the care,
527
custody and protection of the boys. The supreme court affirmed
termination of E.H.’s parental rights.
528
In N.A. v. State, Div. of Family and Youth Services, the supreme court held that the superior court did not violate N.A’s due
process rights by not holding a permanency hearing prior to the
termination of parental rights trial and that it did not err in concluding that the State made active efforts to reunite N.A. with her
529
children. In April 1997, a social worker found N.A. intoxicated in
violation of her probation. As a result, N.A. was placed in alcohol
treatment and all of her children were placed in state custody. In
1998, N.A. was arrested again for intoxication in violation of her
probation and was placed in multiple rehabilitation programs. After a hearing in October 1998, the Division of Family and Youth
Services began implementing a permanency plan to terminate
N.A.’s parental rights. N.A. relinquished parental rights to her two
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 56.
23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1192.
E.H., 26 P.3d at 1188.
Id. at 1190-92.
19 P.3d 597
Id. at 601-02.
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male children but not to her two female children. N.A.’s motion
for a permanency hearing and continuation of the termination trial
was denied, and N.A’s parental rights to her daughters were terminated. On appeal, N.A. argued that the lack of an original permanency hearing or an annual review violated her due process rights.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the October 1998 hearing satisfied the permanency hearing requirements and that the
failure to hold an annual review was not error because the fourteen
months between the permanency hearings and termination trial
530
was due to a continuance requested by N.A. The supreme court
also held that the State made active efforts to prevent breakup of
the family, pointing to the multiple treatment programs provided
531
to N.A., and affirmed termination of N.A’s parental rights.
532
In T.F. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services, the supreme court upheld the termination of S.M. and T.F.’s parental
533
rights under Alaska law and the Indian Child Welfare Act. S.M.
gave birth to premature Indian twins who were developmentally
damaged by prenatal cocaine exposure and may have been affected
by fetal alcohol syndrome. The Department of Health and Social
Services (“DHSS”) immediately took custody of the twins. S.M.
failed to enter drug rehabilitation until one month before trial and
the father, T.F., was incarcerated and escaped from custody before
DHSS could administer a paternity test. T.F. eventually took the
paternity test, met with a social worker and visited with the twins.
However, DHSS had already initiated termination proceedings and
the superior court terminated parental rights before a case plan
was finalized. The supreme court held that the superior court had
not erred in finding that the children were in need of aid and that
the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions placing the
534
The court also held the
children at a substantial risk of harm.
State did not owe T.F. active efforts to prevent the breakup of an
Indian family until paternity was established and that the State had
535
made such efforts in this case. The court concluded that the welfare of the children and the “totality of the circumstances” sup536
ported the superior court’s termination of parental rights.

530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id.
Id. at 603.
26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1093-94 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (Michie 2000)).
Id. at 1094 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
Id. at 1097.
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D. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property
537
In Brandal v. Shangin, the supreme court affirmed the classi538
fication of Brandal’s right to use property as marital property.
The court also held that simple interest should be used in calculat539
ing Brandal’s equity in the marital property. During their marriage, Brandal and Shangin acquired the right to use land in exchange for purchasing a mobile home for Brandal’s grandmother.
Brandal appealed the superior court’s classification of the right to
use his grandmother’s land as a marital asset and the application of
compound interest to Shangin’s interest in that right. The supreme
court found that the land was marital property because it was purchased during the marriage with marital money, the parties demonstrated an intent to treat it as marital property by living on the land
during the fishing season and Brandal had not met his burden of
540
showing that the property was separate. However, the court held
that absent a specific finding that compound interest is necessary to
accurately measure the value of such an asset, simple interest
should have been used in determining the value of Shangin’s inter541
est in the right to use the land.
542
In Leis v. Hustad, the supreme court held that the parties intended an escrow account to be marital property, despite Hustad
being the sole title owner, and that the value of the 401(k) plan
should have been calculated at the time of the trial, not at the time
543
of separation. The court also held that a loan from Leis’ parents
544
After Leis and Hustad began living towas a marital liability.
gether in 1981, Hustad kept the title to his previous residence
solely under his name, but rented out the residence. After their
marriage in 1982, the couple sold the residence, producing cash
used for marital purposes and a receivable known as the “Muntean
Escrow.” Hustad argued that the Muntean Escrow account was
separate property because it was the product of the sale of his
house. The supreme court disagreed, finding that the parties intended the property to be marital property because the account
was listed in both parties’ names and the money was transferred to
545
joint accounts. Additionally, the court held that it was improper
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

36 P.3d 1188 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1193-94.
22 P.3d 885 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 887-88.
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to value Hustad’s 401(k) account at the time of separation rather
than the time of trial because Hustad made no additional contributions to the account between the date of separation and the date of
trial and showed no justification for deviating from the time-of-trial
546
Lastly, the court held that a loan from Leis’ parents
principle.
was a marital liability because both parties signed the promissory
547
note, demonstrating their intent to treat it as a marital obligation.
548
In Tolan v. Kimball, the supreme court affirmed an award to
Kimball of one-half the net value of a home he shared with To549
Kimball lived, unmarried, with Tolan from 1990 to 1997.
lan.
Despite Kimball’s weekly contributions of $200 and contribution to
the downpayment and closing costs of the house, Tolan refused to
put his name on the deed, explaining that she did not want his
name on any of her credit or financial obligations. When Kimball
and Tolan separated, Kimball sued and was awarded one-half of
the home’s net value. On appeal, the supreme court applied the
rule that property accumulated during a period of cohabitation
550
should be divided according to the parties’ intent. The court concluded that the superior court reasonably determined the parties’
intent to share the house equally based on both parties’ contribu551
tions to the downpayment and upkeep of the house. Tolan’s argument that Kimball was merely paying rent was unconvincing because Tolan never claimed these rent payments on her tax
552
Tolan also argued that her refusal to add Kimball’s
returns.
name to the title indicated her intent not to share the property.
The supreme court disagreed, citing Tolan’s statement to a disinterested witness that Kimball was stupid for paying in cash and for
having no proof that he was anything other than a tenant as proof
that Tolan’s refusal to put Kimball’s name on the deed was a cunning, anticipatory design rather than an indicator of mutual in553
tent.
IX. INSURANCE LAW
In Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co.,554 the supreme court held that a motorist must exhaust all underlying li546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id. at 888-89.
Id. at 889.
33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
29 P.3d 829 (Alaska 2001).
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ability coverage before recovering under an Underinsured Motorist
(“UIM”) policy.555 Curran was injured in a single-vehicle accident
in which her husband was driving. She did not sue her husband or
make a claim under his insurance policy, but instead offered the insurance company a credit in the amount of her husband’s coverage
while seeking recovery under both her and her husband’s UIM
coverage. In a separate claim, Barnhill was injured in a two-car
collision. He settled with the other driver’s insurance company for
an amount less than his coverage limit and then sought UIM benefits from his insurance company. In both cases, the claims for UIM
benefits were denied because the claimant had not exhausted the
underlying policy limits, and the superior court granted summary
judgment for the insurers. The supreme court held that A.S.
28.20.445 requires a UIM claimant to exhaust all underlying liabil556
The court
ity coverage before recovering under a UIM policy.
also held that a credit offered to a UIM insurer for the amount of
the underlying coverage did not amount to a settlement exhausting
557
Because neither Curran nor Barnhill
the underlying coverage.
exhausted the underlying policy limits, the supreme court affirmed
558
the judgment of the superior court.
In Farquhar v. Alaska Nat’l Insurance Co.,559 the supreme court
held that Alaska National Insurance Company (“ANIC”) was not
560
liable for prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limit. Farquhar was injured in a traffic accident with Industrial Boiler and
Controls. Farquhar and Industrial’s insurer, ANIC, settled for the
policy limit of one million dollars, attorney’s fees and the release of
liability, and agreed to litigate the question of whether ANIC owed
Farquhar prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limit. The supreme court established “two grounds for holding an insurer liable
for prejudgment interest: (1) if the insurer contractually assumes
liability by the terms of its policy with the insured, or (2) if public
561
policy requires liability despite the language of the contract.”
The court held that neither of these grounds applied and that
562
ANIC was not liable for interest in excess of the policy limit.

555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

Id. at 838.
Id. at 831-34.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 838.
20 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 578.
Id. (citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979)).
Id. at 579-82.
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In Holderness v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,563 the supreme court held that a personal umbrella policy qualifies as automobile liability insurance under Alaska’s insurance code, thereby
requiring the coverage to include prejudgment interest and attor564
The court also held that a business liability policy
ney’s fees.
565
does not cover an executive officer on his commute to work.
Holderness was hit by motorist while driving to Anchorage to perform surgery. Holderness held both a personal automobile liability
policy and a personal liability umbrella policy with State Farm. In
addition, the Alaska Podiatry Associates (“APA”), of which
Holderness was an executive officer, owned a State Farm business
liability policy that covered Holderness with respect to his duties as
an officer. The superior court held that the umbrella policy did not
constitute automobile liability insurance and, therefore, State Farm
did not owe Holderness any prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees
beyond the policy limit. The court further held that APA’s policy
did not cover Holderness’ accident because he was not performing
executive duties at the time. The supreme court reversed the first
part of the ruling, finding that the umbrella policy qualified as
automobile liability insurance because it did not specifically exclude coverage for liability stemming from the ownership or opera566
The court affirmed the ruling that
tion of an automobile.
Holderness was not covered by the business liability policy because
567
commuting to work did not fall under his officer’s duties.
568
In Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises, the supreme court held
that insurance agents have a common law duty to advise their customers about insurance coverage if a “special relationship” exists
569
between the agent and the insured. The court also held that cus570
Peter’s
tomers can sue insurers who violate A.S. 21.89.020(c).
son was seriously injured by a motorist whose insurance coverage
was much less than the Peters’ expected damages. Peter had
minimum coverage, but sued both the insurance agency from
whom she purchased the insurance and the insurance carrier on
grounds that the agency had a duty to recommend higher limit coverage and that the company had a duty to offer such coverage. The
supreme court held that insurance agents do not have a general
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

24 P.3d 1235 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id. at 1239 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(a), (c) (Michie 2000)).
Id. at 1245.
22 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 482-83.
Id.
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duty to advise their clients of appropriate coverage unless a “special relationship” exists.571 Such a relationship exists if an agent
misrepresents the nature of the coverage, voluntarily assumes the
responsibility for choosing a particular insurance policy, fails to respond appropriately to a request or inquiry about a particular type
572
of coverage, or has a duty to clarify an ambiguous request. The
court also held that an implied private right of action exists where
insurance companies violate Alaska law, which requires limits of
573
up to one million dollars for underinsured motorist coverage.
Because issues of material fact existed as to both claims, the court
574
remanded for further proceedings.
In Simmons v. Insurance Co. of North America,575 the supreme
court held that when a business owner acquires insurance under a
trade name, coverage under the policy extends to that individual as
576
Following a serious car accident, Simwell as to the business.
mons sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits under a
policy issued to her father’s business, Happy Puppy Enterprises.
Because the policy did not specifically include her father as a
named insured, Simmons sought to have the policy reformed to include the father as a named insured and thereby derive coverage as
a family member. The superior court granted summary judgment
for the insurance company, reasoning that because the policy extended coverage to insured individuals and their families, and
Happy Puppy was a business and not an individual, the coverage
would not extend to Simmons even if the policy were reformed to
include her father. The supreme court distinguished the case from
577
an instance where a corporation is the named insured and held
that where a policy names a partnership as the insured, “coverage
578
extend[s] to the individuals comprising the partnership as well.”
The court reversed the summary judgment order and remanded the
case to determine if the policy should be reformed to include the
father as a named insured and, if so, whether the policy should ex579
tend to Simmons as a family member.

571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.

Id. at 485.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 483.
17 P.3d 56 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 62 n.30.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64.
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In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lawrence,580 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment for a family whose son
581
was injured in an accident with an underinsured motorist. State
Farm appealed the ruling that the Lawrences’ claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress qualified for the policy limits under
their uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM/UIM”) and
that their UM/UIM coverage covered them for the punitive damages of an underinsured motorist. State Farm argued that the parents did not qualify for separate policy limits because their emotional distress claims were not bodily injury and were not suffered
in the “same accident” as their son’s accident. The supreme court
held that State Farm waived both of these arguments because it
582
failed to adequately raise them in the lower court proceedings.
The court also affirmed the ruling that the Lawrences’ UM/UIM
provision covers the punitive damages of an underinsured driver
because the Lawrences’ liability policies, which UM/UIM must
mirror, covered them for their own punitive damages, the policies
suggested that they cover such punitive damages and public policy
583
did not forbid the result.
In Wing v. GEICO Ins. Co.,584 the supreme court upheld an ar585
Wing, injured by an
bitrator’s award in an insurance dispute.
uninsured motorist, rejected GEICO’s initial settlement offer. The
arbitrators reduced their preliminary award of $33,557 to a final
award of $14,987.70 after deducting expert fees and, presumably,
offsets claimed by GEICO. The panel also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On appeal, Wing argued that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority when it reduced the preliminary award without giving a complete explanation, deducted expert
fees from the award and failed to award attorney’s fees. The court
rejected Wing’s arguments because A.S. 09.43.120(a) does not
permit judicial review of an arbitrator’s award for failure to give a
complete explanation and because the insurance policy governing
the arbitration explicitly provided that each side would bear its
586
own attorney’s fees. In addition, the court rejected Wing’s argument with respect to expert fees because the argument relied on a

580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.

26 P.3d 1074 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1079-81.
17 P.3d 783 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786-87.
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provision of the insurance policy that conflicted with A.S.
21.89.020(f)(1).587
X. PROPERTY LAW
In Foster v. State, Dep’t of Transportation,588 the supreme court
held that state courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the ownership
589
or right to possession of Native allotment land. In 1979, the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management granted Foster’s application for an
allotment to a tract of land based on her claim of seasonal use and
occupancy dating back to 1964. A 1983 survey revealed that parts
of Foster’s allotment were subject to easements that pre-dated her
use and occupancy. In 1998, the U.S. issued Foster a certificate
making her allotment subject to three separate rights-of-way. Foster sued the State for inverse condemnation and trespass, which the
superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over questions involving the ownership or right
to possession of property held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
590
States. The court also held that the superior court could award
costs and attorney’s fees under Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 79
591
and 82, even though it lacked jurisdiction over Foster’s claims.
592
In R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme
court affirmed the denial of relief in an inverse condemnation proceeding, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding
593
that no compensable taking had occurred. The appeal concerned
R & Y’s economic loss from the Municipality of Anchorage’s
(“MOA”) 1990 decision to add a twenty-foot setback band to the
existing eighty-foot setback band surrounding Blueberry Lake.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the MOA’s legitimate interest in protecting wetlands outweighed the minimal
frustration of R & Y’s investment-backed expectations for the
594
property as a whole. The supreme court rejected R & Y’s argu587. Id. at 787-88. The statute provides, “an automobile liability insurance
policy must provide that all expenses and fees, not including counsel fees or adjuster fees, incurred because of arbitration or mediation shall be paid as determined by the arbitrator.” ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(f)(1) (Michie 2000).
588. 34 P.3d 1288 (Alaska 2001).
589. Id. at 1289.
590. Id. at 1290 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994)).
591. Id. at 1291-92.
592. 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001).
593. Id. at 300.
594. Id. at 296.
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ment that every economic loss due to government regulation must
be compensated, and reasoned that, in addition to the factors out595
lined in Anchorage v. Sandberg, courts must consider the princi596
ples of equitable distribution of public burden and benefit. The
court concluded that the setback restriction did not trigger compensation because it was part of a local and national wetlands preservation scheme that applied broadly to all landowners and bene597
fited both the public generally and the landowners in particular.
598
In Safeway, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Transportation, the supreme court held that a municipality cannot vacate the State’s in599
In 1959, owners of adjacent
terest in a highway right-of-way.
pieces of land conveyed land along their common boundary “as a
permanent easement and right-of-way for use by the public as a
600
public road,” later called Becharof Street. Becharof Street was
included within the State’s right-of-way on both the Highway Department’s right-of-way map and on maps recorded with the State’s
declarations of taking. In 1983, over the objection of the Department of Transportation, Anchorage relinquished interests in the
right-of-way covering Becharof Street. In 1996, Safeway, a lessor
of one of the adjacent properties, filed suit to quiet title to Becharof Street after the State concluded it still possessed an easement
over the property. The supreme court held that the State maintained an easement over Becharof Street because the State may accept land dedicated to the public “through a formal official action,”
and that the inclusion of Becharof Street on the highway construc601
Once the
tion right-of-way map was a “formal official action.”
State acquired the right in land for highway purposes, the right
602
could only be vacated by the Department of Transportation.
XI. TORT LAW
603
In Alpine Industries, Inc. v. Feyk, the supreme court held
that Feyk had absolute official immunity for allegedly defamatory
604
speech. Feyk had prepared a public health bulletin issued by the
595. 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993).
596. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 299-300.
597. Id. at 298.
598. 34 P.3d 336 (Alaska 2001).
599. Id. at 337.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 339-40 (quoting State v. Fairbanks Lodge No. 1392, 633 P.2d 1378,
1380 (Alaska 1981)).
602. Id. at 339 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.070(a) (Michie 2000)).
603. 22 P.3d 445 (Alaska 2001).
604. Id. at 450.
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State Department of Health and Social Services warning against
using ozone-generating devices in occupied spaces, specifically
mentioning that a Minnesota court previously ruled that Alpine
Industries had made false claims about the safety of its generators.
Alpine sued Feyk for libel, tortious interference with business relationships and unfair trade practices. The supreme court held that
absolute immunity was appropriate because of the importance of
public health bulletins and the potential for increased frequency of
605
The court recognized
lawsuits against authors of the bulletins.
that Alpine had no other remedy, but determined that other factors
606
weighed more heavily in finding absolute immunity.
In Angnabooguk v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,607 the supreme court held that when the State chooses to take over firefighting operations, it assumes a duty to conduct those operations
non-negligently and that all firefighting decisions are not necessarily discretionary planning decisions subject to immunity under the
608
Landowners who suffered damage to
Alaska Tort Claims Act.
their homes and property as a result of the Miller’s Reach fire of
1996 sued the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division
of Forestry, (“Forestry”) claiming that the State’s firefighting activities were conducted negligently. The superior court dismissed
the suits on the basis of discretionary function immunity. The supreme court reversed, holding that Forestry owed the plaintiffs an
actionable duty of care as a matter of public policy and that the
609
Alaska Tort Claims Act does not provide immunity for all fire610
The court remanded the case to determine
fighting decisions.
which actions taken by Forestry were discretionary and subject to
611
immunity and which acts were operational and subject to liability.
612
In Choi v. Anvil, the supreme court held that plaintiffs allegedly injured in a car accident “were not required to present expert
613
Choi rear-ended a pickup
testimony to establish their claims.”
truck driven by Anvil, with three passengers in each vehicle. Six of
those involved filed suit against Choi, who admitted negligence in
causing the collision. At trial on causation and damages, none of
the plaintiffs offered expert evidence regarding the “causation,
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 450.
26 P.3d 447 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 453, 458.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2000).
Angnabooguk, 26 P.3d at 453, 458-59.
Id. at 459.
32 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 2.
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permanence, or extent of their alleged injuries.”614 On appeal, Choi
argued that the plaintiffs were required to present expert witnesses
to establish causation. The supreme court disagreed, holding that
expert witness testimony is necessary “only when the nature or
character of a person’s injuries require the special skill of an expert
to help present the evidence to the trier of fact in a comprehensible
615
format.” The alleged injuries in the instant case and their causa616
tion were easily understandable by a jury given the lay testimony.
617
In City of Seward v. Afognak Logging, the supreme court af618
firmed Seward’s liability for damages to Afognak’s bulldozer.
During a heavy rainfall, a City representative directed one of
Afognak’s bulldozer operators to cut a channel for floodwater but
failed to tell him that the pavement had collapsed, a condition that
the operator could not see. As a result, the bulldozer was bogged
down and suffered extensive water damage. The supreme court
found that Afognak presented sufficient evidence that the City
owed a duty to warn Afognak of dangerous conditions even though
Afognak, as an independent contractor, was not contractually
619
bound to follow the City’s instructions. In addition, the court re620
jected both of the City’s claims for immunity. It found that state
review of the City’s compliance plan did not transform it from a
statutory duty into “an agreement or contract” that would fall
within a provision for immunity to cities acting under agreement or
621
contract with the State to perform emergency response duties. It
also found that the City’s actions were not budgetary in nature and
622
did not qualify for immunity as protected planning decisions.
623
In Dore v. City of Fairbanks, the supreme court held that
police did not have an actionable duty to arrest a suspect on an
outstanding warrant or otherwise prevent harm to a possible crime
624
Seven days after an arrest warrant was issued charging
victim.
Dore with harassment of his ex-wife, Carmen, Dore killed Carmen
and committed suicide. Three Dore children filed negligence actions against the City of Fairbanks. The supreme court found no

614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
31 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 781.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785-86.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
31 P.3d 788 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 796.
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statutory duty to arrest and noted that later-enacted domestic violence laws suggest that public policy does not support such a duty.625
In addition, the court found no actionable duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the police would only have a duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent a third person from doing
harm when the police took charge of a third person who they knew,
or should have known, to be likely to cause bodily harm to oth626
ers. Because the police never took charge of Dore, the court held
627
that the police had no tort duty to control him.
628
In Estate of Himsel v. Alaska, the supreme court declined to
629
apply the doctrine of Feres v. United States and remanded because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the
630
pilot was acting on behalf of the state as a “borrowed employee.”
The plaintiffs brought suit against the State on behalf of family
members who died in the crash of an Alaska Army National Guard
631
The State argued that the court should apply the Feres
plane.
doctrine, which provides sovereign immunity for tort claims involving the military. The court refused to apply the doctrine, rea632
The
soning that Alaska law was adequate to address the issue.
court applied the planning/operational test to determine if the act
in question was “discretionary” and therefore entitled to sovereign
633
The court found that the negligence alleged by the
immunity.
plaintiffs occurred during the execution, and not the planning of
634
The court rethe trip, and therefore, immunity did not exist.
versed and remanded the case because a question of material fact
635
While
remained regarding the pilot’s relationship to the State.
the pilot was clearly a federal employee, evidence indicated that
Alaska might have retained some control over the pilot, thereby
636
making him a “borrowed employee” subject to liability.
637
In In re the Exxon Valdez, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held a punitive damages award to be appropriate, but
625. Id. at 792 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.515(a)(1)-(4) (Michie 2000)).
626. Id. at 794 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-15, 319
(1965)).
627. Id. at 796.
628. 36 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2001).
629. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
630. Himsel, 36 P.3d at 43.
631. Id. at 37.
632. Id. at 39-40.
633. Id. at 40.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 43.
636. Id. at 42-43.
637. 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
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excessive.638 In consolidated actions against Exxon Corp. and Captain Hazelwood brought by plaintiffs affected by the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages
and $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon and $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood. The defendants appealed, arguing that punitive damages were not allowed in the present case,
that the award was excessive and that the compensatory damage
award was not supported by the evidence. The plaintiffs crossappealed the grant of summary judgment against various claimants
who suffered purely economic injury. The court of appeals held
that punitive damages were appropriate because (1) the prior civil
and criminal penalties imposed on Exxon did not preclude a punitive damages award; (2) punitive damages are not disallowed in
admiralty law; (3) the prior consent decree did not bar a subsequent award of punitive damages for injury to economic and property interests; and (4) neither the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza639
640
tion Act nor the Clean Water Act preempted a private right of
action for punitive or compensatory damages based on injuries to
641
However, the
private economic or quasi-economic interests.
court found that the $5 billion punitive damage award against
Exxon was excessive and remanded for determination of a lower
642
amount. The plaintiffs argued that the district court erroneously
granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon on certain entities’
claims of economic injury unaccompanied by any physical injury to
their property or person. The court of appeals found that federal
admiralty law does not preempt Alaska’s statute providing for
643
strict liability for hazardous substances. As a result, the court of
appeals remanded the claims of those entities with valid claims un644
der Alaska law, but not those with remote or speculative claims.
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,645
the supreme court held that A.S. 46.03.822(a) creates a private
cause of action for the owners of private property damaged by a
release of hazardous substances; that a statute of limitations defense is available for such an action; that a contribution action under section 46.03.822(a) does not accrue for statute of limitations
purposes until the direct action concludes; and that contamination
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.

Id. at 1242-47.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1994).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225-31.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1252-53 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (Michie 2000)).
Id. at 1253.
21 P.3d 344 (Alaska 2001).
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by a past owner or tenant cannot be characterized as a continuing
trespass or nuisance for statute of limitations purposes.646 As a receiver of a failed bank’s assets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) acquired land contaminated by hazardous
waste. To recover cleanup costs, the FDIC sued the former landowner and the owner’s tenants under A.S. 46.03.822, which imposes strict liability on a joint and several basis for release of hazardous substances and allows responsible parties to sue for
contribution. Finding several unresolved issues of Alaska law, the
district court certified four questions to the supreme court. In
finding a private cause of action under section 46.03.822(a), the supreme court held that a private cause of action was in the nature of
the statute, was necessary to provide adequate remedies, did not
conflict with existing remedies, promoted the statute’s purpose, did
not depart from previous applications of the statute and did not
647
create an undue burden on the courts. The court also held that
the limiting language of section 46.03.822(a) does not preclude affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations that have no
inherent relation to the imposition of joint and several liability for
648
release of hazardous substances.
649
In Hibbits v. Sides, the supreme court found that it was error
to dismiss Hibbits’ claim against Sides for intentional third-party
650
spoliation. Hibbits was involved in a motor vehicle accident with
Vogus. Hibbits claimed that Sides, the first state trooper to arrive
at the scene, knew that Vogus was under the influence of marijuana and knowingly removed him from the scene so that Vogus
would not be tested for marijuana use. The supreme court held
that because it recently recognized intentional third-party spolia651
tion to be a tort, it was error to dismiss Hibbits’ claim. The court
found that the case should not proceed until the underlying dispute
between Hibbits and Vogus has been resolved and, therefore, Sides
652
could move to stay the proceeding until resolution occurred.
653
In Joseph v. State, the supreme court held that the intentionality of a prisoner’s suicide is not a complete defense to a wrongful
646. Id. at 356-57.
647. Id. at 348-49. (applying Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98, 10405 (Alaska 1997)).
648. Id. at 354.
649. 34 P.3d 327 (Alaska 2001).
650. Id. at 328.
651. Id. at 328-29 (citing Nichols v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300
(Alaska 2000)).
652. Id. at 330.
653. 26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001).
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death claim alleging that the jailer negligently failed to prevent the
suicide.654 The court also ruled that the use of a blanket preemption to remove those persons criminally charged from the list of
prospective jurors did not constitute reversible error without evidence that a particular person was excluded from service or that
655
using the blanket exemption led to an unrepresentative jury. Jo656
seph’s son hung himself in his jail cell after his arrest for assault.
In Joseph’s wrongful death action, the special verdict required the
jury to return a verdict for the State if it found that Joseph’s son
657
died “as a result of his intentional actions.” On appeal, Joseph
assigned error to the jury instructions and use of the blanket exemption. The supreme court, reasoning that a “duty to prevent
someone from acting in a particular way logically cannot be de658
feated by the very action sought to be avoided,” held that the fact
that a prisoner’s suicide was intentional does not defeat a claim
659
that the jailer negligently failed to prevent the suicide. As a result, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
660
In Mitchell v. Heinrichs, the supreme court held that a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or an award
of punitive damages for the killing of another’s pet is proper only
when the challenged conduct was so outrageous and extreme “as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
661
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” The
court held that a pet’s actual value to the owner may sometimes be
662
the proper measure of its value. Heinrichs saw two dogs running
near her livestock pen and believed the dogs were threatening her
livestock. The dogs then turned to Heinrichs, who shot Mitchell’s
dog out of fear for her personal safety. The superior court concluded that Heinrichs’ conduct did not “go beyond all bounds of
decency” and did not warrant imposition of liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or punitive damages. The supreme
court affirmed, and held that even though sentimental or companionship value may not be included in the award of damages for the
loss of a pet, the actual value of the pet to the owner, rather than

654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 311-12 (citing Hawks v. State, 908 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1995)).
Id. at 313.
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the fair market value, may be the proper measure of damages.663
The case was remanded for determination of damages.
664
In Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., the supreme court held
that a liability release form that fails to unequivocally express intent to release does not protect an individual or company from un665
necessary dangers or unreasonable risk. Moore signed a release
of liability before participating in an ATV safety class offered by
Hartley Motors Inc. (“Hartley”). Moore was injured when her
ATV rolled over on the safety class course. She sued Hartley, alleging that the liability release was invalid for lack of consideration
and void as against public policy, and that the course was inherently unsafe. The trial court granted summary judgment for Hartley. On appeal, the supreme court held that the court did not err
in rejecting Moore’s claim on the basis of lack of consideration or
666
public policy, but found error in the trial court’s failure to consider the scope of the release. The court held that the release only
applied to those risks of operating an ATV that were “obvious and
necessary to the sport,” and not to risks from an unnecessarily dan667
gerous course. Finding that a genuine question of fact existed as
to whether Moore’s injuries resulted from an unnecessarily unsafe
668
course, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate.
669
In Pauley v. Anchorage School District, the supreme court
held that the school district and its official were entitled to qualified immunity for the decision to release a child to his mother prior
670
Pauley sued his son’s school
to her court-scheduled visitation.
and its principal for negligence and intentional interference with
custodial rights after his son was released into his mother’s custody
before her scheduled Christmas visitation, after which the mother
failed to return the boy. The supreme court held that the princi671
The decision
pal’s actions were entitled to qualified immunity.
was discretionary and not malicious, corrupt, or made in bad faith
because the principal contacted the father, examined the mother’s
court documents and the documents on file at the school, and discussed the legal ramifications with the police officer the mother

663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.

Id. at 312-13.
36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
31 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
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brought with her.672 As a result, the claims against the principal and
school district were properly dismissed.
673
In Robles v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc., the supreme court
found error in the exclusion of evidence of Shoreside’s knowledge
of unsafe propane tanks because the evidence supported a potentially viable claim for failure to warn the victim of a propane tank
674
Robles was injured while filling a Shoreside propane
accident.
tank when its corroded bottom gave way and the tank exploded.
Robles submitted evidence that Shoreside’s employees regularly
filled tanks that had not been inspected and recertified according
to federal regulations. Based on this evidence, Robles claimed that
Shoreside was negligent for filling uncertified tanks and failing to
warn him that these tanks were in circulation. However, the superior court excluded the evidence and dismissed this claim. The supreme court reversed, holding that the evidence of Shoreside’s illegal refilling practices should not have been excluded because a jury
may have found that Shoreside had constructive knowledge of its
dealers’ exposure to heightened risk; therefore, Shoreside had a
675
duty to alert Robles to the risk. The case was remanded for retrial on the issue of negligent failure to warn.
676
In Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., the supreme court held that “a corporation that purchases assets of the
manufacturer of a rifle sold in Alaska [can] be held liable for per677
sonal injury caused in Alaska by a defect in the rifle.” Savage Industries, Inc. manufactured a defective rifle purchased by Western
Auto Supply Company. The rifle was sold to a store in Maine and
later resold to Taylor in Alaska. The defective rifle discharged and
caused injury to Taylor’s son. Savage Arms, Inc. purchased assets
from Savage Industries in 1989. In 1990, Taylor sued Savage Industries and Western Auto, which settled with Taylor and sought indemnity from Savage Arms. The supreme court characterized successor liability as an issue of tort law and held that Alaska tort law
678
applied. Faced with an issue of first impression, the court held
that the traditional “mere continuation” exception and the new
“continuity of enterprise” exception to the rule of successor non679
liability are available under Alaska law. In accepting the new ex672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.

Id.
29 P.3d 838 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 840, 844.
Id. at 843-44.
18 P.3d 49 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
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ception, the court reasoned that “the posited negative effects on
the overall economy are too indeterminate and speculative to outweigh the policy of compensating persons injured by product de680
fects.” The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Western Auto and remanded because material factual disputes existed
and because the uncertainty surrounding the successor liability is681
sue inhibited the parties from effectively preparing their cases.
682
In Walden v. State, Dep’t of Transportation, the supreme
court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment for the
683
State. Shawn Walden incurred brain injuries as a result of an accident in which his father, Mel, lost control of the car on a highway
curve after hitting ice. Individually and as Shawn’s legal representative, Shawn’s mother filed suit alleging that the State Department
of Transportation (“DOT”) should have posted a warning sign on
the curve and that DOT’s negligent maintenance of the highway
curve was a substantial factor in Mel’s loss of control. The superior
court found that DOT had no duty to post a sign and granted DOT
partial summary judgment. On appeal, the supreme court upheld
the grant of partial summary judgment because Shawn’s mother
failed to establish a duty on the part of DOT to place a warning
684
The court relied on the Manual of Uniform
sign at the curve.
Traffic Control Devices, which states that DOT “may” place a
685
warning sign at such curves. The court reasoned that the use of
“may” does not rise to the level of a legal requirement to place a
686
warning sign and, therefore, DOT did not breach any legal duty.
687
In Waldroup v. Lindman, the supreme court affirmed summary judgment for an insurer who was sued for tortious interference with a contractual relationship after it offered to defend a patient against a chiropractor when the chiropractor sued her for
688
After an auto accident, Lindman sought chiropractic
payment.
treatment from Dr. Waldroup. Lindman’s insurer, Allstate, informed Waldroup that it would deny payment for a portion of her
treatment received at Waldroup’s rehabilitation clinic unless he
submitted proof that the treatment was reasonable, necessary and
accident-related. Allstate also informed Lindman that if her claim
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
27 P.3d 297 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
28 P.3d 293 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 294-95.
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was denied and Waldroup pursued her for payment, Allstate would
defend her. The superior court dismissed Waldroup’s interference
with contractual relations claim against Allstate because it found
that Allstate’s interference was privileged. On appeal, the supreme
court agreed that Allstate had a direct financial interest in the con689
tractual relationship between Waldroup and Lindman. The court
rejected Waldroup’s argument that Allstate’s interference was not
privileged because Allstate was exposed to potential loss by its of690
fer to defend Lindman in any collection action filed against her.
691
In Wongittilin v. State, the supreme court held that the police
did not owe a duty to arrest a man on an outstanding warrant and,
therefore, were not liable in a civil tort action for the death caused
692
by the man after issuance of the warrant. An arrest warrant was
issued for Jackson after he violated his probation. A police officer
subsequently met with Jackson but did not arrest him because he
believed the return flight to Nome from Savoonga was full. Three
months later, Jackson struck and killed Wongittilin with his fourwheeler. On appeal from summary judgment for the State, the supreme court determined that the police had no duty to arrest Jack693
son on the outstanding warrant under statutes or case law. The
court concluded that A.S. 18.65.080 does not create a duty to arrest
on an outstanding warrant and only imposes a duty on the police to
assist other governmental departments but not a general duty to
694
protect the public. The court concluded that prior case law suggested that no duty existed without a special relationship, and that
no such relationship existed without the police taking charge of the
695
Finding that no duty was created in statutes,
dangerous party.
case law or public policy, the court held that the police had no duty
to arrest Jackson.
XII. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
696
In Enders v. Parker, the supreme court upheld denial of attorney’s fees to Enders under A.S. 13.16.435, and to Parker under
697
In an action
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 82(b) and 79(b).
challenging admission of her stepfather’s will into probate, Enders
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.

Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
36 P.3d 678 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 681-82.
Id. at 683-84.
28 P.3d 280 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 281-82.
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was unsuccessful in establishing undue influence by Parker, her
stepfather’s companion. Enders appealed the denial of her claim
for attorney’s fees under section 13.16.435, which provides that in
order to receive attorney’s fees, a litigant must show that the probate proceeding was filed in good faith. The supreme court held
that although the superior court did not expressly find that Enders
acted in bad faith, the language and tone of the opinion clearly
supported that conclusion, and the court found that Enders “failed
698
In addition, the court held that
to act in the estate’s interest.”
Parker could not recover attorney’s fees under Rules 82(b) or
79(b) because the rules do not apply where a specific statutory
699
scheme for attorney’s fees exists.
700
In Helgason v. Merriman, the supreme court affirmed the
decision to retain Merriman as the personal representative of Hel701
gason’s estate. Helgason’s will named Merriman as personal representative, but Helgason’s sons, as heirs, sought Merriman’s removal under A.S. 13.16.295, which provides for removal in the
estate’s best interests. Helgason’s sons claimed that removal would
be in the estate’s best interests because of hostility and a conflict of
interest between Merriman and the sons. The supreme court upheld the finding that there was no conflict of interest because
Hegalson’s sons failed to raise a “real issue” of a conflict of interest
such that the personal representative would be potentially liable to
the estate because of the existence of some cause of action against
702
him. The court likewise upheld the conclusion that no evidence
703
of hostility existed between Merriman and the plaintiffs.
Heather M. Bell*

698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 286.
36 P.3d 703 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 706, 709-10.
Id. at 710.

* The Editor wishes to thank Jennifer Tomsen, Erin Foley, David Kim and
the authors of The 2001 Year in Review: Erin Abood, Jason Bliss, Joseph Davies,
Tillman Finley, Matthew Kane, Kurt Lunkenheimer, David Miscia, Jaclyn Moyer,
Leah Russin, Emily Schilling, Joshua Simko, Jacquelyn Sumer and Jason Veloso.

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

2002]

06/04/02 2:07 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

283

APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM 2001 YEAR IN REVIEW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,704 the supreme
court held that the Board of Equalization’s failure to make substantial factual findings was harmless error when the reasoning be705
Alvarez appealed the
hind the Board’s decision was apparent.
assessments of three parcels of land to the Board of Equalization,
arguing that the assessment for two parcels should have been based
on the best offer that she was able to obtain when they were on the
market and that the third assessment was based on incorrect factual findings made by the borough assessor. The Board upheld the
assessments and Alvarez appealed, arguing that the Board did not
make factual findings sufficient to allow it to conduct judicial review. The supreme court pointed out that the standard for sufficiency of a board’s findings of fact is “whether the record sufficiently reflects the basis for the [board’s] decision so as to enable
706
The supreme court upheld the
meaningful judicial review.”
Board’s ruling and found that the failure of the Board to make
findings of fact was harmless because the decision made clear how
the Board resolved the conflicting theories of the case and ad707
dressed all issues in dispute.
In Anderson v. State, Department of Revenue,708 the supreme
court affirmed the denial of Anderson’s application for a permanent fund dividend, finding sufficient evidence that Anderson
failed to overcome the presumption of non-residency and that the
709
Department did not misinterpret its own regulations. Although
Anderson left Alaska in 1991, he remained registered to vote, held
an Alaska driver’s license, owned no real property in another state,
and paid no residence taxes in his new location. Between 1991 and
1997, Anderson and his family made three trips to Alaska, spending a total of seven days in the state. In that same period, Anderson accumulated 205 days of personal leave time. Anderson filed
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.

28 P.3d 935 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 940.
Id.
Id. at 942.
26 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1108.

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

284

06/04/02 2:07 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:1

for a permanent fund dividend for 1997 but the Department denied
his application, finding that Anderson had not established residency. In affirming the superior court, the supreme court noted
Anderson’s infrequent and short trips to Alaska, his choice to use
only a small percentage of his leave to visit Alaska, his inability to
control his residency due to a military career, his choice to vote absentee in Alaska only once, his decision to accept a transfer knowing it would weaken his chances of an Alaskan assignment and the
short duration of his adult residency in comparison to his ab710
sence. Although the evidence could also support a finding that
Anderson overcame the presumption of non-residency, the court
held that it is obligated to affirm the decision of the Department
when it chooses between two alternatives which are both supported
711
by substantial evidence. The court also found that in giving some
regulatory factors more weight than others, the Department did
712
not arbitrarily interpret its own regulation.
713
In Baker v. University of Alaska, the supreme court held that
Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 604(b)(1)(B)(iv) grants courts
broad discretion to grant relief to appellants from the requirement
that they prepay the costs of preparing an administrative transcript
714
and record for appeal upon a showing of good cause. Baker, a
non-tenured professor, brought suit after the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks (“UAF”) gave him notice of non-retention and rejected
his grievance. Baker prevailed in his suit, which was remanded to
UAF for the determination of damages, and then appealed UAF’s
denial of damages beyond lost salary, retirement, benefits and expenses. Baker sought an indigency exception to the requirement
that he prepay the costs of preparing the administrative record for
the appeal. The superior court denied his motion and dismissed his
appeal for lack of prosecution. The supreme court first pointed out
that Appellate Rule 604(b)(1)(B)(iv) does not restrict the court
from relaxing the advance payment requirement, and allows the
court to deviate from ordinary procedure upon a showing of good
715
cause. The court then concluded that Baker showed substantial
hardship considering his illegal termination, the fact that UAF’s
conduct had increased his litigation costs and attorney’s fees, his

710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
22 P.3d 440 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 442.
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existing debt and UAF’s ability as an employer to recover preparation costs in the future.716
In Brown v. State,717 the supreme court held that a hearing officer may not deny an in-person hearing in driver’s license revoca718
tion proceedings that involve issues of the licensee’s credibility.
Arrested after a breath test showed his blood-alcohol level to be
above the legal limit, Brown declined an independent chemical test
of his blood and the arresting officer revoked his driver’s license.
Brown claimed that he declined the independent test only because
the handcuffs in which he had been placed were hurting him and he
sought an administrative hearing to review the revocation. The
hearing officer denied Brown’s request that the hearing be held in
person and conducted a telephone hearing instead, ultimately upholding the revocation of Brown’s license. The supreme court
ruled that because the case involved issues of fact as to whether
Brown waived his right to an independent blood test, Brown’s
719
Following its decision in Whitesides v.
credibility was at issue.
720
State, the court ruled that when the licensee’s credibility is at issue, the hearing officer may not deny a request for an in-person
721
hearing.
In Edwardsen v. Department of Interior,722 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Mineral Management
Services’ (“MMS”) Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for
the Northstar oil and gas development project had “reasonably
723
documented” the project’s environmental impacts. BP Exploration acquired the rights to federal and state leases for the Northstar
project and sought approval to begin producing oil by expanding
an artificial gravel island, drilling wells on federal portions of the
reservoir and constructing pipelines. The Army Corps of Engineers determined that the issuance of construction permits constituted a “major Federal action” under the National Environmental
Protection Act and required an EIS. The MMS adopted the EIS
and later approved the Northstar development plan. Six Alaska
Natives and Greenpeace sued, challenging the adequacy of the final EIS. The court held that the MMS took the required “hard
look” in the EIS at both the direct and indirect impacts of the proj716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.

Id. at 443.
20 P.3d 586 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 588.
Id.
20 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2001).
Brown, 20 P.3d at 588.
268 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 791.
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ect,724 and that the EIS analysis adequately considered the cumulative impacts of the project, including impacts on lakes, rivers, wild725
life, air quality and wetlands. Therefore, the court declined to review the approval of the project.
726
In Estate of Basargin v. State, the supreme court affirmed the
decision of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(“CFEC”), which denied Basargin a commercial fisheries entry
727
Basargin’s estate argued that Barsargin was denied
permit.
meaningful hearings and that the CFEC improperly denied Basargin points for “unavoidable circumstances,” his vessel and gear
claims, and his economic dependence claims. The supreme court
concluded that Basargin was given a meaningful opportunity to
728
present his case consistent with due process concerns. The court
also concluded that cultural barriers and Basargin’s English language limitations did not entitle him to “unavoidable circum729
stances” points. The court determined that even if Basargin had
been granted the points he sought for his vessel and gear investments, he would not have accumulated enough points, and therefore, any miscalculation by the CFEC for this category was harm730
Finally, the court found that substantial evidence
less error.
showed that Basargin was not entitled to economic dependence
731
points.
In Leuthe v. State,732 the supreme court held that the denial of a
tardy application for a commercial fisheries entry permit was
proper where the applicant was unable to show that he had been
733
misadvised. Leuthe filed an application for an entry permit after
the deadline had passed. The superior court affirmed the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission’s decision to deny his application. For consideration after the deadline, an applicant must establish that he had been misadvised about his eligibility for an
entry permit and must prove that he spoke to a fisheries agent before the deadline, that he received bad advice from the agent, and

724. Id. at 786 (quoting Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d
468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000)).
725. Id. at 789-90.
726. 31 P.3d 796 (Alaska 2001).
727. Id. at 797-98.
728. Id. at 797-800.
729. Id. at 797-98.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. 20 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
733. Id. at 548.
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that the bad advice caused him to miss the deadline.734 The supreme court affirmed the denial of Leuthe’s application because
Leuthe was unable to show that the advice he received was errone735
ous.
In Lopez v. Public Employees’ Retirement System,736 the supreme court held that the Public Employees’ Retirement Board
(“Board”) was correct in finding that Lopez had not established
that “a condition or hazard undergone in the course of her em737
ployment was a substantial factor in causing her disability.” Lopez was a resident aide at the State’s Harborview Developmental
Center, where she injured her back while lifting a resident. Following the injury, Lopez never returned to work and she later applied for occupational disability benefits. The Board denied Lopez
occupational benefits but awarded her non-occupational disability
benefits due to her inability to work as a resident aide and the lack
of alternate employment opportunities with Harborview. The supreme court affirmed, holding that the Board applied the correct
legal standard in concluding that the sole cause of Lopez’ disability
was an arthritic hip and that the occupational injury to her back
738
was not a substantial factor in her disability.
In Yoon v. Alaska Real Estate Commission,739 the supreme
court affirmed the decision of the Real Estate Commission against
740
Yoon for promissory fraud. Moore sought to purchase commercial real estate and retained Yoon as her agent. To induce Moore
to buy a mall with serious roof problems, Yoon promised to take
care of the roofing repairs at his own expense. When Yoon billed
Moore for repairs totaling more than $20,000, Moore filed a claim
with the Alaska Real Estate Commission. The Commission found
that Yoon had committed promissory fraud and awarded Moore
$10,000. On appeal, the supreme court found substantial evidence
of the elements of promissory fraud: (1) a promise; (2) intention
not to keep the promise; (3) intention to induce reliance; (4) justifi741
able reliance; and (5) damages. Moore’s testimony showed that
Yoon had made oral promises and did not intend to keep those
promises because he later claimed that he never made any guaran-

734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.

Id. at 549.
Id. at 550-51.
20 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 573.
17 P.3d 779 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 782.
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tees in writing.742 The evidence also showed that Yoon intended to
induce reliance on his promises because he was also acting as the
agent for the mall, he recommended an inspector with whom he
had previously worked, and agreed to act as property manager
743
The court found Moore’s reliance on
without compensation.
Yoon’s promises to be justifiable because Moore was inexperienced, she testified that the promises “led her to close” and she received other assistance from Yoon in the course of buying the
744
mall.
BUSINESS LAW
In Bennett v. Artus, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s judgment for costs of remodeling a condominium in favor
of Bennett, a client with whom Artus, a lawyer, had a romantic re746
lationship. During their relationship, Bennett and Artus remodeled a condominium that Bennett bought on Artus’ behalf and Artus performed other legal services for Bennett. Bennett later sued
Artus, claiming he had defaulted on loans and failed to pay her for
the remodeling. Artus counterclaimed for amounts Bennett allegedly owed him for legal services and the remodeling. The supreme
court held that the superior court did not clearly err in applying the
principle of unjust enrichment to credit Artus for the value of the
benefits conferred on Bennett during the condominium remodel747
The court also held that it was not error to find that paying.
ments Bennett made to Artus were reimbursements for legal serv748
ices, rather than loans Artus was obligated to repay, and that
Artus was entitled under unjust enrichment to keep these
749
amounts.
750
In Garrison v. Dixon, the supreme court upheld an award of
attorney’s fees and costs after an unfair trade practice action was
prosecuted in bad faith in order to gain an advantage over a busi751
The Garrisons filed suit against Dixon, a real
ness competitor.
estate agent working for a competitor, under the Alaska Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act in response to sev745

742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.

Id. at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
Id.
20 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 563-65.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 566-67.
19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1230.

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

2002]

06/04/02 2:07 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

289

eral ads in which Dixon referred to herself as a “buyer’s agent” and
warned of the differences between a buyer’s agent and a buyer’s
agency. The Garrisons moved to dismiss their individual claims after two and a half years of pretrial motions because they “were
never real parties in interest;” the trial court granted the motion,
awarding final judgment to Dixon, and later granted summary
judgment to Dixon on the remaining claims. The supreme court
rejected the Garrisons’ argument that the trial court erred in entering final judgment against them before the final resolution of the
752
other claims because their argument was moot. The court upheld
the award of attorney’s fees against the Garrisons, although it disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that an award of attorney’s
753
fees depends on the number of non-prevailing parties. However,
because the Garrisons filed their claim in bad faith and pursued it
for two and a half years before filing a motion to dismiss, and because an award of reasonable attorney’s fees was appropriate under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the court affirmed the decision
754
to enhance the attorney’s fees awarded against the Garrisons.
755
In Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., the supreme court
held that an independent contractor ratified an invalid contract after he learned the meaning of the contractual terms, failed to act
thereafter, and signed onto a new term under the same agree756
As part of an initial deal with a Russian company, All
ment.
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. (“AAS”) developed an unusual and complicated formula for paying its crab catcher vessel crews. AAS explained its payment system verbally, but failed to ensure that all
individual contractors understood the formula. Krossa was hired
later in the season and the compensation system was not adequately explained to him. However, after the first crab delivery,
Krossa learned the meaning of AAS’s terms, continued with the
trip and later signed on for a second term under the same contract.
Krossa later sued for breach of the first contract. On appeal, the
supreme court held that although the written agreement Krossa
signed did not constitute a valid contract because the plain language was ambiguous and the parties understood the agreement
differently, the parties formed a valid contract when Krossa
757
learned of and implicitly accepted the terms. The court reasoned
that if a party “knows or has reason to know” of the mistake, and
752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
757.

Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1233-34.
32 P.3d 398 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 405-06.
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he manifests to the other party an intention to affirm, then the
party loses the ability to avoid the contract.758
In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc.,759 the supreme court held that
proxy solicitation statements made by candidates for Koniag’s
board of directors were materially false as a matter of law and af760
The Meidinger slate
firmed summary judgment for Koniag.
sought election to Koniag’s board of directors and solicited proxies
urging voters to reject a proposition that would allegedly grant the
current board members “irrevocable delegation” and the ability to
appoint themselves as trustees to a new settlement trust. Koniag
sued, alleging that the proxy statements were false and misleading.
The supreme court found the false statements of the proxy statements to be material as a matter of law because the misrepresentations were so obviously important to an investor that reasonable
761
minds could not differ on the question of materiality.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
762
In Bartek v. State, Department of Natural Resources, the supreme court held that lower courts can determine that no evidentiary hearing or discovery is required before deciding on class certi763
A group of landowners brought suit against the State
fication.
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Forestry (“Forestry”) for negligent firefighting after a fire caused damage to their
property. The action was later converted into a class action. The
supreme court held that the superior court has the discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing or discovery is necessary to
764
resolve factual disputes before it grants class certification. However, the court remanded the case to determine whether the two
765
sets of requirements for certification were met.
766
In Bradley v. Bradley, the supreme court reaffirmed the established rule that executions may not issue on partial judgments
767
until they become final. Bradley appealed the issuance of writs of
execution on a money judgment entered against him because all
the claims and counterclaims had not yet been adjudicated. The
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.

Id.
31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83-84.
31 P.3d 100 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23.
32 P.3d 372 (Alaska 2001).
Id.
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court found that the judgment was not final and had not been certified pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and, there768
fore, execution could not ensue.
In Gamble v. Northshore Partnership,769 the supreme court
held that because Northshore’s defense of an action to reform an
easement could be regarded as an enforcement action, the provision in the easement regarding attorney’s fees in enforcement ac770
The Gambles requested reformation of a
tions was applicable.
recorded easement, which was denied by the trial court. The
easement contained a provision that granted the prevailing party in
a suit to enforce the easement reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
The supreme court held that the fact that Northshore’s defense
could have been expressed as a counterclaim demonstrated that
771
there is slight difference between a suit and a defense to a suit.
As a result, Northshore’s defense came within the easement
agreement provisions, and Northshore, as the prevailing party, was
772
entitled to full attorney’s fees.
In Hebert v. Honest Bingo,773 the supreme court held that Hebert’s pleadings in her personal injury lawsuit raised triable issues
of fact as to whether an amended complaint related back to a
774
timely initial complaint. Hebert was struck on the head by a falling bingo box at a bingo hall operated by Honest Bingo. Hebert
filed suit against Honest Bingo one day before the applicable statute of limitations ran out and named four “John Doe” defendants
because she did not know the exact structure of the bingo operation. Ten months later, Hebert learned that Fairbanks Drama Association (“FDA”) was one of the three business entities that comprise Honest Bingo and added FDA to the complaint. FDA
refused participate in settlement negotiations and ultimately filed a
successful motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that
Hebert’s amended complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that because factual questions existed as to
whether Hebert’s amended complaint related back to the initial
timely complaint filed against Honest Bingo, FDA was not entitled
775
to judgment on the pleadings.

768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.

Id.
28 P.3d 286 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id. at 289-90.
18 P.3d 43 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
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In Johnson v. State,776 the court of appeals held that an attorney representing an indigent defendant whose claims on appeal
were allegedly frivolous could not withdraw without providing
777
adequate arguments supporting his allegations. When the Office
of Public Advocacy filed an appeal on Johnson’s behalf, Johnson’s
attorney sought permission to withdraw due to the frivolous nature
of the issues on appeal. The supreme court concluded that an attorney representing an indigent defendant may not withdraw unless there is a reasonable assurance that the appeal presents only
frivolous issues as determined by the both the attorney and the
778
Therefore, the court ordered the attorney to submit an
court.
amended brief which adequately presented the frivolous issues
within forty-five days so that the court could discharge its duty of
779
verifying the arguments.
780
In Kellis v. Crites, the supreme court held that an award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and
A.S. 09.30.065 applies only from the date when an offer of judge781
ment is made. After Crites, a defendant in a personal injury action, made a $250 pretrial offer that was rejected by Kellis, the jury
returned a verdict in Crites’ favor. The trial court subsequently
awarded Crites full attorney’s fees and costs, even though Crites
asked for only seventy five percent of attorney’s fees. The supreme
court vacated the attorney’s fees award and remanded for recalculation because the award violated A.S. 09.30.065(a), which provides
that the offeree shall pay 75 percent of the offeror’s reasonable attorneys fees if the offer was made no later than 60 days after the
782
disclosures required by the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, because the cost bill was ambiguous, the court vacated
and remanded the costs so that the cost bill and Kellis’ objections
783
to the bill could be considered by the clerk of court.
784
In McDowell v. State, the supreme court upheld the dismissal
of an action against the State for trespass under the doctrine of res
judicata because the court had previously dismissed a trespass
785
The McDowells sued the
claim arising from the same event.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.

24 P.3d 1267 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
20 P.3d 1112 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
23 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2001).
Id.
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State in 1993, alleging trespass, negligence and nuisance resulting
from petroleum contamination on their property. The superior
court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing
the negligence, nuisance and trespass claims under the doctrine of
discretionary immunity. The McDowells filed a new complaint in
1998, alleging that the state had failed to clean up the contamination. The second complaint was based on a theory of landowner
liability, which the McDowells had not advanced in their original
opposition to the State’s summary judgment motion because the
McDowells’ original complaint treated the State as a regulatory
agency rather than as a landowner. The supreme court upheld the
lower court’s dismissal of the new complaint under the doctrine of
res judicata because the McDowells’ second complaint arose out of
the same set of operative facts as their first complaint, and that
786
theory should have been advanced as part of the first action.
787
In MAPCO Express, Inc. v. Faulk, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s finding of liability on a trespass claim,
but reversed and remanded the award of compensatory and punitive damages because portions of the compensatory damages were
clearly erroneous and the award of punitive damages required fur788
The superior court held
ther consideration and findings.
MAPCO liable for trespass for snow melt that ran onto and dam789
aged Faulk’s property and the supreme court affirmed. However,
because some of Faulk’s costs may have included double billing,
the court remanded the award of compensatory damages for fur790
ther clarification. Finally, because the trial court’s award of punitive damages was not based on a finding supported by evidence in
the record, and because the trial court increased the amount of punitive damages without explanation, the supreme court reversed
and remanded the award of punitive damages for further consid791
eration and findings.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Anderson,792 the supreme
court held that an award of attorney’s fees was a non-final order
entered by an intermediate court of appeal and was not subject to
793
appeal under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 202. Anderson was injured on the job and did not attend an employer re786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.

Id. at 1166-67.
24 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 547.
37 P.3d 420 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 420-21.
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quested physical capacity exam because he erroneously believed
that he was not required to attend the exam if it was not conducted
by a physician. As a result, he was denied benefits by the Workers’
Compensation Board. The superior court concluded that an employer can require an employee to take the examination with a
non-physician specialist, but that Anderson’s failure to comply did
not constitute a “refusal to submit” because the statute was ambiguous as to the requirement. Therefore, the superior court
awarded Anderson attorney’s fees and costs, and remanded the
matter for further proceedings. The supreme court dismissed the
Municipality’s appeal as improper because the attorney’s fee award
was part of a case that was remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Board and, therefore, was a non-final order that could not be
794
appealed.
795
In Sengupta v. University of Alaska, the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment
796
for the University of Alaska. Sengupta, a professor at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, was terminated after he brought
grievances against the University. Sengupta filed a complaint
against the University alleging that his free speech, due process and
equal protection rights had been violated. He also alleged that his
right to be free from employment discrimination had been violated.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the superior court had applied the proper standards of review and did not err in granting
summary judgment against Sengupta, denying Sengupta’s motion
for reconsideration, and awarding the University of Alaska, Fair797
banks attorney’s fees.
In Ulmer v. Alaska Restaurant & Beverage Ass’n,798 the supreme court dismissed as moot lieutenant governor Ulmer’s appeal
from the superior court’s ruling that an initiative petition was de799
fective. In 1999, Ulmer certified and prepared an initiative petition to increase the statutory excise tax on various alcoholic beverages. The Alaska Restaurant & Beverage Association challenged
the petition, claiming it was unconstitutional and defective because
it did not include the amount of the tax increase and that it implied
that the tax increase covered a group not included in the statute.
The superior court ruled that the petition was constitutional, but
that the failure to include the amount of the increase made it defec794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.

Id. at 421.
21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1254-55, 1257, 1259, 1260, 1262.
33 P.3d 773 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 774.
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tive. The sponsors of the initiative then failed to file the petition
with the lieutenant governor in a timely fashion, effectively killing
the initiative. Nevertheless, Ulmer appealed the decision of the
superior court. The supreme court determined that the question
presented on appeal was moot because the initiative was dead,
there was no further controversy and there was no relief available
800
to the State even if it prevailed. Although Ulmer argued that if
the State prevailed, it might be able to collect attorney’s fees, the
court pointed out that the State never asked for such fees so it
801
The sucould not argue that it may have a right to such fees.
preme court also declined to apply the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine, reasoning that a decision would not have
any doctrinal value and that any future similar questions could be
handled in a timely fashion so as to not hinder the election proc802
ess.
In Zok v. Collins,803 the supreme court held that the superior
court improperly granted summary judgment against Zok as to his
malpractice claims which did not require the testimony of an expert
804
witness. Zok sued Collins, his former attorney, for malpractice.
The superior court denied Zok’s motion for partial summary judgment because expert witnesses were required to prove malpractice
and Zok had not offered any expert testimony. The supreme court
held that Collins was entitled to summary judgment only for those
claims that required expert testimony, but that some of Zok’s
claims were clear enough for the jury to understand and did not require expert testimony and, therefore, as to those claims, summary
805
judgment was inappropriate.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
806
In Brandon v. Corrections Corp. of America, the supreme
court held that the prisoner filing fee statute is constitutional and
that the superior court properly denied Brandon’s motion to waive
807
the filing fee, but erred in dismissing Brandon’s claim. Brandon,
a state prisoner, sued to recover surcharges applied to his commissary purchases. He requested a filing fee exemption and submitted
a motion to waive the filing fee. Although it did not specifically
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 777-79.
18 P.3d 39 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42-43.
28 P.3d 269 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 271.
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rule on the motion to waive the fee, the superior court ordered
Brandon to pay a reduced fee. After Brandon received an extension to pay the fee, his case was dismissed for failing to pay the fee
before the extension expired. Brandon appealed, claiming that the
court erred in dismissing his case, that the filing fee should have
been waived entirely and that the prisoner filing fee statute is unconstitutional. The supreme court held that the prisoner filing fee
statute is constitutional, even though it sometimes requires indigent
prisoners to pay a filing fee, because indigent prisoners and indigent non-prisoners are in fundamentally different situations be808
cause the State completely supports a prisoner’s basic needs. Although the court held that Brandon’s case was prematurely
dismissed, it concluded that the reduction of the filing fee was an
implicit denial of Brandon’s motion to waive the filing fee entirely
809
and that the superior court did not err in denying the motion.
In Brause v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,810
the supreme court held that a declaratory judgment claim by a
same-sex couple denied benefits available to married couples was
811
Brause and Dugan challenged the
not ripe for adjudication.
State’s refusal to grant them a marriage license and the state and
federal constitutionality of A.S. 25.05.013(b), which provides that a
“same-sex-relationship may not be recognized by the state as being
812
entitled to the benefits of marriage.” The adoption of article I,
section 25 of the Alaska Constitution mooted the complaint with
respect to the State’s refusal to grant them a marriage license because as a matter of constitutional law “a marriage may exist only
813
On appeal, the supreme
between one man and one woman.”
court held that Brause and Dugan failed to assert that they had
been, or will be, denied rights that are available to married part814
ners. The court noted that the claim was a case of first impression in Alaska and cautioned that ruling on the constitutionality of
a statute before the issues are concretely framed increases the risk
815
of erroneous decisions.

808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 274.
21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW
In Avila v. State, the court of appeals affirmed Avila’s conviction for attempted second-degree controlled substance misconduct but vacated his conviction for solicitation of second-degree
817
controlled substance misconduct. Avila, a prisoner, was the target
of a police “sting” operation attempting to catch him distributing
heroin within the prison. The police used another inmate who
owed Avila money as an informant in the operation. The informant arranged for a police officer posing as his friend on the outside to provide Avila’s girlfriend with money in return for discharging his debt, with the understanding that the girlfriend would
use the money to purchase heroin and deliver it to Avila. The
“sting” operation ended when Avila’s girlfriend refused to deliver
the drugs to the prison, and Avila was arrested and convicted of the
charges in question. The court of appeals found that there was
enough evidence to allow a reasonable person to believe that Avila
intended to deliver at least some portion of the heroin to another
818
Avila argued that he could not be convicted of the atperson.
tempt charge because his only actions were telephone calls, which
were nothing more than solicitations for the delivery of heroin for
personal use. The court of appeals noted that Avila could be convicted of attempt if either he or his girlfriend took a “substantial
819
The court
step” toward the commission of the intended crime.
then decided that the girlfriend’s search for a heroin supplier
820
amounted to such a “substantial step.” Finally, Avila argued that
his two convictions must merge because they are based on “conduct designed to . . . culminate in [the] commission of the same
821
crime.” The court of appeals agreed, and directed the superior
822
court to vacate his conviction for solicitation.
823
In Baker v. State, the court of appeals held that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Baker of interference
with official proceedings and first-degree witness tampering and
that the trial judge did not commit plain error when he failed to in824
struct the jury on the meaning of the word “threaten.” Baker was
violating his probation by sitting in a car with a handgun inside
816

816.
817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.

22 P.3d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 895.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.140(b) Michie (2000)).
Id.
22 P.3d 493 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 497-98.
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when a police officer drove by and noticed him. Baker encouraged
his passenger, Nesmith, to tell the police that she had been driving
the car. Instead, Nesmith told the police about Baker’s request and
the presence of the gun. Following the incident, Baker repeatedly
telephoned Nesmith asking her what she had told the authorities
and what she was going to tell them, and urged her to say that he
had not been driving the car. Baker also implied that he was surveiling her home by telling her what she was doing at an exact moment. The court of appeals upheld Baker’s conviction because
A.S. 11.81.900(b)(60) broadly defines “threat” to include any menace, no matter how it may be communicated, and not merely ex825
The court reapress manifestations of intent to harm another.
soned that a jury could reasonably find that Baker intended the
calls, surveillance and statement at the scene to communicate a
826
“threat” to Nesmith. The court found that the trial judge did not
commit clear error by not instructing the jury on the definition of
“threaten” because there was no reasonable probability that the
827
jury made its determination based on a faulty theory.
828
In Baum v. State, the court of appeals held that the forfeiture
of an airplane worth $40,000 for a big-game guiding offense did not
violate the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment of the
829
U.S. Constitution. Baum was convicted of possessing and transporting unlawfully taken game and, as part of his sentence, he was
forced to forfeit the plane used in the hunt. The plane belonged to
Baum’s brother, Raymond, who asked the court for a remission of
the forfeiture because he had nothing to do with his brother’s violation. Although Raymond valued the plane at $40,000, the court of
appeals found that the fine was not excessive because the amount
of the fine was within the penalty for a second or subsequent of830
The court also upheld the denial of
fense under Alaska law.
Raymond’s request for remission of the forfeiture because the record clearly supported the finding that Raymond was not an inno831
cent and negligent owner of the plane.
832
In Brockway v. State, the court of appeals held that Brockway could not collaterally attack a prior conviction as part of the
sentencing proceedings in his present case but “must pursue a peti825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.

Id. at 497.
Id.
Id. at 498.
24 P.3d 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580-81.
37 P.3d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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tion for post-conviction relief” because he did not claim he was
completely deprived of counsel. 833 Three years after Brockway
pled no contest to third-degree assault, he was arrested again and
pled no contest to third-degree weapons misconduct. Brockway
reached a plea agreement for a composite sentence of no more
than three years and was sentenced to a term of thirty-two months.
On appeal, Brockway claimed that his prior convictions were erroneous because the trial court did not comply with Rule 11 of the
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure and that his sentence was excessive. The court of appeals held that a defendant can collaterally
attack a prior conviction only if he “was completely denied the
834
right to counsel in the prior proceeding.” Therefore, Brockway
could not challenge his prior convictions in the current proceeding
because he did not claim to be deprived of counsel. In addition,
the court referred Brockway’s claim of excessiveness to the supreme court because the sentence imposed was consistent with the
835
plea agreement and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.
836
In Edwards v. State, the court of appeals held that Edwards
did not violate his probation, which restricted him from living with
females under sixteen years of age, by spending time with eightyear old daughter, and upheld a modification of the terms of his
837
Evidence showed Edwards spent a substantial
probation.
amount of unsupervised time one evening with his daughter at his
ex-wife’s residence. Edwards later lied and attempted to induce his
children to conceal his conduct. The court of appeals held that
Edwards’ conduct did not constitute “living with” his ex-wife and
daughter at that residence and did not violate the probation or838
der. However, the court upheld the superior court’s modification
of Edwards’ probation, which imposed stricter limitations on his
contact with minors, because Edwards’ unsupervised contact with
his daughter, his perjury and his attempts to induce his children to
conceal his conduct were significant reasons to amend the condi839
tions of his probation.
840
In Fine v. State, the court of appeals vacated Fine’s composite sentence of nine years imprisonment for criminally negligent
homicide, assault in the third degree and driving while intoxi833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.

Id. at 429-30.
Id.
Id. at 430-31.
34 P.3d 962 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 970.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 969.
22 P.3d 20 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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cated.841 The court also vacated the lower court’s decision to re842
voke Fine’s driver’s license for life. In order to impose a sentence
greater than the statutory maximum of five years and to revoke
Fine’s driver’s license for life, the lower court must have found that
the greater sentence and lifetime revocation of his driver’s license
843
were necessary to protect the public. The court of appeals concluded that Fine’s sentence was not necessary to protect the public
and was therefore excessive because the record did not support the
trial judge’s conclusion that Fine was a chronic alcohol abuser and
because Fine did not have a prior history of driving while intoxi844
cated.
In Haynes v. State,845 the court of appeals held that Alaska
courts have the authority to award restitution to the State for “drug
846
buy money” as part of Haynes’ sentence. The court held that the
State is a “victim or other person injured by the offense” within the
meaning of A.S. 12.55.015(a)(5) and 12.55.045(a) and, therefore,
may be awarded restitution for the money used by an undercover
847
The court relied primarily on the Alaska
officer to buy drugs.
848
Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzales v. State, that the State was
an “aggrieved party” under A.S. 12.55.100(a)(2) and could be
awarded restitution for drug buy money as a condition of proba849
tion.
In Heaps v. State,850 the court of appeals affirmed Heaps’ con851
victions of first-degree and fourth-degree assault. Heaps had assaulted Stevens, with whom he lived, while he was awaiting trial for
misdemeanor assault stemming from a previous altercation with
Stevens. On appeal, Heaps argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence showing Stevens’ propensity for violence, refusing
to instruct the jury on a potential justification for the previous assault and failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on potential lesser
included offenses. The court of appeals first held the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in restricting Heaps’ direct examination and
admitting only two photographs of a prior incident where Stevens

841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.
850.
851.

Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23-24.
15 P.3d 1088 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1091.
Id.
608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980).
Haynes, 15 P.3d at 1090-91.
30 P.3d 109 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 117.
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had wrecked their house.852 The court of appeals reasoned that
even when evidence of a victim’s character or past bad acts is relevant, the trial judge can limit the amount of evidence introduced as
long as the substance of the defendant’s claim is communicated to
853
Second, the court of appeals held the trial court reathe jury.
sonably declined to include Heaps’ proposed jury instruction informing the jury that although Heaps was not on trial for the previous assault, he had a potential justification of self-defense of
854
property for that assault. Lastly, the court of appeals held that
reasonable judges could differ on whether Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30(b) obligated judges to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses in the absence of a request from either party and,
therefore, the trial court did not err in omitting such an instruc855
tion.
856
In Hunt v. State, the court of appeals held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear a sentencing appeal unless the sentence ex857
Hunt pled no contest to fourth-degree conceeded two years.
trolled substance misconduct, a class C felony, and was sentenced
to a presumptive term of two years imprisonment because he had a
prior felony conviction. Hunt appealed, arguing that the trial court
should have adjusted his sentence downward because the trial
judge found a mitigating factor in that Hunt’s offense involved a
small quantity of the controlled substance. The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because A.S.
12.55.120(a) allows felony offenders to appeal sentences only if the
sentence involved a term or aggregate terms exceeding two years
858
of unsuspended incarceration.
In Lewandowski v. State,859 the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s finding that Lewandowski’s crime of first-degree
860
Lerobbery did not qualify for a mitigating sentencing factor.
wandowski was convicted of first-degree robbery for robbing a grocery store with an accomplice while armed with a pellet gun. For
first-time felons convicted of such a class A felony, there is a presumptive prison sentence of five years. Lewandowski proposed as
a mitigating factor that his conduct was among the least serious
852.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 116.
18 P.3d 69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 70.
Id.
18 P.3d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1223.
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conduct included in the offense, emphasizing his youth, the inoperability of his gun and the fact that his accomplice was the only one
hurt in the offense. The superior court judge rejected the mitigating factor, concluding Lewandowski’s offense was not among the
least serious offenses because he had acted with an accomplice
rather than alone, they had planned the robbery and armed themselves with the pellet gun and knives and there was a scuffle in the
course of the robbery. The court of appeals found that the judge
did not clearly err in rejecting the mitigating factor and upheld the
ruling, because although the facts of the case could support a “least
861
serious finding,” the conclusions were supported by the record.
862
In McGill v. State, the court of appeals affirmed McGill’s
conviction for first-degree sexual assault, holding that the lower
court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence showing
McGill’s prior bad acts and did not commit plain error when it gave
a jury instruction that consent to sexual penetration could be with863
drawn after initial penetration. At McGill’s trial, evidence relating to his prior sexual assault on his girlfriend was admitted. The
court of appeals affirmed use of this evidence because Alaska Rule
of Evidence 404(b)(3) permits such evidence where the defendant’s
864
defense is that the alleged victim consented. Second, the court of
appeals upheld the jury instruction that even if consent was given
with respect to the initial sexual penetration, the victim could sub865
sequently withdraw consent. The court found that giving the instruction was not plain error because the three cases relied on by
McGill were not persuasive nor well-reasoned and because
Alaska’s first-degree sexual assault statute was broad in the con866
duct it proscribed.
In Macsurak v. Municipality of Anchorage,867 the court of appeals held that police officers properly relied on the statements of
an apartment manager that Macsurak was intoxicated and tres868
passing when they entered his apartment. The police were called
to an apartment complex to investigate a complaint of a drunk and
disorderly person. When they arrived, the apartment manager informed the police that Macsurak had been evicted and returned to
the apartment for unknown reasons. Upon approaching the
861.
862.
863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.

Id.
18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 84 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (Michie 2000)).
16 P.3d 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 754.
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apartment, which was empty and had a pickup truck parked out
front packed with personal belongings, the officers heard noises
coming from inside. The supreme court determined that the officers legally entered the apartment if they reasonably believed that
869
The court
the defendant had no right to occupy the premises.
then held that the officers could rely on the statement of the
apartment manager that the defendant had been evicted, as well as
their observations about the apartment and truck, and therefore
they reasonably concluded that the defendant had been recently
870
evicted and was now trespassing.
871
In Malutin v. State, the court of appeals held that Alaska
Rule of Appellate Procedure 209(b)(5) should be construed to
mean that “only defendants who succeed in having their convic872
tions reversed are exempt from paying attorney’s fees.” Malutin
was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
Malutin did not challenge his conviction, but attacked the decision
requiring him to pay restitution to the victim. He also argued that
all information relating to his prior court-ordered psychological
evaluation should have been excised from the pre-sentence report.
Malutin prevailed on both points and objected to the judgment
against him of attorney’s fees, arguing that Rule 209(b)(5) exempts
those who win an issue on appeal, even if the conviction is not reversed. The court of appeals disagreed with Malutin, because the
plain language of Rule 209(b)(5) directs the clerk to enter judgment for attorney’s fees “unless the defendant’s conviction was reversed by the appellate court” and “[d]espite Malutin’s victory on
873
appeal, he remain[ed] convicted.”
874
In Miller v. State, the court of appeals held that Miller could
not be convicted on the basis of statements he made to the police
that were induced by an implied promise that he would not be
875
prosecuted for accidentally starting a fire. A vacant warehouse,
where Miller had been residing without permission, burned and
was extensively damaged, and a witness placed him there at the
time of the fire. Although the police had questioned Miller freely
before, they did not inform him that he was free to go when they
questioned him a second time. After being told that if he had
started the fire by accident it “was not that big a thing” and it
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.
874.
875.

Id.
Id. at 755.
27 P.3d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 793.
Id.
18 P.3d 696 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 701.
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would be “an over and done deal,” Miller admitted that he had set
fire to a block of insulation but thought he had fully extinguished it.
Miller was then arrested for arson. The statements Miller made
prior to his arrest were admitted at trial, and he was convicted.
The court of appeals held that the statements were involuntary and
therefore inadmissible because, due to the charges presented, a
jury could have reasonably found him to be at fault based on his
876
877
account. As a result, Miller’s conviction was overturned.
878
In Moses v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s ruling that A.S. 12.25.150(b) was not violated, that the State
was not collaterally estopped from asserting that it had complied
with the statute, that police are not required to videotape breath
test refusals and that Moses waived his right to an independent
879
An Alaska State trooper stopped Moses’ vehicle and artest.
rested him for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). The trooper allowed Moses to call his wife from the scene before transporting
him to the police station. Upon his arrival at the police station,
Moses said he wanted to call his wife again but gave no indication
that he wanted his wife to call an attorney. Moses then refused to
provide a breath sample, and his refusal was audiotaped but not
videotaped. The court found that because Moses had an opportunity to make a phone call to his wife after his arrest and prior to
taking the breath test, there was no violation of section
12.25.150(b), which allows a prisoner to call an attorney, relative or
880
friend. The court also held that collateral estoppel did not apply
in this case because the issue before the Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer—whether to revoke Moses’ license for refusing a breath test—was not identical to the issue before the dis881
trict court—whether the statute had been violated. Furthermore,
the issue was never actually litigated at the license revocation
882
The court held
hearing, a requirement for collateral estoppel.
that police have no duty to videotape DWI processing and that
Moses did not provide any concrete explanation as to how a video883
Finally, the court concluded that
tape would have aided him.

876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.

Id.
Id.
32 P.3d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1081-82.
Id. at 1081 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (Michie 2000)).
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id.
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Moses’ testimony proved that he made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his right to obtain an independent breath test.884
In Peters v. State,885 the court of appeals held that admitting
into evidence a DNA profile match absent “evidence that properly
interprets the significance” of the match was erroneous because it
886
was potentially misleading. While prosecuting Peters for sexual
assault, the State introduced evidence of a match between the
DNA profile of skin cells found under Peters’ fingernails and the
DNA profile of the victim. However, there was no evidence of the
likelihood of the randomness of such a match. Because the jury
might have been misled regarding the weight and significance of
the match, the court concluded that it was error to admit the match
887
First, the court
into evidence, but that the error was harmless.
determined that the jury was properly instructed regarding the
888
weight of the DNA profile match absent interpretive evidence.
Second, the court found that the match was not particularly probative in this case because the identity of the defendant was undisputed and the existence of the victim’s skin cells under Peters’ fingernails could be explained through actions other than sexual
889
assault. Finally, the court noted that the State’s other evidence
890
was strong.
In State v. Brueggeman,891 the court of appeals expressed its
disapproval of the lenient sentence given to Brueggeman by the
892
Brueggeman engaged in multiple acts of fraud
superior court.
and perjury, including inducing a mentally challenged friend to
pose as him for a DNA test in order to avoid paying child support.
The superior court found Brueggeman guilty of the class B felony
of perjury, his first felonious offense, and sentenced him to only
500 hours of community service under the sentencing guidelines set
893
forth in State v. Jackson. The court of appeals disagreed with the
894
Under
lower court’s application of these sentencing guidelines.
the Jackson guidelines, Brueggeman’s suspended sentence with no
jail time was a “probationary” sentence that can be imposed only if

884.
885.
886.
887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.
893.
894.

Id.
18 P.3d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1225, 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
24 P.3d 583 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 584.
776 P.2d 320, 326-27 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Brueggeman, 24 P.3d at 587.
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“Brueggeman’s case was ‘significantly mitigated in terms of both
the offender and the offense.’”895 Although reluctantly accepting
the lower court judge’s characterization of Brueggeman as a mitigated offender, the court of appeals found that the judge did not
896
The court of apfind the offense to be significantly mitigated.
peals affirmed the sentencing guidelines of Jackson and found that
Brueggeman’s probationary sentence conflicted with those guide897
However, because the defendant did not appeal the senlines.
tence as too excessive, the court of appeals was not authorized to
898
increase the sentence.
In State v. Martin,899 the court of appeals certified the question
to the Alaska Supreme Court: “What is the relationship between
the supreme court’s jurisdiction and the trial court’s jurisdiction
when an untimely petition for hearing is accepted for filing, or
900
when such a petition is later granted?” In 1982, Martin received
a suspended sentence for charges of incest, for which he later completed probation and had the conviction set aside. In 1998, a regulation was passed that redefined “sex offenders” to include those
whose convictions had been set aside, such as Martin. Martin was
then charged with failure to register as a sex offender in two previous years. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal and reinstated charges against Martin. On July 20, 2001, the
supreme court agreed to hear Martin’s case. The State appealed
the district court’s decision but then wished to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that the district court’s decision was void because, since the
supreme court granted hearing, the district court retroactively lost
901
its jurisdiction. The court certified the question to the supreme
court, reasoning that it probably did not have jurisdiction over the
902
matter and the issue was of “substantial public interest.”
903
In Tall v. State, the court of appeals held that the lower court
did not err by not giving advance notice of the court’s proposed
904
dismissal of Tall’s post-conviction relief application. Tall claimed
that under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.1, he was entitled
to advance notice of the judge’s decision to dismiss his post895.
896.
897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.
903.
904.

Id. (citing Jackson, 776 P.2d at 327).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 590-591.
Id. at 584 n.1.
33 P.3d 495 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
25 P.3d 704 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 706.
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conviction relief application. However, in this case, the State filed
the motion to dismiss and, therefore, Rule 35.1(f)(3) governed the
decision, not Rule 35.1(f)(2), the subsection upon which Tall re905
lied. Because the judge granted the State’s motion to dismiss and
did not summarily dismiss the case himself, Tall did not have to be
given advance notice in order to respond because the reasons for
906
dismissal were in the motion.
907
In Wurthmann v. State, the court of appeals held that a livein boyfriend who had spent seven years as the primary caretaker of
his girlfriend’s child was in a “position of authority” over her for
purposes of third-degree sexual abuse as required under A.S.
908
Wurthmann moved in with the child’s mother when
11.41.438.
the child was ten years old and “assumed the role of [the child’s]
909
Despite allegations of earlier abuse, Wurthmann
stepfather.”
admitted to only a consensual sexual relationship after the child
turned seventeen, but he was convicted of first, second and thirddegree sexual abuse. Wurthmann appealed the trial court’s refusal
to grant a judgment of acquittal on the third-degree sexual abuse
charge on the grounds that he did not occupy a “position of
authority” over the child as required by the statute. On appeal, the
court affirmed Wurthmann’s conviction for third-degree sexual
abuse, holding that the legislature intended “position of authority”
to include adults who exercise undue influence over a child and
that “a live-in boyfriend who assumes the position of a stepfather
has additional influence by virtue of his status as a person of special
910
trust in the child’s life.”
EMPLOYMENT LAW
911
In Barios v. Brooks Range Supply, Inc., the supreme court
affirmed the denial of Barios’ claim for overtime pay and held that
the exclusion of one of Barios’ witnesses was not an abuse of dis912
Three months after Barios’ employment with Brooks
cretion.
Range Supply ended, she sued the company claiming that she was
not compensated for overtime. Where an employer does not keep
records of hours worked by employees, as in this case, the employee need only produce evidence to create a “just and reason905.
906.
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.

Id. at 707.
Id.
27 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764-65.
26 P.3d 1082 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1089.
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able” inference to support her claim for overtime pay. Then, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to produce specific evidence regarding the amount of work performed by the employee
or to negate the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence.
The superior court found that Barios had met her burden, but that
Brooks had subsequently met its higher burden by producing testimony of witnesses that Barios continually arrived late to work,
that Barios missed several days of work to care for her husband,
that there was not enough work available to require anyone to
work overtime and that Barios usually went home early or on time.
The supreme court found that the lower court did not err in finding
913
that this was sufficient evidence to meet Brooks’ burden of proof.
In addition, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Barios’ expert witness because the witness
was only going to testify as to what the end result of the case
should be and such testimony is inappropriate where the court is
914
required to make such a determination.
915
In Collins v. Arctic Builders, Inc., the supreme court vacated
the superior court’s decision to dismiss Collins’ claim for workers’
compensation benefits and remanded the case for factual determi916
nations. Collins was diagnosed with chronic asbestos pleuritis on
November 3, 1990, and filed for benefits with the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board on May 21, 1993. The superior court dismissed Collins’ claim on the grounds that he failed to file a timely
notice of injury under A.S. 23.30.100(a) and that Collins was barred
by the two-year statute of limitations under A.S. 23.30.105(a),
which had begun to run on November 3, 1990. Collins argued that
he attempted to file his claim before the statute of limitations had
run, but that the clerk at the state workers’ compensation office
told him he had to file with a federal agency, and Collins’ paperwork was apparently lost. If Collins had made this attempt within
two years of November 3, 1990, he would be allowed to argue that
he was excused from his failure to give timely notice of injury un917
der A.S. 23.30.100(d). Because the superior court made no determination as to whether Collins attempted to file his claim in
1991, the supreme court vacated the dismissal and remanded the
918
case for factual determinations on his attempted filing.

913.
914.
915.
916.
917.
918.

Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1088.
31 P.3d 1286 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1287-88.
Id at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
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In Finch v. Greatland Foods, Inc.,919 the supreme court reversed summary judgment against Finch on his claims of constructive discharge and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, but affirmed summary judgment against him on his claim
920
Finch brought a
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
claim against his employer, Bob’s Distribution Company, Inc. After the parties settled the suit, Finch claimed that Bob’s engaged in
a pattern of harassment and retaliation designed to force his resignation and filed suit alleging breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, retaliation and constructive discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted
Bob’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. The supreme
court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Bob’s constructively discharged Finch and breached the
921
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The supreme court also
found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or
not Bob’s actions were authorized under the parties’ settlement
922
However, the court affirmed the superior court’s
agreement.
grant of summary judgment in favor of Bob’s on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the record revealed no
more than “insults, indignities, threats, annoyances [and] petty op923
pressions.”
In Gillum v. L & J Enterprises, Inc.,924 the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in finding that a falling door did
not cause Gillum’s disability, in finding Gillum comparatively neg925
ligent or in disregarding the testimony of his expert witness.
Gillum suffered two separate industrial accidents when he was
struck on the head by a falling warehouse door and, fifteen days
later, suffered another head injury when he fell from his semitrailer. The supreme court upheld the decision of the lower court,
finding that the special master simply rejected Gillum’s trial theory
that the initial accident caused the second fall and additional inju926
ries. The court also declined to find error in the special master’s
finding Gillum comparatively negligent and disregarding the testi927
Because the special master
mony of Gillum’s expert witness.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.

21 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1287-89.
Id. at 1286.
29 P.3d 266 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269-70.
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found that the testimony of Gillum’s expert witness was based on
assumptions that did not comport with the evidence on record, it
928
properly chose not to rely on the expert’s testimony.
In Goodman v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dis929
trict, the supreme court found that the time at which Goodman
knew or should have known that his employer would not accommodate his disability was a question of material fact and reversed
930
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district.
Goodman sued Fairbanks North Star Borough and the school district alleging discrimination based on disability under A.S.
18.80.220(a)(1). The lower court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, holding that Goodman had failed to file his
claim within the two-year statute of limitations. The supreme court
reversed, noting that the date when Goodman discovered or should
have discovered the school district would not accommodate his disability is a question of fact not ordinarily determined by the lower
931
The supreme court
court on a motion for summary judgment.
found that the record supported the inference that Goodman did
not receive unequivocal notice that the school district was refusing
to accommodate him until his application for disability retirement
was accepted in late February 1996, placing his February 18, 1998
932
claim within the statute of limitations.
In Lincoln v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,933 the supreme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment as to Lincoln’s claims against her former employer for violating the Alaska Whistleblower Act, breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and intentional infliction of emo934
Lincoln was employed by the Interior Regional
tional distress.
Housing Authority (“Authority”), an organization established to
address housing shortages in interior Alaska. Lincoln cooperated
with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development during an investigation of her employer, even though her
boss allegedly instructed her not to cooperate. Shortly after her
cooperation, Lincoln was laid off, but was told that she would be
935
“recalled as soon as fiscally possible.” Lincoln was not recalled
when a position similar to her old job opened up and was not hired
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.
935.

Id. at 270.
39 P.3d 1118 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1120-21.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1120-21.
30 P.3d 582 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 584.
Id.
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for another position that subsequently opened up. The supreme
court found that Lincoln raised inferences showing that Authority’s
reasons for firing her were pretextual and that genuine issues of
material fact existed on this point and, therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Lincoln’s Whistle936
blower and covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. The
supreme court also determined that wrongful discharges can lead
to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and because
the superior court did not make a threshold decision as to whether
Authority’s conduct was sufficiently outrageous to support the
claim, the court reversed and remanded the claim to the superior
937
court.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Robertson,938 the supreme
court held that a municipal worker can claim workers’ compensation for an injury sustained while crossing the street between the
city parking lot and his actual place of work because the parking
939
garage was part of the Municipality of Anchorage’s premises.
The court reasoned that because the Municipality provided the garage parking to Robertson, benefited from the parking and indirectly owned the garage, Robertson had already reached his place
940
of work when he was injured. Therefore, the “going and coming”
941
rule did not apply, and he was erroneously denied benefits.
942
In Rhines v. State, the supreme court held that Rhines was
not eligible for occupational disability benefits under A.S.
39.35.410(a) because she was not terminated because of her disability and her injuries were not serious enough to be considered a
943
In February 1993,
total and permanent occupational disability.
Rhines filed an occupational injury report due to pain in her wrists
and hands resulting from computer use. She did not return to work
after March 16, 1993. In May 1993, Rhines was notified that her
department was being reorganized and her position would be
eliminated at the end of July 1993. The Public Employees’ Retirement Board denied Rhines’ claim for occupational disability
benefits and the superior court affirmed. The supreme court concluded that it was the reorganization of Rhines’ department, and

936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.

Id. at 586-88.
Id. at 589.
35 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
30 P.3d 621 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 630.
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not her injuries, that severed her ties with her employer.944 The
court also concluded that Rhines’ injury was not a total and permanent occupational disability as defined in A.S. 39.35.680(26) because she suffered from tendonitis, but not carpal tunnel syndrome
945
As a result, the court affirmed
or other serious nerve damage.
the superior court’s decision denying Rhines’ claim for occupational disability benefits.
FAMILY LAW
In Barrett v. Alguire, the supreme court held that a custodial
parent’s move out-of-state constitutes a material change of circumstances as a matter of law, and that the superior court did not err in
947
holding a custody hearing and granting custody to Alguire. Barrett was awarded primary physical custody of the couple’s two sons
after the dissolution of their marriage. When Barrett moved his
sons to Washington, Alguire petitioned for custody modification.
The superior court ruled that Barrett’s move was a material change
of circumstances meriting a custody hearing, and ultimately
awarded custody to Alguire upon finding that such an award was in
the best interests of the children. On appeal, the supreme court
held that the hearing was appropriate because Barrett’s move con948
stituted a material change of circumstances as a matter of law,
and declined to find error in the best-interests determination because the superior court properly applied the applicable statutory
949
provisions of A.S. 25.24.150(c).
950
In C.J. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, the
supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which terminated the parental
951
C.J.’s biological children were
rights of a non-Indian father.
taken into state custody and placed in foster care after their Indian
mother was arrested and charged with child abuse and neglect.
The Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) relied on
social workers in Florida, where C.J. was living, to determine
whether he was willing and able to care for his children. At trial,
the superior court terminated C.J.’s parental rights based solely on
testimony of an expert who had never spoken with C.J. or the chil946

944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.
950.
951.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 628.
35 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15-16.
18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001).
C.J., 18 P.3d at 1220.
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dren and a DFYS social worker who testified only to second-hand
information from Florida placement officials as to C.J.’s inability to
care for the children. The supreme court held that this evidence
952
did not meet the heightened requirements of the ICWA because
it did not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that placement with
C.J. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the children or that the State had engaged in active efforts to pre953
vent the breakup of the family.
954
In D.D. v. L.A.H., the supreme court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing
before entering an order in an opposed custody modification
955
When D.D. (Danielle) and L.A.H. (Leif) divorced in
hearing.
September 1996, they negotiated a custody agreement giving Leif
custody of their son, Travis, for seven of the twelve months of the
year while Danielle went to school. Danielle moved back to
Alaska in December 1996 and the parties agreed to split custody.
Subsequently, Danielle filed motions to modify child custody and
to appoint a child custody investigator. The superior court denied
Danielle’s motion and granted Leif custody during the school year
without giving Danielle visitation rights. The judge also denied
Danielle’s motion to appoint an investigator, finding that there was
sufficient information to make such a determination. Danielle appealed, arguing that she had a constitutional due process right to be
heard prior to the issuance of a custody order. The supreme court
agreed, holding that an evidentiary hearing is required before an
956
Therefore,
opposed motion to modify custody can be granted.
the supreme court reversed the judgment of the superior court and
remanded the case.
957
In Elliott v. Settje, the supreme court held that the “stability
and continuity” factor is not decisive in child custody cases and that
courts are not required to follow a guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”)
958
recommendation. The superior court granted Elliott and Settje
joint physical custody of their child, Kessa. Elliott appealed, arguing that the stability and continuity offered by one primary care
giver should have compelled the superior court to award her primary physical custody. The supreme court disagreed, holding that
trial courts should have substantial discretion to analyze the stabil952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.

25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2000).
C.J., 18 P.3d at 1219.
27 P.3d 757 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 758.
Id. at 760.
27 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 321-22 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(5) (Michie 2000)).
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ity and continuity factor, but are not required to give that factor
special weight when other factors are equal.959 Because the superior court considered Kessa’s young age and her strong interest in
establishing ties with each parent, the court did not abuse its discre960
tion in awarding joint physical custody. The supreme court also
held that courts are not required to follow a GAL’s recommendation, but that the superior court’s decision was consistent with the
961
GAL’s report and testimony in any event.
962
In Goliver v. McAllister, the supreme court reversed the
grant of summary judgment for the McAllisters because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether Goliver’s motion was time
963
Goliver sought to set aside the adoption of her son by
barred.
her parents, the McAllisters. Without conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the superior court found that Goliver’s motion was timebarred by A.S. 25.23.140(b), which requires that all appeals and
challenges of adoption decrees be brought within one year’s time.
The supreme court found that an unresolved issue of material fact
existed regarding whether the McAllisters had “taken custody” of
the child and if so, whether they took custody more than one year
964
Accordingly, the supreme court vaprior to Goliver’s motion.
cated the superior court’s denial of Goliver’s motion and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing.
965
In Green v. Green, the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
division of the Greens’ marital assets, but required additional
findings on the valuation and distribution of the parties’ cash as966
sets. The Greens owned and operated a flight-seeing and air taxi
service during their marriage. Gary Green asserted that the trial
court erred in including the couple’s cabin site and two airplanes in
the marital estate. The supreme court affirmed, concluding that
the lower court had not erred in finding that Gary Green had intended to transmute the property he owned prior to the marriage
967
The court held that the Greens’ actions,
into marital property.
including the use of property as their residence, the maintenance of
property by both parties, the placement of title in joint ownership
and the use of the non-titled owner’s credit to improve the prop959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id.
34 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326.
29 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857-59.
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erty, indicated Gary’s intent to treat the cabin as marital property.968 However, the court remanded the issue of valuation of cash
assets because the trial court failed to enter required findings as to
why the Greens’ marital cash assets were valued as of the time of
969
separation rather than the time of trial.
970
In Hanson v. Hanson, the supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that Judges Reese and Hensley did not abuse their
discretion in denying William Hanson’s motion to recuse Judge
971
During a hearing to modify custody of the Hansons’
Reese.
daughter, William filed a motion to recuse Judge Reese from the
hearing. Judge Reese stated to William that “what you have convinced me of is that you really hate women, you’re very judg972
mental, that you’re absolutely insensitive to different cultures.”
Both Judges Reese and Hensley denied Hanson’s motion. Judge
Reese decided that the two parties should continue to split custody
of the child with Yelana Hanson maintaining primary physical custody. On appeal, the supreme court found that the motion to recuse was properly denied because Judge Reese was still able to give
a fair and impartial decision and because his comments were based
on knowledge and opinion acquired during the proceedings and
973
were necessary to the completion of the judge’s task.
In J.H. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,974 the
supreme court affirmed the termination of J.H.’s parental rights
because the record clearly showed that the Department of Health
and Social Services had made reasonable efforts to reunite mother
975
and child. J.H. appealed the termination of her parental rights,
arguing that the State had not made reasonable efforts to reunite
her with her daughter and that State was estopped from terminating her parental rights because the Department changed its goal
from reunification to termination. The supreme court held that the
evidence supported the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in
976
the child’s best interests. The court also held that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not preclude termination because J.H. failed
to show that she was prejudiced by the Department’s change of po968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.

Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
36 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184, 1186.
30 P.3d 79.
Id. at 86-87.
Id.
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sition and because the public interest would be prejudiced if the
Department’s actions could comprise the child’s best interests.977
As a result, the court held that J.H.’s rights were properly terminated.
978
In J.J. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, the
supreme court held that where a doctor received her information
on the case by reading an incomplete case file and did not meet or
speak with a parent, her children or the parent’s counselors, or
make a substantial inquiry into the parent’s activities, the testimonial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the parental unfitness required to terminate parental rights under the In979
After being convicted of
dian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA.”)
child neglect, J.J.’s social worker from the Division of Family and
Youth Services (“DFYS”) arranged for J.J. to be evaluated at
Alaska North Addictions Recovery Center (“ANARC”) in April
1998, and created a written case plan. J.J. was admitted to
ANARC again in May 1999, and learned that DFYS had petitioned
to terminate her parental rights. The superior court terminated
J.J.’s parental rights, finding that she had abandoned her children
and that it was in the children’s best interest to be placed in an
adoptive home. The supreme court reversed, finding that the expert testimony did not consider J.J.’s completion of the ANARC
treatment program and her continued sobriety, and that without
supplemental information, “a reasonable fact finder could [not]
conclude without reasonable doubt that placement of the children
980
with J.J. would likely cause them serious damage.” Accordingly,
the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
981
In J.L.P. v. V.L.A., the supreme court upheld the denial of
982
J.L.P.’s motion for modification of custody. The motion was filed
two weeks after the trial court awarded J.L.P. custody of his son,
but left the mother with primary physical custody of their daughter.
The supreme court found that the motion was a de facto motion for
reconsideration of the custody question raised in the initial pro983
ceeding. Before granting a motion to modify custody, the noncustodial parent must demonstrate changed circumstances and the
984
modification must be in the child’s best interests. Because J.L.P.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.

Id. at 88.
38 P.3d 7 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 10-11.
Id.
30 P.3d 590 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Id.
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did not establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, the
denial of his motion without such a hearing was appropriate.985
In J.M.R. v. S.T.R.,986 the supreme court held that a domestic
violence petition is an inappropriate proceeding for a non-parent to
987
litigate custody and visitation issues. The appellant grandmother
alleged that her son and daughter-in-law were unfit parents and
sought custody of her grandchildren. The supreme court held that
parental rights are better adjudicated in a full-blown custody proceeding, rather than the expedited process required by a domestic
988
The court therefore rejected the appellant’s
violence petition.
claim that the word “petitioner” in A.S. 18.66.100 required the trial
court to allow her to litigate her custody claim in her domestic vio989
lence petition.
In Maxwell v. Maxwell,990 the supreme court held that the allegations of an abusive environment made by Gary Maxwell were in991
sufficient to modify a custody agreement. Gary Maxwell filed a
motion to modify custody claiming that his two children were in an
abusive environment. His motion was based on two incidents in
which his former wife, Laurie Maxwell, sent one of his children, on
short notice, from her home in Ketchikan to stay with him in Anchorage for a short period of time. On review of the superior
court’s denial of Maxwell’s motion, the supreme court held that he
had failed to establish that a change in circumstances had occurred—one of the two conditions to be satisfied before a motion
992
to modify custody is granted. The supreme court also held that
the trial court did not err in preferring a custody investigator’s
993
findings over Mr. Maxwell’s “factually unsupported speculation.”
994
In Meier v. Cloud, the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint a custody investigator because the need for a “timely decision” outweighed any
additional benefit that would have been gained through a formal
995
custody investigation. Meier and Cloud were ex-spouses sharing
custody of their son, Tyler, when Cloud moved for a modification

985.
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.

Id.
15 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 256-57.
Id.
37 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 426.
34 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1277.
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of the custody arrangement in the hopes of moving Tyler to Seattle
by the start of the upcoming school year. Meier opposed the motion and requested a court-appointed child custody investigator,
but the parties were unable to agree on the scope and choice of the
investigator. The superior court finally ruled that a child custody
report was unnecessary. After the court awarded primary custody
to Cloud, Meier appealed, arguing that the court erred in declining
to appoint a custody investigator. The supreme court disagreed,
reasoning that a child custody report is only meant to assist the trial
court and the decision not to appoint an investigator was not an
abuse of discretion because an investigation would have been time
consuming and there was no indication that a report would have
996
been helpful in this case. The court also held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody to
Cloud because its decision was appropriately considered and bal997
anced all relevant statutory factors.
In M.W. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,998
the supreme court affirmed the termination of Mark W.’s parental
999
rights to his daughter, Michelle. The Department of Health and
Social Services took Michelle from her mother after she was born
with cocaine in her bloodstream. The Department social worker
met with Mark to discuss Michelle’s care, but his refusal to cooperate led the Department to place Michelle in foster care. After
Mark failed to follow up on his case plan for receiving custody of
Michelle and failed to set up any visitations with her, the Department petitioned to terminate Mark’s parental rights, which the superior court granted. The supreme court held the lower court had
correctly applied the statutory requirements for parental termination in finding that (1) Michelle was in need of aid because her parents had abandoned her, were unwilling to provide for her care and
engaged in conduct that placed her at substantial risk of harm; (2)
Mark’s failure to resolve the abandonment within one year was unreasonable; (3) the Department’s placement of Michelle in foster
care and repeated attempts to contact Mark, even though he did
not receive a written copy of the case plan, constituted reasonable
efforts provide family services; and (4) it was in Michelle’s best interest to remain in her foster home because she had bonded with
1000
her foster parents.

996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.

Id.
Id. at 1278-79.
20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1144-47 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(a) (Michie 2000)).
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In Platz v. Aramburo,1001 the supreme court vacated the order
granting custody to Aramburo and remanded the case to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing on the child’s best interests
1002
Platz and Aramburo had a daughpursuant to A.S. 25.24.150(c).
ter, Rebecca, and separated shortly after Rebecca’s birth. According to Aramburo, Platz did not allow him to have any contact
with Rebecca. In response, Aramburo filed a petition to attempt to
restore contact and visitation with Rebecca. Platz did not respond
to Aramburo’s petition or any of Aramburo’s subsequent motions.
After a default hearing, the court awarded custody to Aramburo
and Platz appealed. The supreme court held that the trial court
had properly asserted jurisdiction and did not err when it did not
dismiss the case on the basis of forum non conveniens because not
enough information showed that Alaska was an inconvenient fo1003
However, the court held that the trial
rum under A.S. 25.30.060.
court did not properly take into account all the factors required in
determining the child’s best interest under A.S. 25.24.150(c) when
1004
The supreme court vacated the
it ordered a change in custody.
order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing as to the
1005
child’s best interests.
In Routh v. Andreassen,1006 the supreme court held that a court
may not “impute income to a child support obligor” if the court did
not conduct a hearing when there is a genuine factual dispute as to
the income of the obligor and the obligor did not withhold any fi1007
Andreassen and Routh divorced and Annancial information.
dreassen was granted primary custody of their son. Andreassen
moved to have Routh document his income in order to modify his
child support payments. After Routh produced documents, Andreassen moved to have her child support increased, and Routh
filed a cross-motion to have it decreased. The superior court referred the motion to a standing master, who, after recognizing a
discrepancy in Routh’s documents regarding his income, recommended to the superior court that the support be raised. The superior court adopted the standing master’s recommendation, and
Routh appealed. The supreme court found that because there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to Routh’s exact income, it was
error for the superior court to raise Routh’s child support obliga1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.

17 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
19 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 594.
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tion without a hearing when Routh had been forthcoming in producing documents regarding his income.1008 Therefore, the supreme
court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
1009
In Sloane v. Sloane, the supreme court held that the superior
court’s valuation of certain items in a divorce was not clearly erroneous, its division of marital property was not clearly unjust and its
1010
Sally
awards of interest and attorney’s fees were legally correct.
Sloane appealed the division of marital property that resulted from
her divorce from George Sloane. First, the supreme court held the
superior court did not commit clear error in valuing a $25,000 note
payable to George at only ten dollars because it was unlikely the
1011
Second, the court held that the supenote would ever be repaid.
rior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only fifty-seven
percent of the marital property to Sally because the lower court
had properly considered factors such as the relative age of the par1012
Third,
ties, the health of the parties and future medical needs.
the court found no statutory basis for Sally’s request to delay the
divorce decree for three years so she could continue health insur1013
Fourth,
ance as a spouse under her former husband’s coverage.
the court ruled that Sally’s concern about post-judgment interest
was moot because George subsequently paid the amount owned to
1014
Finally, the court held
Sally as ordered by the superior court.
that additional awards of attorney’s fees to Sally were not required
because her award of fifty-seven percent of the marital property
put the two parties in comparable economic situations, and it
would not make sense, after leveling the playing field, to hold one
1015
party liable for the other party’s litigation choices and expenses.
1016
In Wright v. Wright, the supreme court held that child support orders can only be modified according to Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 90.3, and that a modification could be effective no ear1017
Mark
lier than the date of the filing of a motion under that rule.
Wright filed a “Motion to Retroactively Modify Child Support,”
arguing that a previous order was erroneous. Tracy Wright opposed the motion, arguing that retroactive modification of child
1008.
1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.
1017.

Id. at 595-96.
18 P.3 60 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 65-67.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68-69.
22 P.3d 875 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 879.
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support is prohibited under Rule 90.3(h) and federal law. The supreme court agreed, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of retro1018
The court also held that the previous child
active modification.
support order could not be set aside under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) because Mark’s argument for relief was based on
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, and was
1019
proper, but time-barred.
INSURANCE LAW
In Shaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,1020
the supreme court held that because there was a material issue of
fact relating to how a truck was used during a shooting, granting
1021
Shaw
summary judgment in favor of State Farm was erroneous.
was shot by Murphy, who then shot himself. Because Shaw’s injuries exceeded the limits of Murphy’s insurance policy, she sued her
insurance company, State Farm, to recover under the uninsured/underinsured clause of her policy. Shaw claimed that Murphy used his truck to block Shaw’s car and keep her from driving
away, while State Farm asserted that Murphy was merely lying in
wait in his truck. In order for Shaw to be covered under the underinsured portion of her policy, the injuries must have been
caused by an accident that arose out of the use of the truck. Although the court refused to proffer an exact test for what may be
considered “use” of the truck in the crime, it held that the determi1022
Because those facts
nation depends upon the facts of the case.
were in dispute, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor
of State Farm and remanded the case for further proceedings.
PROPERTY LAW
In Beaux v. Jacob, the supreme court held that the superior
court did not err in finding that the sellers of a home violated the
1024
However, the court
Residential Real Property Transfers Act.
reversed the damage award because it exceeded the cost of putting
the purchaser’s home in the condition represented by the disclo1025
In addition, the court remanded for a recalculation of
sure form.
1023

1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.

Id. at 878.
Id. at 879-80.
19 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 590.
30 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 97-98.
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prejudgment interest, distinguishing between damages for economic loss and for harm to property.1026 Beaux sold a home he had
built to the Jacobs. On the property transfer disclosure form,
Beaux indicated that there were no water problems in the basement but that “Sump Pumps must be maintained and used.” The
Jacobs used the automatic sump pump but did not use the deep
sump. Consequently, water infiltrated the Jacob’s basement and
soaked the carpet on multiple occasions. The supreme court held
that Beaux failed to use reasonable care in answering the disclosure form questions, finding substantial evidence in the record to
support a conclusion that the disclosure form was ambiguous and
did not adequately disclose the need to use the deep sump to avoid
1027
The court reversed the damages award, holdwater infiltration.
ing that the Jacobs should have been awarded the cost of installing
a permanent pump in the deep sump, not the cost of a new perimeter drain system, because the Jacobs did not expect to purchase a
1028
house with such a system. Additionally, the court held that prejudgment interest must be recalculated because A.S. 09.30.070(b)
applies only to actions for personal injury, death or damages to
1029
property, not to purely economic loss claims.
In Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1030 the supreme court
held that a land classification decision is not a quasi-judicial proceeding and, therefore, the dismissal of Cabana’s appeal was
1031
Cabana challenged
proper because the court lacked jurisdiction.
the Borough’s decision to classify a piece of land as “light industrial,” arguing that the Borough failed to comply with various procedural and statutory requirements. The supreme court held that
the classification of municipal land involves a legislative rather than
a quasi-judicial proceeding because the classification of public land
does not immediately and directly affect the rights of a particular,
1032
Because review by appeal is only allowed for
private landowner.
decisions of legislative bodies where the decision is quasi-judicial,
the superior court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic1033
tion.

1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 100-01.
21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 835-36.
Id.
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In Griswold v. City of Homer,1034 the supreme court affirmed a
grant of summary judgment against Griswold, who had challenged
1035
In 1998, the City of Homer
the legality of a zoning ordinance.
passed a zoning ordinance that permitted a certain area to be used
for businesses that sold and repaired automobiles. In an earlier
1036
case, Griswold successfully challenged the legality of a similar
ordinance, arguing that one of the council members had a conflict
of interest. After the new ordinance was passed, Griswold filed
suit again, arguing that the ordinance amounted to illegal spot
zoning. The superior court ruled that Griswold’s spot zoning claim
was precluded by the decision in Griswold I, and granted summary
judgment against him on all of his claims. The supreme court affirmed the decision on Griswold’s spot zoning claim without deciding whether the suit was precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because Griswold had failed to demonstrate that
material differences existed between this case and the precedent
1037
established in Griswold I.
In John v. United States,1038 the en banc Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in a per curiam
1039
The district court opinion was the result of a remand
opinion.
from an earlier Ninth Circuit three judge panel, which had interpreted the term “title” to limit federal protection of subsistence
fishing under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
1040
(“ANILCA”).
In Vezey v. Green,1041 the supreme court held that Green had
adversely possessed the land in question to the north, east and
south areas of the property, but remanded the case to determine
whether Green adversely possessed the land to the west of the
1042
Through an unrecorded oral gift, Green received a
property.
parcel of land. Green built a house on the land, developed certain
parts of it and was the recognized owner by several people. Over
ten years later, Vezey purchased part of the land, which included
some of the land that Green was supposedly given by gift. Green
claimed that she owned the land by adverse possession, and the su1034. 34 P.3d 1280 (Alaska 2001) (hereinafter Griswold II).
1035. Id. at 1288.
1036. Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996) (hereinafter
Griswold I).
1037. Griswold II, at 1284.
1038. 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).
1039. Id. at 1033.
1040. Id. at 1034.
1041. 35 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2001).
1042. Id. at 28.
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preme court agreed because Green had adversely possessed the
land for more then ten years, continually and exclusively used the
land as an average owner would, placed the recorded owners on
notice of her adverse possession and possessed the land as hostile
1043
However, the court only found
against the recorded owners.
proof that Green adversely possessed the land to the east, north
and south of the property in question and remanded the case to determine if she owned the land to the west through adverse posses1044
sion.
TORT LAW
In Bierria v. Dickinson Manufacturing Co.,1045 the supreme
court held that the superior court did not err when it excluded evidence about other boat fires and admitted evidence of experimen1046
Bierria sued
tal tests conducted on the allegedly defective stove.
Dickinson Manufacturing after his boat caught fire and sank, alleging that the stove manufactured by Dickinson was defective and
caused the fire. The jury concluded that the stove was defective,
but that it was not defective when it left Dickinson’s possession.
On appeal, Bierria argued that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of other boat fires related to Dickinson stoves and
admitted Dickinson’s expert testimony relating to tests of Dickinson’s stoves. The supreme court held that the causes of the other
fires Bierria wanted to introduce into evidence were different
enough from Bierria’s case and, therefore, the judge did not abuse
1047
The court also held that
his discretion in excluding the evidence.
it was not an abuse of discretion to admit Dickinson’s expert testimony because there was no evidence suggesting that the expert’s
tests “were likely to be distorted by the circumstances under which
1048
they were conducted.”
1049
In Glamann v. Kirk, the supreme court found no error in the
superior court’s decisions to admit evidence of malingering, give an
aggravating-cause jury instruction, deny the motion for a new trial
1050
Glamann’s
and disallow Glamann’s wife’s wage loss claim.
stopped truck was rear-ended by Kirk, causing Glamann’s truck to
collide with another vehicle. Glamann filed suit against Kirk for
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.

Id. at 21-23.
Id. at 28.
36 P.3d 654 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 658-59.
29 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 257.
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her negligent failure to stop. Although Kirk admitted fault in
causing the accident, she disputed the extent of her liability for the
injuries. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. First, it held that evidence of malingering was not unfairly
prejudicial, was directly relevant to credibility and causation de1051
Second,
terminations and was neither confusing nor misleading.
the aggravating-cause jury instruction was not erroneous because it
properly stated and clarified the law and allocated the burden of
1052
Third, Glamann’s motion for a new trial was properly deproof.
nied because there was sufficient evidentiary support for the verdict and there was no evidence that the special verdict caused
1053
Fourth, there was no legal basis to support a claim for
prejudice.
1054
lost wages by Glamann’s wife.
1055
In L.C.H. v. T.S., the supreme court held that T.S.’s testimony of prior sexual abuse was admissible as testimony based on
personal knowledge and that admission of expert testimony on profiles of child sexual abuse victims was proper as rebuttal testi1056
Tabitha S. filed suit against Lance H., alleging sexual
mony.
abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial,
Tabitha testified about a number of instances of inappropriate sexual conduct by Lance and others and referenced four years of diaries detailing her belief that she had been sexually assaulted. On
appeal, Lance argued that Tabitha’s testimony should not have
been admitted because it was unreliable and that the court erred in
admitting expert testimony about the typical behavior or profile of
victims of childhood sexual abuse. The supreme court held that the
superior court correctly rejected Lance’s objections to Tabitha’s
1057
The
testimony on grounds it constituted “recovered memory.”
court also held that sufficient evidence existed that Tabitha had
personal knowledge of the abuse but did not appreciate the consequences of the actions, and that her testimony was not unfairly
1058
The court also held that the expert testimony on
prejudicial.
child sexual abuse profiles satisfied the admissibility requirements
for expert testimony and that the expert testimony was properly

1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.
1058.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 262-64.
Id. at 265.
28 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id. at 920-21 (citing State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999)).

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

326

06/04/02 2:07 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:1

admitted to rebut Lance’s claim that Tabitha had fabricated the
allegations of abuse.1059
In Loncar v. Gray,1060 the supreme court affirmed the superior
1061
Loncourt’s evidentiary decisions and its denial of a new trial.
car was involved in a car accident with Gray in which Gray admitted liability, but disputed the damages attributable to the accident.
The jury awarded Loncar only half of the past medical expenses
that she entered into evidence. On appeal, Loncar first argued that
the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding her prior
medical history. The supreme court disagreed because Loncar
opened the door to issues surrounding her prior medical history by
asking her neuropsychologist questions about her prior ongoing
1062
Second, Loncar appealed the trial
symptoms and treatment.
court’s exclusion of evidence regarding her Medicare and Medicaid
benefits. The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
exclude the Medicaid evidence as part of pain and suffering damages because it opened the door to a potentially large body of evi1063
dence that would be more confusing to the jury than probative.
The supreme court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence for double recovery purposes because Loncar
did not object to the jury instruction telling the jury to award the
full amount of necessary medical expenses regardless of who actu1064
Third, the supreme court overruled Loncar’s
ally paid the bill.
claim that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her exhusband’s bias from previous divorce proceedings because the trial
1065
Fourth, the sucourt had, in fact, never excluded the evidence.
preme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit all of the
medical records of testifying physicians and the records they relied
upon, reasoning that the records of doctors who did not testify fall
within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that if
Loncar wished to question the doctors, she could have called them
1066
Finally, the denial of Loncar’s motion for a new
to the stand.
trial was affirmed because the jury had an evidentiary basis to
doubt both the causation and the extent of Loncar’s claimed in1067
jury.
1059.
1060.
1061.
1062.
1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.

Id. at 923-24.
28 P.3d 928 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 935.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935.
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In Lybrand v. Trask,1068 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Trask’s conduct was not “sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to support” a claim of inten1069
During construction on
tional infliction of emotional distress.
the Lybrand home, debris entered the Trask property. Unable to
resolve the ensuing conflict, Trask painted various biblical passages
and a message to George Lybrand on the roof of her home.
George Lybrand then sought an injunction to have the lettering
removed. In an amended complaint, Elizabeth Lybrand also
claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress damages. The
superior court held that although Lybrand had indeed suffered
emotional distress as a result of Trask’s intentional conduct, that
conduct was not outrageous enough to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The supreme court agreed,
distinguishing the case from cases “involv[ing] multiple, concerted
efforts to seriously damage the well-being and reputation of the
1070
The court also determined that the alleged violation
plaintiff.”
of a sign ordinance had no bearing on whether Trask’s conduct was
1071
outrageous.
In Lynden, Inc. v. Walker,1072 the supreme court affirmed the
denial of Lynden’s motion for summary judgment because there
was a factual dispute as to whether Lynden breached its duty to
load its materials in a way that permitted them to be unloaded
1073
Walker was permanently injured while unloading pipe
safely.
saddles from a truck loaded by Lynden. Walker sued Lynden for
negligence, claiming that Lynden’s failure to secure the loose pipe
saddles to pallets caused his accident. The superior court found
that Lynden had a duty to load the pipes safely under the Restate1074
The supreme court questioned the sument (Second) of Torts.
perior court’s rationale under the Restatement, but found that a
duty was imposed on Lynden after considering the seven factors
used to determine whether a duty should attach to particular con1075
duct. Because Walker established a factual dispute as to whether

1068. 31 P.3d 801 (Alaska 2001).
1069. Id. at 802.
1070. Id. at 804.
1071. Id. at 805.
1072. 30 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2001).
1073. Id. at 611.
1074. Id. at 613 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 391-93 (1965)).
1075. Walker, 30 P.3d at 614-16 (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1997)). The seven factors are: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
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Lynden breached its duty to load the pipe saddles so that they
could be safely unloaded, the supreme court affirmed the denial of
Lynden’s motions for summary judgment and judgment notwith1076
standing the verdict.
In Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc.,1077 the supreme court
upheld a grant of summary judgment for Dowell Schlumberger
(“Schlumberger”) because Sopko’s claim was barred by the statute
1078
In 1996, Sopko sued his former employer,
of limitations.
Schlumberger, alleging exposure to toxic chemicals. Schlumberger
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Sopko’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations. The superior court
granted the motion and, on appeal, Sopko argued that the discovery rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the prospective plaintiff “discovers, or reasonably
should discover, the existence of all elements of his cause of action,” should preclude the entry of summary judgment against
1079
The supreme court determined that Sopko reasonably
him.
should have discovered both his injury and its causation no later
1080
than September 20, 1990, nearly six years before he filed suit.
The court also rejected Sopko’s contention that his case should be
viewed as a latent injury because Sopko began suffering symptoms
1081
almost immediately. Furthermore, the court held that the statute
of limitations could not be put off until the plaintiff learns the full
1082
extent of his damages.
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
1083
In Critell v. Bingo, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s finding that Houssien’s will was invalid, but vacated and
1084
Houssien died
remanded the court’s award of attorneys fees.
leaving behind an estate worth approximately $1.59 million. Critand the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct;
(5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.
1076. Id. at 617.
1077. 21 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2001).
1078. Id. at 1267.
1079. Id. at 1270.
1080. Id. at 1271.
1081. Id.
1082. Id. at 1272.
1083. 36 P.3d 634 (Alaska 2001).
1084. Id. at 643-44.

YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC

2002]

06/04/02 2:07 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

329

tell, a friend of Houssien, petitioned the court to appoint him personal representative of her estate and to accept a will she executed
in 1995 for informal probate. Houssien’s sisters challenged Crittell’s petition. At trial, the sisters sought to establish that the will
was a fraud because Houssien lacked testamentary capacity when
she signed the will and because she acted out of undue influence as
a result of Crittell’s and his wife’s fraudulent conduct. The supreme court found that the record supported the conclusion that
Hussien lacked sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature
1085
Furthermore, the court held there was
of her testamentary act.
no clear error in the superior court’s finding of undue influence because the evidence supported the six factors used to determine the
1086
On the issue of
presence of undue influence arising from fraud.
attorneys fees, the court found the superior court’s award under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b)(2) to be in conflict with the
1087
plain language of the rule and, therefore, in plain error.
1088
In Riddell v. Edwards, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision denying a motion for jury trial in a probate
proceeding and affirmed the court’s finding that a decedent’s will
1089
Lillie M. Rahmwas invalid for lack of testamentary capacity.
Riddell (“Lillie”) executed a will in 1992 that gave half of her estate to her brother, Irvin Edwards. She met Robert Riddell in 1993
and, in the remaining four years of her life, she executed two additional wills in 1994 and 1997. Both wills were prepared by Riddell
and the 1997 version, drafted almost eight months before she died,
expressly disinherited her brother, daughter and grandchildren.
During the time that Lillie was married to Riddell, a domestic violence petition was filed against him on her behalf and he was ordered to avoid contact with her. Notwithstanding the order, Riddell found Lillie in an assisted living home in Washington, removed
her from the home and refused to tell anyone where she was until
her death in 1997. Edwards and Riddell filed competing requests
to probate the 1992 will and the 1997 will, respectively. The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Riddell’s motion for
jury trial because the Alaska Constitution preserves a jury trial
only for those causes of action which are legal, not equitable, in na1090
The supreme court also
ture, and probate matters are equitable.
held that the superior court did not err in declaring the 1997 will
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.

Id. at 641.
Id. at 642 (citing Estate of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 891-93 (Or. 1958)).
Id. at 643.
32 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2001).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7-8.
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invalid due to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence
because substantial evidence existed that Lillie was incompetent at
1091
the time she executed the 1997 will.

1091. Id. at 10.

